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1. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of standard terms in contracts is a roadblock on the road to 
reform of American contract law in the era of electronic commerce. In the 
1. The title draws on that of Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard Form 
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. 1. REv. 429 (2002). 
t Visiting Professor of Law, The Catholic University School of Law and Rutgers-Camden 
School of Law. J.D. with specialization in International Legal Affairs, Cornell 1977; L1.M., 
Georgetown 1981; Dr. jur., Ludwig Maximilians Universitlit (Munich, Germany) 1986. Formerly, as 
Vice President and Associate General Counsel of Dun & Bradstreet, the author was a business 
observer/participant in the meetings of the drafting committee of Proposed Article 2B-Licenses, which 
became the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act. He testified in favor of the act in the two 
states that have adopted it. He is a member of the American Law Institute. The views expressed here are 
entirely his own. Translations are the author's unless otherwise noted. 
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1990s the two sponsors of the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.")-the 
American Law Institute ("ALI") and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL")-decided to modernize 
Article 2 of the U.C.c., which deals with sales of goods, and to create a new 
Article 2B, to govern licensing of "computer information," i.e., information in 
electronic form, including software.2 By the end of the decade this ambitious 
project lay in shambles. In April 1999, ALI rejected Proposed Article in part 
because it did not make major changes in existing law governing standard 
terms. In July 1999 NCCUSL rejected the proposed Revised Article 2-Sales 
in part because it did seek to change existing law. This continuing controversy 
is discussed below in Part II.C. 
Standard terms are contract terms that one party formulates for use in its 
contracts generally and provides to other parties for use in their mutual 
transactions. Typically they are not negotiated but are presented to customers 
at the conclusion of bargaining over the contract's principal subject matter. 
Standard terms are often referred to pejoratively as "boilerplate." Their legal 
importance is that they alter default solutions provided by law. That is, the law 
provides one solution that applies "unless the parties agree otherwise." In 
standard terms, the parties "agree" otherwise. For example, in a standard term 
the buyer may "agree" with the seller to negate a warranty that contract law 
would otherwise imply. Standard terms are a feature of the vast majority of 
written contracts. Since only one party participates in their formulation, they 
offer opportunity for that party to introduce terms that the other might not 
willingly agree to in negotiations? In the words of a popular song, "the large 
print giveth, and the small print taketh away.,,4 
For over forty years American law has authorized courts to decline to 
enforce "unconscionable" terms. This unconscionability control is not limited 
to standard terms, although it has its principal application there. How 
necessary and how successful ·it has been is controversial. While some 
observers believe that economic self-interest largely prevents standard terms 
drafters from overreaching and that a control limited to the rare 
"unconscionable" term is sufficient,5 others complain that the current control 
is awkward at best and woefully inadequate at worst. 6 
2. ALI is the source of the noted "Restatements" of the law; it is composed of several 
thousand leading jurists. NCUSSL is responsible for most Uniform Acts and consists of several 
commissioners per state, usually appointed by the governor of the state, that represent the state. See 
Richard E. Speidel, Revising Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607, 608-09 (2001). 
3. To name a few examples: a term in a contract for new electronic equipment disclaims all 
warranties; the terms of a trial subscription to a magazine provide that if not cancelled at the end of the 
thirty-day trial, a five-year subscription will be entered; a software license provides that in no 
circumstance may the licensee transfer the program to another computer. 
4. TOM WAITS, Step Right Up, on SMALL CHANGE (Elektra Entertairunent 1976), lyrics 
available at http://www.yimpan.comlSongsitelLyric/index.asp?sid~2335.SeeWaitsv.Frito-Lay. Inc., 
978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding songwriter's claim for misappropriation of the song). 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 78 to 80. 
6. See, e.g., Bates, infra note 15, at 105 ("[A]dequate consumer protection against unfair 
terms in form contracts [is] not being provided by the American legal system"); Mark Klock, 
Unconscionability and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REv. 317, 350 (2002) (describing the 
American approach as "a complete failure when it comes to deterring unconscionable contracts"). See 
also Swanson, infra note 17, at 370. 
2003] Standard-Terms Contracting 111 
The development of infonnation in electronic fonn and of software 
(collectively, "computer infonnation") has given standard tenns new and 
increased importance. Computer infonnation contracts are hardly imaginable 
without standard tenns. Computer infonnation contracts are "licenses." The 
standard tenns of these licenses set out what the parties contracting for the 
infonnation, i.e., the licensees, may do with it. Typically these licenses limit 
the number of users the licensee may permit to use the infonnation, restrict the 
uses that the licensee may put the infonnation to, and control the circle of 
recipients to whom the licensee may distribute the infonnation. The wish for 
legal validation of standard tenns computer infonnation licenses, "shrink-
wrap" and "click-wrap" licenses,? was a major goal of the backers of the 
Unifonn Computer Infonnation Transactions Act ("UCITA"). 
Thanks to development of the Internet, standard tenns are a global issue. 
Parties from different countries meet on the Internet. They enter into online 
license agreements that govern use of Internet sites and transactions in 
computer infonnation. They reach contracts for international sales of goods 
that utilize standard tenns. As a result, standard tenns designed for use in one 
country are subject to laws for which they were not designed. Dozens oftenns 
in common use by American Internet service providers such as AOL and 
CompuServe have been struck down abroad as unlawful. Even mighty 
Microsoft has bowed to consumer associations rewriting its standard license 
for Windows 2000.8 
Ever more countries are adopting standard tenns laws. In 1993, on the 
eve of the commercialization of the Internet and just as the United States 
began revising the D.C.C., the European Union ("E.D.") introduced controls 
on standard tenns. It adopted Council Directive 93/13IEEC of April 5, 1993 
on unfair tenns in consumer contracts (hereinafter, the "Unfair Tenns 
Directive"). The directive requires Member States to have unfair tenns 
statutes that meet certain minimum standards. Those standards are more 
restrictive than American law. Other countries outside Europe have also 
adopted standard tenns statutes.9 . 
The E.D. Unfair Tenns Directive did not appear out of nowhere. Perhaps 
its most important source of inspiration was the Gennan Standard Tenns 
Statute of 1976 [Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen 
7. "Shrink-wrap" licenses are licenses printed on the packaging of software and other 
computer information delivered to licensees in tangible media (e.g., computer diskettes of some kind). 
The package is wrapped in a clear-read-through shrink-wrap plastic. The buyer of the computer 
information is deemed to have assented to the terms of the license by ripping open the shrink-wrap. 
"Click-wrap" licenses are licenses shown in electronic form or made available to users on computer 
screens to users. Before the user is permitted to use the online service or the computer program, the user 
must agree to the license terms. The user assents to the standard terms by clicking with the mouse. The 
term "click-wrap" arose by analogy to "shrink-wrap." Online licenses are typically in "click-wrap" 
form, but there is yet another form of online license that is asserted: "browse-wrap." The theory of a 
browse-wrap license is that the user is informed that use of the Internet site amounts to the user's assent 
to the site's stated terms. 
8. See infra text accompanying note 346. The same trio seems to have lost only one term to 
legal action in the United States. See Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. and America Online, 
Inc., 306 F.3d 17 (2nd Cir. 2002). 
9. See, e.g., The Consumer Contract Act [Japan 2001); Adhesion Contract Act [Korea 1986, 
amended 1992), both available in English translation at Asia Pacific Consumer Law, 
http://www.ciroap.org/apcl/index.htrnl. 
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Geschiiflsbedingungen]. 10 That statute itself seems to have had a common 
origin with present day American law. In the 1950s, just as both the u.e.e. 
and the Common Market were being launched, German and American legal 
systems were both working on new approaches to standard terms. The 
approaches in the two countries were strikingly similar. This seems to have 
been a product of a flow of ideas across the Atlantic. l1 In any case, by the 
1960s and 1970s the courts in the two countries were working to give form to 
those new rules. In Germany the courts were sufficiently successful that the 
legislature could codify the rules in a new statute, the Standard Terms Statute 
of 1976. 
Already in the 1950s when the U.C.C. was first under consideration, 
Rudolf B. Schlesinger called for a "serious study of the advantages and 
disadvantages" of the methods undertaken to control oppressive clauses in 
Europe and America. 12 Schlesinger had an essentially legislative rationale for 
his proposal-such a study would bring critical perspective to drafting 
American laws. In 1976, on the eve of adoption of the German Standard 
Terms Statute, John P. Dawson published such a study of the then existing 
German case law. He found much to admire in German law and counseled 
that "German experience can be a guide.,,!3 Two decades later, when ALI and 
NCCUSL took up revisions to the u.e.C., Professor Peter Winship reminded 
them of Schlesinger's invocation that "[t]he civilians have faced the same 
issue and resolved it with a variety of devices," and he renewed the call for a 
systematic study.14 The comparativists' call for systematic study has gone 
unheeded, even though now there is also a highly practical reason to study 
foreign standard terms law. 15 
The goal of this article is to begin at long last such systematic 
comparative studies of foreign standard terms laws from an American 
perspective. Its aims are at the same time both highly practical-facilitation of 
compliance with foreign law-and highly scientific-improved 
comprehension of the issues and approaches available to deal with standard 
terms. 
10. BGBI. IS. 3317 [hereinafter AGB-Gesetz]. See Thomas Wilhelmsson, Standard Form 
Conditions, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 255, 258 (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998); 
Carl Baudenbacher, Some Remarks on the Method of Civil Law, 34 TEX. INT'L LJ. 333, 341 (1999). 
II. See infra text accompanying notes 37-42, 197. 
12. RudolfB. Schlesinger, The Uniform Commercial Code in the Light of Comparative Law, 
1 INTER-AM. L. REv. 11,33 (1959). Schlesinger's article first appeared in a government document in 
1955. !d. at 11. 
13. John P. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REv. 
1041, 1125 (1976). 
14. Peter Winship, As the World Turns: Revisiting Rudolf Schlesinger's Study of the Uniform 
Commercial Code "In the Light of Comparative Law," 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1143, 1156-58 (1996). 
15. There is no study in American legal literature of the E.U.'s Unfair Terms Directive and no 
study based on primary sources of German Standard Terms law since Dawson's study made before the 
German statute was adopted. The closest article there is to such a study is Larry Bates's recently 
published work, Administrative Regulation of Terms in Form Contracts: A Comparative Analysis of 
Consumer Protection, 16 EMORY INT'L L. REv. I, (2002) (surveying law in Germany, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom before the directive, as well as the law of Israel, for models for American law). 
Unfortunately, Professor Bates's article does not treat the Unfair Terms Directive, and for its discussion 
of German standard terms law, the article relies exclusively on secondary, English-language sources 
published more than fifteen years ago. 
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This article examines American, European Union, and German law. It 
considers not only current law, but significant aspects of the development of 
these bodies of law. Awareness of the latter furthers understanding of the 
former. Part II sets out general issues involved in standard terms laws and 
summarizes American law. It notes the possible origin of American concepts 
in Europe and examines standard terms in the struggle over revision of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Part III looks at the law of the European Union 
and its origin in the consumer movement. Part IV considers in detail the law 
of one Member State as an example, that of Germany.16 Finally, the 
conclusion summarizes the results of the examination and notes insights into 
American practice that European experiences suggest. 
II. AMERICAN LAW 
Part II first examines standard terms in contracts as a general issue. It 
then summarizes standard terms in American law17 and notes the possible 
origins of the American law in the German law of the day. Finally, it 
examines the treatment of standard terms in the reform of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
A. Standard Terms Generally as a Legal Problem 
Standard terms have been used for well over a century. The issues 
involved in their use have long been known. Contract law in Western 
countries is based on the principle of freedom of contract. Thus, to varying 
extents, but generally as much as is widely acceptable in anyone system, 
contract law is default law. That is, it is law that applies unless the parties 
agree otherwise. 
The nineteenth century brought not only mass production, but also mass 
distribution, and with mass distribution, form contracts. In form contracts the 
party supplying a product or service (referred to here as "user") spells out the 
terms on which the party does business and which it expects the other party to 
accept (referred to here often as the "other party"). Standard terms permit 
suppliers to rationalize their offerings, to control their agents, and to avoid 
wasting time negotiating terms that they are not prepared to vary. Standard 
terms can provide answers to questions on which the law is silent. 18 Yet just 
16. See infra text accompanying note 197. 
17. A comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this article. For recent fuller examinations 
of standard tenns in American law, see E. ALAN FARNSWORTII, CONTRACTS § 4.28 (3d ed. 1999); W. 
DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH-CENTURY REFORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 142 
(1996); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 151-77 (5th ed. 2000); 
Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1; Carol B. Swanson, Unconscionable Quandary: u.c.c. Article 2 
and the Unconscionability Doctrine, 31 N.M. L. REv. 359, 367 (2001). For a listing of still others, see 
Bates, supra note 15, at 2 n.2, 14 n.38 (2002). 
18. For discussions of the costs and benefits of enforcing standard fonns, see Hein Katz, 
Welche gesetzgeberischen Maftnahmen empfehlen sich zum Schutze des Endverbrauchers gegenuber 
Allgemeinen Geschiiftsbedingungen und Formularvertriigen?, in 1 VERHANDLUNGEN DES FONFZIGSTEN 
DEUTSCHEN JuruSTENTAGES, A9, A21-A25 (1974); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 437-41 
(2002). Standard tenns make up standard fonn contracts. Standard fonn contracts are themselves 
sometimes called contracts of adhesion. 
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as fonn contracts provide benefits, so too, they produce problems. Karl N. 
Llewellyn observed that users of standard tenns may "turn[] out a fonn of 
contract which resolves all questions in advance in favor of the one party.,,19 
What controls, if any, should a legal system place on such tenns? 
In contract law, tenns become parts of contracts because parties assent 
to them. Typically where standard tenns are used, however, parties are asked 
to submit to them unread or, if read, not necessarily understood.20 Moreover, 
when parties do read and understand standard tenns and object to them, the 
parties imposing them may refuse any alteration. Where standard tenns are 
inalterable, parties asked to "agree" to the tenns in some instances will have 
no easy alternatives other than to submit. That is most obviously the case 
where the supplier has a monopoly or where all other suppliers use the same 
tenns. But practically-at least in smaller matters-it may also be the case 
where the inconvenience of seeking out alternatives is disproportionate to the 
dangers involved in accepting the tenns. Users of standard tenns act in their 
own interests.21 Ask in house counsels to speak candidly and they will 
acknowledge, as one general counsel advised senior management of a Fortune 
500 company, that "[t]he purpose of fonn contracts is primarily to protect the 
needs of our [internal] clients, not to protect the interests of our customers.,,22 
But when users provide tenns in their own self-interest, and parties submitting 
to them do not read them or have no choice but to accept them, possibilities 
for abuse arise. 
Recognition that contract law should provide some measure of 
protection against overreaching in contract tenns is near universal in modem 
legal systems.23 Comparative law questions relate to how different legal 
systems perceive and define the problem and how they seek to resolve it. 24 
Perceptions of the problem mostly lie between two points of view. One view 
sees the issue as a contract law question of how the general contract law 
requirement of assent applies to standard tenns; the other view sees the 
problem as an issue of protection of weaker parties to contracts. Actions taken 
to resolve the problem tend to address one or both of two principal questions. 
One question is whether and what fonnal or procedural requirements should 
detennine whether tenns become parts of contracts (referred to here as 
"incorporation control"). The other question is whether and how the content or 
19. Karl N. Llewellyn, Contract-Institutional Aspects, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES 329,335 (Edwin R.A. Seligman ed., 1931). 
20. For a discussion of the economic, social, and cognitive reasons parties do not read forms, 
see Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note I, at 445-54. 
21. While users are usually suppliers, sometimes they are customers, particularly large ones. 
They also may be trade associations or even government bodies. They frequently seek to transfer all 
risks to the other parties. See K6tz, supra note 18, at A26-A29 (rejecting the argument that the risk 
transfer produces lower prices). 
22. This quotation is from a company internal communication on file with the author. While 
this might seem obvious to a lawyer, it is not always obvious to laymen. The author had the in house 
lawyer's nightmare come true: an internal client used the company form when the company was, 
exceptionally, on the other side of the transaction. 
23. See 1 HEIN K6TZ & AxEL FLESSNER, EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 138 (Tony Weir trans. 
1997); KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN K6TZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 333 (Tony Weir trans., 
3d ed. 1998) 
24. This article is concerned only with overreaching through use of standard terms and not 
with other issues of overreaching, such as duress. 
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substance of tenns should be subject to control (referred to here as "content 
control"). All of these concepts are found in American law. 
B. . American Approaches to Standard Terms, Especially in the U. C. C. 
American treatments of standard tenns have been dominated for over 
forty years by concepts identified with Llewellyn: "unconscionability" and 
"blanket assent." Llewellyn's influence is pervasive to this day.25 As the 
leading commercial law scholar of the mid-twentieth century, principal 
architect of the U.C.C., and Reporter for Article 2, Llewellyn drafted section 
2-302 of the U.C.C. It pennits, but does not require, a court to decline to 
enforce a tenn that it finds "unconscionable.,,26 While a precursor of section 
2-302 drafted in the early 1940s applied only to standard tenns,27 section 2-
302 is not limited to controlling standard tenns. It applies to transactions 
between merchants as well as to transactions with consumers. Section 2-302 
first became law in 1954 when Pennsylvania became the first state to adopt 
the u.C.C.; in the 1960s it became law throughout the land,zs Llewellyn 
considered the section to be "perhaps the most valuable section in the entire 
Code.,,29 Subject to much discussion3o and criticism from the beginning, 
section 2-302 has never been amended. It almost certainly will remain 
essentially unchanged for the foreseeable future. 3 ! 
25. See, e.g .. FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 4.26, at 301-02 (highlighting Llewellyn's name 
in the margin); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note I (in which Llewellyn's name appears 34 times). Cf 
Dawson, supra note 13, at 1117. 
26. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2002) provides: 
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been 
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it 
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may 
so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable 
result. 
Official Comment 1 elaborates: 
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly against the 
contracts or clauses which they fmd to be unconscionable. In the past such policing has 
been accomplished by adverse construction of language, by manipulation of the rules of 
offer and acceptance or by determinations that the clause is contrary to public policy or to 
the dominant purpose of the contract. The section is intended to allow the court to pass 
directly on the unconscionability of the contract or particular clause therein and to make a 
conclusion oflaw as to its unconscionability. The basic test is whether, in the light of the 
general commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, 
the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances 
existing at the time of the making of the contract. Subsection (2) makes it clear that it is 
proper for the court to hear evidence upon these questions. The principle is one of the 
prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks 
because of superior bargaining power. /d. (internal citations omitted). 
See also Kiitz, supra note 18, at A49 (discussing the virtues of an open control of content in German 
law). 
27. Allen R. Kamp, Uptown Act: A History of the Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-49, 51 
SMU L. REv. 275, 299-302, 306-14, 334-36 (1998) (quoting the provision); see also Arthur Allen Leff, 
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 509-10 (1967) 
(quoting the provision). 
28. The history of the drafting of section 2-302 is set out in Leff, supra note 27, at 489-501, 
509-16. 
29. FARNSWORTI!, supra note 17, § 4.28, at 307, citing New York Law Revision Commission, 
Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code at 121 (1954). 
30. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 365 (4th ed. 1998). 
31. If the ALI Membership adopts the NCCUSL-ALI post-1999 compromise, already 
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Section 2-302 was not Llewellyn's last word on the subject. In the 1960s 
he introduced the concept of "blanket assent" to explain what happens in 
standard fonn contracts. He denied that there is assent to all the tenns of a 
standard fonn contract. Assent, he argued, applies only to the few "dickered" 
tenns, the broad type of the transaction, and "a blanket assent (not a specific 
assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent tenns the seller may have on his 
fonn, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered 
tenns.,,32 The idea is said to dominate American treatment of standard fonns. 33 
From this base the United States has dealt with standard tenns. Court 
decisions and scholarship-there has been no legislation as such34-have built 
on this base, seeking to make sense of it, and working to make it effective. 
Competing or perhaps better described as complementary approaches, i.e., the 
doctrines of "reasonable expectations" and a somewhat similar scheme used in 
the Restatement of Contracts, have sought favor. The efforts have not been 
universally regarded as successful.35 
Llewellyn considered the authority bestowed on courts by section 2-302 
to be novel in American law.36 Comparative law scholars believe that 
Llewellyn drew his inspiration for section 2-302 from the practice of 
controlling standard tenns in Gennany under the general clauses of the 
Gennan Civil Code.37 Although in the latter part of his life Llewellyn 
approved by both NCCUSL and by the ALI Council, see Report of ALI Council Consideration of 
U.C.C. Projects, available at http://www.ali.org/forum4/ALIReport_LiebmanI002.htm (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2002), the only change will be to substitute the word "term" for the word "clause." See 
American Law Institute, Uniform Commercial Code-Proposed Amendments to Article 2. Sales & 
Proposed Amendments to Article 2A. Leases-Council Draft No.2 (October 8, 2002) § 2-302 (2002). If 
that draft is defeated, which seems unlikely, there will be no change at all. 
32. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LA W TRADITION-DECIDING ApPEALS 370 (1960). 
33. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 461. See also MARTIN MUNZ, ALLGEMEINE 
GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN IN DEN USA UND DEUTSCHLAND 1M HANDELSVERKEHR 70 (1992). 
34. At least there has been no general legislation. There have been consumer protection laws 
that affect standard terms in certain types of contracts and sectors. 
35. See, e.g., Bates, supra note 15, at 2 n.2, 14 n.40 (concluding that there is an "absence of 
any sort of consensus among legal commentators" and "[t]he case law is full of inconsistencies, 
contradictions, and lacks any sort of unifying theme"); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 434 
(noting that "[t]he doctrine governing contract enforcement has long been criticized as vague, ill-
defined, and easily muddled"). 
36. This is clear from the official comment, quoted in supra note 26. Cf FARNSWORTH, supra 
note 17, § 4.28, at 307 (calling it "one of the [U.C.C.'s] most innovative sections"). 
37. RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-MATERIALS 20-21 
(6th ed. 1998); JUTTA KLAPISCH, DER EINFLUB DER DEUTSCHEN UND OSTERREICHISCHEN EMIGRANTEN 
AUF CONTRACTS OF ADHESION UND BARGAINING IN GoOD FAITH 1M US-AMERIKANISCHEN RECHT 66 
(1991) (citing views of Eike von Hippel). The inspirational sections would be Section 138 (prohibiting 
sittenwidrige transactions, i.e., those against good morals), and Section 242 (requiring Treu und 
Glauben, i.e., "good faith" in carrying out contracts). But not everyone sees its origin in German law. 
See, e.g., Kamp, supra note 27, at 299-302, 306-14, 334-36 (1998) (discussing origin of Section 2-302 
with no mention of a German connection). Those who see the origin elsewhere find it in the practice of 
the courts of equity. The concept of unconscionability is said to have "deep roots in law and equity." See 
CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 9.38, at 366. But see United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
315 U.S. 289, 300 (1942) (suggesting skepticism in referring to an "asserted doctrine of 
unconscionability"). What mix of influences may have directed Llewellyn's drafting of § 2-302 may 
never be known, but that the German Civil Code was a direct influence on him is generally believed. See 
E. Allan Farnsworth, Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Under the UNIDROIT Principles, Relevant 
International Conventions, and National Laws, 3 TuL. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 47, 52 (1995) (noting that the 
obligation of good faith in U.C.C. Section 1-304, former Section 1-203, comes directly from Section 242 
of the German Civil Code). 
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preferred to downplay, if not conceal, the importance of foreign ideas on his 
thinking/8 his familiarity with the German legal system is now well known.39 
While from New York City, Llewellyn graduated from high school in 
Germany and he spoke German fluently. In the 1920s and early 1930s, he 
spent two years in Leipzig as a visiting professor and published one of his 
most important jurisprudential works there.4o His knowledge of the pre-War 
practice of standard terms control is obvious from his review of the first 
comparative book on the topic in which he stated some of his thoughts on the 
subject.41 Just as he may have drawn on German law in drafting section 2-302, 
Llewellyn may also have drawn inspiration for his idea of blanket assent from 
German practice in the 1950s.42 
Section 2-302 on unconscionability is the principal American.treatment 
of standard terms. Even where it is not directly applicable-because a 
transaction does not involve a sale of goods-its approach is often followed, 
either explicitly or sub silentio.43 Section 2-302 is not limited to standard 
38. See SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 37, at 21. Riesenfeld reports the counsel that 
Llewellyn gave him immediately upon his arrival in the United States: 
Another piece of advice impressed me even more. He mentioned the failure of courses in 
comparative law and told me never to reveal when I relied on an idea coming from continental 
Europe, because that would be the 'kiss of death,' again reiterating that admonition three times 
over so that it would sink in as it did. 
Stefen A. Riesenfeld, Reminiscences of Karl Llewellyn, in RECHTSREALISMUS, MULTIKULTURELLE 
GESELLSCHAIT UND HANDELSRACHT: KARL N. LLEWELLYN UND SEINE BEDEUTUNG HEUTE 11, 14 
(Ulrich Drobnig & Manfred Rehbinder eds., 1994). 
39. See Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 705 (1992); Paul D. 
Carrington, Der Einflu/3 kontinentalen Rechts auf Juristen und Rechtskultur der USA 1776-1933 JZ 
[JURISTENZEITUNG] 529, 537; Ulrich Drobnig, Llewellyn and Germany, in RECHTSREALISMUS, supra 
note 38, at 17; Shael Hennan, Llewellyn the Civilian: Speculations on the Contribution of Continental 
Experience to the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 TuL. L. REv. 1125, 1128 (1982); Riesenfeld, supra 
note 38, at 15 ("Llewellyn was intimately acquainted with Gennan doctrinal developments."); James 
Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156 (1987). A close connection remained to the end of his life. 
When he died in 1962 Llewellyn was working on a set of lectures to deliver in Gennany that were to 
give a "comprehensive picture of his thought" such as he had never before given. WILLIAM TWINING, 
KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT viii (1973). 
40. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, PRAJUDIZIENRECHT UND RECHTSPRECHUNG IN AMERIKA (1933), 
translated as THE CASE LA W SYSTEM IN AMERICA (M. Ansaldi trans., 1989). 
41. Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REv. 700 (1939) (reviewing OTTO 
PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW 
(1937». Dawson observed that the "main object" of the book was to describe Gennan practice on 
standardized fonn contracts. Dawson, supra note 13, at 1117-23. 
42. Dawson hints at such an inspiration. Compare Dawson, supra note 13, at 1108 (noting 
Gennan Supreme Court Judgment of March 8, 1955) with id. at 1118 ("[E]ven a brief summary [of 
Llewellyn's 1960 argument] should suggest how closely it parallels the basic elements in the thinking of 
Gennan courts and scholars." Nor did the influence of Gennan law on American treatment of fonn 
agreements stop with Llewellyn. Emigre Gennan scholars, particularly Friedrich Kessler and Albert 
Ehrenzweig, had a substantial influence. See GOTTFRIED RAISER, DIE GERICHTLICHE KONTROLLE VON 
FORMULARBEDINGUNGEN 1M AMERIKANISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN RECHT 12 n.65 (1966); KLAPISCH, 
supra note 37, at 55-110; Jerome Frank, Civil Law Influences on the Common Law-Some Reflections 
on "Comparative" and "Contrastive" Law, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 887, 889 (1956); RudolfB. Schlesinger, 
supra note 12, at 32 n.54. 
43. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 9.39, at 370; FARNSWORTH, supra note 17, § 
4.28, at 308; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-2, at 153. See also Gillman v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, N.A., 534 N.E.2d 824, 828 (N.Y. 1988) (applying § 2-302 unconscionability analysis to non-
Article 2 transaction); Gonzalez v. A-I Self-Storage, Inc. 795 A.2d 885, 888 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2000) 
(applying § 2-302 unconscionability analysis to non-U.C.C. transaction and commenting on role of 2-
302 generally). Cf SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 142 (noting that when courts adopted unconscionability, 
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terms, but applies to all contract terms, including separately negotiated terms. 
In practice, however, most cases in recent times involve standard terms.44 
Review of standard terms is not limited to anyone class of contracting parties, 
e.g., consumers, but applies generally to all parties. Cases applying section 2-
302 in practice often involve businesses,4s although businesses are said to 
have little success except in cases of procedural unconscionability.46 
Section 2-302 is a general clause, essentially authorizing courts to 
review contract terms. It provides little direction and is not backed up by any 
list of unconscionable terms. The question is a legal one for the court, but 
requires taking evidence on the term's "commercial setting, purpose and 
effect.,,47 Unconscionability determinations are "fact-sensitive" and are made 
on a "case-by-case basis.,,48 Although section 2-302 does not distinguish 
between incorporating standard terms into contracts and controlling the 
contents of those terms, the Official Comment seems to suggest, when it 
references 0p.pression and unfair surprise, that the section is concerned with 
both issues. Notwithstanding the absence of a clear statutory mandate, 
commentary and case decisions under 2-302 distinguish between "procedural 
unconscionability" and "substantive unconscionability."so That pair of terms 
corresponds to incorporation control and content control, respectively. 
Procedural unconscionability is concerned with how the parties reached 
agreement and which terms are part of it, i.e., the contract documents, their 
legibility and comprehensibility, etc. Substantive unconscionability relates to 
the promises actually made in the terms themselves, e.g., liability disclaimers. 
Since section 2-302 has no explicit control on incorporation of terms, 
courts have derived a control from the general prohibition of 
unconscionability. Perhaps as a result, they are disinclined to invalidate terms 
"they were not changing the common law to be like Article 2-they were making the common law and 
the law of the article simultaneously"}. 
44. SINAI DEUTCH, UNFAIR CONTRACTS: THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY 24 n.l 
(1977) (reporting one non-standard term case out of 160); SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 142 (reporting 
"not one" case out of "thousands" involving a non-standard term). In the earliest days of the Section, 
many cases are said to have involved excessive prices, which obviously are not standard terms. Those 
cases, however, are said to have dwindled to a "trickle." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-6, at 
163. 
45. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, at 371; SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 143 (1996) 
(reporting "[a]t least 40 percent of the parties seeking the protections of unconscionability in the 
reported cases have been business consumers since 1990"). 
46. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-9, at 176. But see SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 143 
(noting that it is applied to both "without distinction"). 
47. U.C.C. § 2-302(2}. 
48. Forsyth v. BancBoston Mortgage Corp., 135 F.3d 1069, 1074 (6th Cir. 1997). Accord, 
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-3, at 156 ("It is not possible to define unconscionability. It is not 
a concept, but a determination to be made in light of a variety of factors not unifiable into a formula."). 
Dawson also emphasized the general character of the Section 2-302 test. See Dawson, supra note 13, at 
1042 (noting that "[a]1I will agree that by any test Section 2-302 is a general clause"). 
49. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 9.37, at 366, § 9.40, at 373. The Comment is 
quoted supra note 26. 
50. Formative for the American discussion is Leff, supra note 27. See also Hillman & 
Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 456-58 (discussing unconscionability and the importance of Leffs 
argument). Views ofLeffs article are disparate. According to one view, it is one of the twenty-two most 
influential law review pieces published between 1965 and 1985. Robert C. Berring & Sally Gunderson, 
Preface to 3 GREAT AMERICAN LAW REVIEWS 1, 1-3 (Robert C. Berring & Sally Gunderson eds.,1990). 
Dawson thought it, of the many articles on U.C.C. unconscionability, "the silliest of them all." Dawson, 
supra note 13, at 1041 n.l. 
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on this ground alone, except in cases of essential goods or services and 
monopoly-like situations.5l They commonly require that both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability be present, employing what has been called a 
"sliding scale" that allows taking into account both elements. 52 They are 
reluctant to invalidate a term based on substantive unconscionability alone.53 
A most peculiar result follows from this: a clever user need only make sure 
that the other party knows of the term's existence. A party who knows what 
he or she is agreeing to cannot later complain that it is unconscionable. 54 
American law imposes on that party a duty to read which is said to enshrine 
the writing as "sacrosanct" and make it "impregnable.,,55 
The unconscionability standard of section 2-302 conjures up a picture of 
Simon Legree demanding the debtor's first-born child to guarantee 
performance. 56 It seems to have been meant to impose a hurdle higher than 
unfairness. 57 The Official Comment says that Section 2-302 is not designed to 
adjust for imbalances in bargaining power in order to protect weaker parties. 
Thus it would seem to be more concerned with the bargain that is struck than 
with the respective strengths and weaknesses of the parties. 58 Although some 
51. See V.C.C. [New) Revised art. 2. Sales § 2-302, Comment I, at 34-35 (Council Draft No. 
I) (Oct. 5, 2000) (noting that courts "should seldom invalidate a contract, or a term of a contract, that is 
not substantively unconscionable solely on the basis of one party's conduct," but "generally" should 
require both "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionability); Swanson, supra note 22, at 365, 393-95. 
52. E.g., Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting and Engineering, Inc., 107 Cal. 
Rptr. 645, 656 (2001). See SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 57; Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note I, at 457; 
Swanson, supra note 22, at 367, 393-95. 
53. Swanson, supra note 17, at 368. See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-7, at 
169. 
54. See, e.g., Eller v. Nationsbank of Texas, 975 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Tex. App. 1998) 
(upholding a term absolving bank of all liability for loss to safe deposit box content, noting "[h]aving 
signed it, she is bound by its terms"). But see WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-7, at 169 (noting 
that courts have yet to give an answer to this question). Murray notes that in American contract law, 
"[t]he overriding reluctance to excuse a party from the terms of a record he has signed continues as a 
brooding omnipresence." John E. Murray, Jr., The Emerging Article 2: The Latest Iteration, 35 DUQ. L. 
REv. 533, 565 (1997). It is especially strong in a business context, even where the signer cannot read the 
language of the document. See, e.g., MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Cermanica Nuova 
d'Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 1386 n.5 (11th Cir. 1998) ("We find it nothing short of astounding 
that an individual, purportedly experienced in commercial matters, would sign a contract in a foreign 
language and expect not to be bound simply because he could not comprehend its terms."). But under 
German law, the contract partner ordinarily will be deemed to have accepted foreign language standard 
terms only if they are in the language in which contract negotiations took place. Schmidt in 
VLMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ ZUR REGELUNG DES RECHTS DER 
ALLGEMEINEN GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN 277 (9th ed. 2001) [hereinafter ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, 
AGB-GESETZ]. Speidel, long before he became Reporter for Revised Article 2, argued against ''writ[ing] 
off the individual consumer who should have reasonably understood that a risk was allocated to him." 
Richard E. Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 359, 364 
(1970). He called for eliminating any requirement of assent for consumers and testing consumer general 
terms only against "oppression." !d. at 374-75. Cf WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-7, at 169 
("Courts probably delude themselves when they assume that the prominence of a printed clause brings it 
to the buyer's attention and thus gives buyer a more 'meaningful choice. "'). 
55. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 9.45, at 390. 
56. Cf WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-3, at 156 (giving as an example, "I have the 
right to cut off one of your child's fingers for each day you are in default"). 
57. See, e.g., Smith v. Professional Claims, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1280 (M.D. AI. 1998) 
(noting that "the doctrine of unconscionability is reserved for egregious cases"). Cf WHITE & SUMMERS, 
supra note 17, § 4-2, at 154 ("gross advantage-taking"). 
58. But see MUNZ, supra note 33, at 225-26 (arguing that the goal of American law is to 
create a fictitious equality of the parties). 
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courts have attempted to give a more concrete definition to unconscionability 
~ , 
no generally accepted tests have emerged. The cases are said to be too fact 
specific to lead to a useful body of case precedent. 60 
Two alternative tests have been proposed: that of Restatement section 
211 61 and that of "reasonable expectations." Under Restatement section 
211 (3), "Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting 
such assent would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular 
term, the term is not part of the agreement." The Restatement test has not been 
frequently applied. A few years ago one review found only forty-three 
reported decisions applying this, test, of which twenty-five came from 
Arizona.62 As this provision has been applied, courts have focused on the 
expectation of the party manifesting assent rather than the drafter of the terms, 
notwithstanding that the language suggests a contrary focus. 63 This has 
resulted in the Restatement test becoming more like the "reasonable 
expectations" test. 64 
The reasonable expectations test invalidates a term that lies outside what 
a party might reasonably expect. The reasonable expectations test has been 
applied mostly to insurance contracts, particularly where the fine print negated 
the insured's purpose in acquiring the insurance.65 Both the Restatement and 
reasonable expectations tests look to the expectations and intentions of the 
particular parties to the transaction.66 
In important respects all three approaches are similar as applied. They 
provide general clauses with somewhat different tests, They do not provide 
separate regimens for incorporating terms into contracts, They do not give 
specific types of objectionable terms. Their focus is on the individual parties 
and is case-specific. They do not develop abstract and generalizing rules. 
They are all said to follow Llewellyn'S concept of "blanket assent" which is 
said to be "best understood to mean that, although consumers do not read 
(1997). 
59. Swanson, supra note 17, at 366. 
60. SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 57. 
61. RilsTA TEMENT § 211 reads in full: 
§ 211 Standardized Agreements 
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or otherwise 
manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly 
used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an 
integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing. 
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly 
situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of the 
writing. 
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent 
would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a partiCUlar term, the term is not 
part of the agreement. 
62. James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2,75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315, 324-25 
63. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note I, at 459. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. But the Restatement test "seems to be suggesting a new kind of objective approach to 
standardized agreements. Rather than seeking out true assent on a case by case basis, it places the duty 
on the courts to consider the essential fairness of the printed terms, both from the viewpoint of surprise 
and inherent one-sidedness." CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 9.45, at 391. Had American 
contract law gone in that direction, it would be similar to the contract model of German law. See infra 
Part IV.B. 
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standard terms, so long as their formal presentation and substance are 
reasonable, consumers comprehend the existence of the terms and agree to be 
bound to them. ,,67 
Section 2-302 provides only one mechanism for dealing with 
unconscionable terms: a court may choose not to enforce them. That 
mechanism, of course, assumes that the user seeks to enforce the 
unconscionable term. Section 2-302 makes no provision for damages, 
injunctive, or declaratory relief. It provides no authorization for proactive 
action by an administrative or other public law body. It is the same for both 
the Restatement and the reasonable expectations tests. As a result of the 
method of enforcement, use of unconscionable terms is practically a no-risk 
proposition. If one party uses the term and the other party does nothing, one 
wins. If the other party has the wherewithal to challenge the term, if the 
challenge is unsuccessful, the party using the term wins. If, on the other hand, 
the party challenging the term wins, the user is no worse off than if he or she 
had never used the term at all. He or she can now redraft the term in slightly 
different language and use it again.68 
Unconscionability, in any case, has proven to be a hard standard to meet: 
only a small handful of cases-according to one count, just fourteen in one 
ten-year period-did.69 Judge Posner noted some years ago that Indiana was 
"so unfriendly to the defense of unconscionability" that in more than twenty 
years there was only one reported case where it was accepted: a clause, 
untitled, in fine print, whereby a high school drop-out guaranteed a 
multinational oil company against the consequences of its own negligence.7o 
So how is the American approach of unconscionability judged? A 
current consumers' guide published by the American Bar Association 
concludes in typical telegraphic text that th~ rule's application is "uncommon, 
uneven, and unpredictable.,,71 Most scholarly commentators would probably 
agree. Standard works on contracts72 and studies of unconscionability suggest 
as much. 73 Section 2-302 is extremely difficult to defend as a working rule 
and hardly anyone does. 
67. Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 461. 
68. SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 143. Of course, the careful user in the occasional challenge 
case will settle that case so as not to risk an adverse decision on the term that might hinder its future use. 
See Swanson, supra note 17, at 387. For a discussion of the infirmities of enforcement through litigation, 
see Bates, supra note 15, at 6-7,18-28. 
69. U.C.C. Revised art. 2, § 2-105 (Discussion Draft 1997). The actual number of cases is 
debated, but the fact that the number is in the tens or hundreds rather than in thousands or higher seems 
clear. 
70. Amoco Oil Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 522-23 (7th Cir. 1985). 
71. ABA Guide to Consumer Law, Chapter 3, 
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/practicallbooks/consumer/home.html(last visited Dec. 15,2002). 
72. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 30, § 9.45 (finding inconsistency in which theory 
should be applied, and a lack of uniformity in the results reached in similar cases); FARNSWORTH, supra 
note 17, § 4.28 ("[That] the term is incapable of precise definition is a source of both strength and 
weakness."); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 17, § 4-3, at 155 (noting that the test of unconscionability 
is "nearly useless"). 
73. See, e.g., Bates, supra note IS, at 14 n.40 ("The case law is full of inconsistencies, 
contradictions, and lacks any sort of unifying theme."); Swanson, supra note 17, at 386 ("Athough the 
commentary is mixed, most is negative, and the volume of discontent alone signals a desire for 
change-for improvement. The most common criticisms stem from the amorphous nature of the 
doctrine .... "). See also John E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. PIIT. L. REv. 
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Instead of admiring how well it works, supporters of section 2-302 
emphasize that alternatives are likely to be worse. When section 2-302 
originated, it was subject to much controversy. There was much fear that it 
would disrupt the commercial world. Llewellyn surely did not have disruption 
in mind when he proposed section 2-302, but, just as surely, he did hope that 
section 2-302 would lead to judicial development of a "machinery for striking 
down,,74 improper terms that would permit courts to "police explicitly against 
the contracts or terms which they find to be unconscionable.,,75 The feared 
disruption has not occurred.76 But the cost has been that the provision is rarely 
enforced and has little effect on actual business practice.77 
Advocates of the "alternatives-would-be-worse" approach fall into two 
basic camps that might be characterized as optimists and pessimists. Optimists 
like the present law. Some believe that there is no problem78 or that the market 
sufficiently discourages opportunism in standard terms. 79 Others feel that 
section 2-302, with all its warts, works pretty well. 8o Pessimists, on the other 
hand, concede that section 2-302 does not work well. But they doubt that there 
is any way to improve on it. They are resigned to a less than satisfactory law. 
Typically they are inclined to continue with judicial development of 
. b'l' 81 unconsclOna Ilty. 
The defenses of section 2-302 are less than satisfying. If oppressive 
terms are not a problem, then why not simply dispense with the section 
1, 2 (1969) ("The existing case law is not helpful with rare exception-the writers have done little 
beyond deplore the Delphic nature ofthe concept or the codification thereof."). 
74. LLEWELLYN, supra note 32, at 369-70. Cf Murray, supra note 37, at 38. 
75. U.C.C. § 2-302 (Official Comment 1) (2002). 
76. This was already noted in 1970. See Robert Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or 
Term, 31 U. PITT. L. REv. 337, 345 (1970) ("Conservatism in the application of section 2-302, together 
with refusal to give it punitive or penal effect, have kept it from having any noticeably disruptive effect 
on the commercial world."). 
77. See, e.g., SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 143; see also Eben Colby, Note, What Did the 
Doctrine of Unconscionability Do to the Walker Thomas Furniture Company?, 34 CONN. L. REv. 625 
(2002) (reviewing a famous unconscionability case and its impact on the party to it). 
78. See, e.g., Letter from Professor Randy E. Barnett, Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston 
University School of Law, to Lawrence 1. Bugge, Chairman, Article 2 Drafting Committee (Mar. 9, 
1999) at 1, 2, quoted in Holly K. Towle, Mass Market Transactions in the Uniform Computer 
Information Transactions Act, 38 DUQ. L. REv. 371, 403 (2000) ("There is no great reservoir of 
problematic cases in which consumers have been victimized in ways that are not currently redressed by 
2-302. I searched hard for such cases to include in my casebook ... but to no avail. The seas were 
relatively tranquil. .. .It is an attempt to fix something that is not broken, with the effect of harming both 
consumers and sellers in the process."). 
79. See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1. See also Robert A. Hillman, Debunking 
Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U. C. C. Section 2-302, 67 CORNELL L. 
REv. 1,25 (1981). 
80. See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 461 ("The current bundle of judicial 
approaches to policing paper-form contracts reflects Llewellyn's vision and provides a workable 
solution to the issues raised by paper standard forms."); Swanson, supra note 17, at 399 ("As for 
substantive content, the current Section 2-302 adequately serves its underlying purposes .... Despite all 
the fuss, the more things change, the more they remain the same-and that is not a bad result here."); 
White, supra note 62. 
81. See, e.g., John E. Murray, Jr. & Harry M. Flechtner, The Summer, 1999 Draft of Revised 
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: What Hath NCCUSL Rejected?, 19 J.L. & COM. 1,40 
(1999) ("There is no escape from such a necessarily fluid and vague standard."); Murray, supra note 73, 
at 38 ("any statute is at best dubious, uncertain, awkward, deficient or spotty") (paraphrasing 
LLEWELLYN, supra note 32, at 370); SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 144, 174 ; William J. Woodward, Jr., 
Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 WIS. L. REv. 971, 1004 (2001). 
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altogether? Nearly everyone recognizes that application of section 2-302 does 
not work well. But if standard terms are a problem, then why not do 
something meaningful about them? There is no apparent reason why one 
should believe that a law that is rarely applied and that has little sanction when 
it is applied much affects business behavior. Advocates of the status quo insist 
upon "hard statistical data" to justify revision.82 Perhaps they should present 
data supporting the status quo. One need not look far to see that section 2-302 
has invalidated only a tiny number of standard terms. An examination of cases 
illustrates that even the variety of terms subject to the section is limited. 
Nevertheless, empirical research into what terms businesses actually use 
would be welcome. 
Mixed judgments of section 2-302 are not limited to the scholarly 
community. A split in public perception became apparent in the course of the 
reform of the V.C.C. Then consumer groups largely opposed section 2-302 
unconscionability while business interests generally supported it.83 
C. The U. C. C. Reform Debacle84 
By the late 1980s the V.C.C. seemed middle-aged. Article 2 appeared to 
need change. Since it had been drafted in the 1940s, it had no provision for 
software or other forms of computer information. An official study 
commission created in 1988 recommended that a drafting committee be 
appointed to propose revisions to Article 2. A committee was appointed and 
began meeting in 1992.85 
As originally conceived, Revised Article 2 was to include both the 
existing law of sales of goods and new law for licensing computer 
information. It was to accomplish this through an approach known as "hub-
and-spoke." Matters common to both types of transactions were to be covered 
by the "hub," while matters peculiar to one type of transaction were to be 
covered in their respective "spokes." This approach to drafting is well-known 
to those familiar with European codes that are divided into "General" and 
"Special" parts. The approach contributes to consistency and uniformity in the 
law. 86 In 1995 the leadership of NCCVSL decided to abandon the hub-and-
spoke approach in favor of a separate article for software and information, 
Proposed Article 2B-Licenses. It appointed a separate drafting committee to 
create a new article.87 
82. Swanson, supra note 17, at 387. 
83. Michael M. Greenfield & Linda I. Rusch, Limits on Standard-Form Contracting in 
Revised Article 2, 32 U.C.C. L.J. 115,144 (1999). 
84. "Debacle" is a tenn used by the original Reporter for Revised Article 2-Sales, Professor 
Richard Speidel. See Speidel, supra note 2, at 612. 
85. See generally Linda I. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never 
Ending Saga ofa Search for Balance, 52 SMU 1. REv. 1683 (1999). 
86. On the hub-and-spoke approach generally in the proposed revisions to Article 2, see 
Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 83, at 123; Rusch, supra note 85, at 1686; Speidel, supra note 2, at 612-
13. Professor Rusch was Associate Reporter for Revised Article 2. 
87. According to the Reporter for the Article 2 Drafting Committee, Professor Richard E. 
Speidel, the NCCUSL dropped the hub-and-spoke approach because certain strong software producers 
and others in industry opposed it. These producers viewed the draft then on the table as too oriented 
toward consumers. They wanted their own law. Speidel, supra note 2, at 619. 
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The two drafting committees went about their work separately, although 
they tried to coordinate their work as best they could. Both committees held 
open meetings in which they welcomed anyone who wished to attend, and 
many observers did. Nevertheless, consumer interests soon identified the 
Proposed Article 2B-Licenses Drafting Committee with the software 
industry, while business interests saw the Revised Article 2 Drafting 
Committee as anti-business. It thus should not have been a total surprise 
when, in 1999, ALI, which itself was less identified with business interests, 
rejected Proposed Article 2B-Licenses, and NCCUSL, which was more 
identified with business interests, rejected Revised Article 2. 88 
Neither NCCUSL nor ALI was ready to discard nearly a decade's worth 
of work. Both acted swiftly to rescue something out of the ashes. NCCUSL 
was able to act first because it could act alone. It is the source of uniform 
laws; only for the Uniform Commercial Code does it share sponsorship with 
ALI. By the simple expedient of detaching the proposed law from the U.C.C., 
NCCUSL could and did promulgate Proposed Article 2B-Licenses without 
ALI's cooperation. It dubbed the new law the Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act, or "UCITA." Transforming Article 2B-Licenses into 
UCITA did require sacrificing the aura of association with America's leading 
uniform law, the U.C.C. Losing that aura may have diminished UCITA's 
chances for enactment. The criticism that had led to ALI's defeat of Proposed 
Article 2B-Licenses did not abate. More than three years after UCITA's 
promulgation, only two states-Maryland and Virginia-have enacted it. In 
summer 2002 NCCUSL amended UCIT A to improve chances for adoption by 
other states. 
ALI, on other hand, could not unilaterally save Revised Article 2-
Sales. ALI had to have the cooperation ofNCCUSL in order to amend Article 
2, which is part of the U.C.C. While ALI was able to save the idea of revision, 
it could not keep the 1999 proposal intact in the manner NCCUSL was able to 
maintain Proposed Article 2B-Licenses. After Revised Article 2-Sales was 
rejected in summer 1999, ALI conferred with NCCUSL and together they 
appointed a new drafting committee to write a new Revised Article 2-Sales. 
While that new draft retained features of the defeated proposal, it eliminated 
much that had been controversial, and generally simplified and scaled back 
the changes originally proposed. That new draft, somewhat modified, is likely 
to receive final approval in 2003.89 
The original Reporter for Revised Article 2-Sales, Professor Richard 
Speidel, has explained the different courses that the two proposed laws have 
taken by pointing to the economic interests concerned with them. In the case 
of UCITA, former Proposed Article 2B-Licenses, there were substantial 
economic interests behind the legislation. In the case of Revised Article 2-
Sales, on the other hand, there was no comparable group pushing for adoption. 
88. In both instances, the leadership of the respective organizations declined to present the 
proposals to their memberships for a vote. See id. at 611, 619. 
89. The proposal was approved by NCCUSL at its annual meeting in summer 2002 and by the 
ALI Council in October 2002. It has only to receive the approval of the ALI Membership at the ALI 
Annual Meeting in May 2003 to be adopted. See Report of ALI Council Consideration of U.C.C. 
Projects, supra note 31. 
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Indeed, Speidel believes quite the contrary was the case. According to 
Professor Speidel, "strong sellers" are very pleased by current Article 2-
Sales: "Limited only by the porous doctrines of unconscionability and good 
faith, strong sellers are able to shape the contract to fit their interests, 
particularly where small business and consumers are involved.,,90 He charges 
that they opposed proposed revisions without themselves offering solutions 
that they would accept. He suggests that consumer interests were 
underrepresented in both committees' deliberations.91 
The U.C.c. reform caused latent discontent with section 2-302 and its 
treatment of unconscionable standard terms to surface. The two drafting 
committees that set to work in 1995 had very different views of how they 
should treat standard terms and unconscionability. The Revised Article 2-
Sales Drafting Committee sought to develop a new, stronger rule, while the 
Proposed Article 2B-Licenses Drafting Committee chose to maintain the 
status quo. Consumer representatives involved in the process lauded the 
former and condemned the latter while business representatives tended to do 
. h 92 Just t e reverse. 
The Associate Reporter for Revised Article 2-Sales, Professor Linda 
Rusch, has detailed the Revised Article 2-Sales Drafting Committee's efforts 
to reform the U.C.C. 's treatment of standard terms contracts.93 Early drafts of 
Revised Article 2-Sales distinguished between standard terms and negotiated 
contracts.94 Use of standard terms invoked rules that, to prevent unfair 
surprise, encouraged users to disclose the terms and to obtain informed 
consent. Not long into the drafting process, however, NCCUSL leadership 
decided to drop rules that turned on whether a contract used standard terms.95 
None of the drafts of Revised Article 2-Sales would have created a 
separate incorporation control; all of them would have controlled 
incorporation and content together in the same provisions. But the Revised 
Article 2-Sales Drafting Committee sought to strengthen those provisions' 
control over content using a new general clause. The Committee's drafts left 
the unconscionability provision essentially intact and added a new section 2-
206 of varying texts. That latter provision would have provided additional 
safeguards applicable to standard terms in consumer contracts.96 For a time 
the Committee focused on a reasonable expectations test and attempted to 
concretize that standard to meet criticism that it created too much 
uncertainty.97 In the end, however, the Committee dropped the reasonable 
expectations test and settled on one based on commercial fair dealing. 
90. Speidel, supra note 2, at 617-18. 
91. Id. at 618. 
92. The author, then a representative of business, was somewhat unusual in his views. While 
not promoting radical change, he did urge that the Proposed Article 2B-Licenses Drafting Committee 
adopt some broadening of Section 2-302 in order to make the proposed legislation more enactable. 
93. Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 83. 
94. Speidel, supra note 2, at 615. 
95. !d. at 614-16. Industry objected to special rules for consumers and to rules based on 
standard terms. See, e.g., Letter from William M. Elliott, Senior Vice President, General Counsel and 
Secretary, Gateway to Lawrence J. Bugge, Chairman, U.C.C. Article 2 Drafting Committee (Mar. 9, 
1999) (on file with author). 
96. For the earlier part of the § 2-206 story, see Murray, supra note 54, at 563-71. 
97. Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 83, at 125-26. 
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The final version of Proposed section 2-206 reads, in part: 
(a) In a consumer contract, a court may refuse to enforce a standard term in a record the 
inclusion of which was materially inconsistent with reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing in contracts of that type, or, subject to section 2-202, conflicts with one or 
more nonstandard terms to which the parties have agreed. 98 
The Committee's final proposal, however, protected warranty disclaimers and 
warranty modifications that met Code requirements from being invalidated. It 
thus would have preserved for business one of the most valuable uses of 
standard terms. 
1. Proposed Article 2BIUCITA 
As already noted, standard terms are especially important in the 
computer information industry. Copyright law does not protect all information 
and does not always provide the protection that computer information 
providers need. Because of limited legal protections provided by intellectual 
property laws, computer information providers need contractual protections. 
For the industry, the license is the product.99 Securing the validity of those 
licenses was one of its major goals in seeking adoption of Proposed Article 
2B-Licenses. 
The opening position of Proposed Article 2B-Licenses on standard 
terms was not dissimilar from that of Revised Article 2-Sales. Given their 
common origin, that is not surprising. Both started off distinguishing standard 
terms and negotiated terms, required full opportunity to review, and adopted a 
general clause review along the reasonable expectations line.lOo Their ending 
points, however, were rather different. 
Whereas Revised Article 2-Sales dropped a distinction between 
standard terms and negotiated terms, UCIT A maintained one in its definition 
of standard form. 101 This enables it to extend its protections not only to 
98. U.C.C. Revised art. 2-Sales (proposed Final Draft) (May I, 1999). 
99. See UClTA, Prefatory Note (2000) ("What rights are acquired or withheld depends on 
what the contract says. This point only is implicit in Article 2 for goods such as books; UClTA makes it 
explicit for the information economy where, unlike in the case of a book, the contract (license) is the 
product."); see also Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The License Is the Product: Comments on the Promise of 
Article 2B for Software and Information Licensing, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 891, 895-99 (1998). In 
Germany, in discussing standard terms, the point is made of insurance: "insurance as product of law" 
("Versicherung als Rechtsprodukt"). Joachim Schmidt-Salzer, EG-Richtlinie iiber mij1briiuchliche 
Klauseln in Verbrauchervertriigen. Inhaltskontrolle von AVB und Deregulierung der 
Versicherungsaufsicht, VersR [VersicherungsRecht] 1995, 1261, text and accompanying note. See also 
J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling 
Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 875,900-03 (1999); cf. 
Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REv. 131 (1970); Margaret Jane Radin, Humans. 
Computers. and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J. 1125 (2000). 
100. See Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 83, at 125 (noting that the October 1, 1995 draft of § 
2-206 included the reasonable expectations test; see also U.C.C. Revised art. 2B (Licenses with 
Prefatory Note and Comments § 2B-308(b)(I» (Feb. 2, 1996), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/ulc/ulcjrame.htrn ("[T]he term creates an obligation or imposes a 
limitation that is not consistent with customary industry practices and that a reasonable licensor should 
know would cause most licensees in transactions of similar type to refuse the contract if the term were 
brought to the attention of the licensee .... "). 
101. UClTA § 102(a)(60). See also Speidel, supra note 2, at 619. 
2003] Standard-Terms Contracting 127 
consumers, but to all participants in "mass market transactions.,,102 Advocates 
ofUCITA cite this as a significant advance and a "dramatic legal shift.,,103 Yet 
critics say that the distinction makes relatively little difference in the law that 
was adopted. 104 
Unlike Article 2 and Revised Article 2-Sales, UCITA has a provision 
directed toward incorporation of standard terms. Originally, section 209(b) 
provided that standard terms could become effective in a mass market license 
even though "a copy of the license is not available in a manner permitting an 
opportunity to review by the license before the licensee becomes obligated to 
pay.,,105 To make this result more palatable, the section gave the licensee a 
generous right to return at the expense of the licensor. This shift was 
somewhat less dramatic than it might otherwise have been, however, because 
before UCIT A was drafted, the Seventh Circuit seemed to allow the same 
result under Article 2. 106 The provision met significant resistance. At its 2002 
Annual Meeting NCCUSL revised section 209 to provide that a term does not 
become part of the license if "the licensee does not have an opportunity to 
review the term before agreeing to it.,,107 
The early drafts of Pro~osed Article 2B-Licenses followed the test of 
Restatement section 211(3).1 8 In 1997 the Drafting Committee dropped the 
Restatement test in favor of the unconscionability standard of section 2-302. 
At the suggestion of the NCCUSL 1998 annual meeting in July, the test was 
broadened to prohibit terms contrary to "public policy.,,109 The public policy 
provision is to make clear that UCITA does not uphold licenses that are 
invalid under federal copyright law. The public policy exception was regarded 
h · .. I 110 as not c angmg eXIstmg aw. 
As enacted, UCIT A provides that terms in mass market licenses are not 
enforceable if they are unconscionable, preempted by federal law, or contrary 
102. See UCITA § 209. 
103. See, e.g., Towle, supra note 78, at 379-80 (2000) ("Under UCITA, the customer in a 
'mass-market transaction' is afforded what amount to consumer protections, even if the customer is a 
business. As noted, this represents a dramatic legal shift."). 
104. See Speidel, supra note 2, at 619. 
105. UCITA § 209{b). 
106. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 808 
(1997) (enforcing an arbitration clause that the consumer did not receive or review until after receiving 
the product). But it appears that the court believed that the consumer did have an opportunity to review, 
which the consumer did not exercise. Id. at 1150. The Article 2 Drafting Committee also struggled with 
this issue and in the end ignored it. See Speidel, supra note 2, at 616. Gateway's General Counsel 
advised the Article 2 Committee Chairman of facts indicating that there was an opportunity to review. 
Letter from William M. Elliott, Senior Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, Gateway, to 
Lawrence J. Bugge, Chairman, U.C.C. Article 2 Drafting Committee (Feb. 3 1999) (on file with author). 
Similarly, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (l991), does not uphold enforcing standard 
terms where there is no opportunity to review. The Shute Court specifically noted that the question of 
opportunity to review had been conceded. Id. at 590. 
107. The summer 2002 final amendments are available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edulblllu\c/ucital2002act.htm. 
108. U.C.C. art. 2B-Licenses (Discussion Draft Mar. 21, 1997), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edulbll/ulc/ucc2/397art2.htm. 
109. U.C.C. art. 2B-Licenses (Discussion Draft Aug. 1, 1998), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edulblllulc/ucc2b/2b898.pdf. 
110. U.C.C. art. 2B Software Contracts and Licenses of Information (Council Draft No.4, Dec. 
1,1998) § 2B-105 Reporter's Notes at 38-39 (1998), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu. 
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to public policy.111 Its unconscionability provision in section 111 is a virtual 
clone of U.C.c. section 2-302. Critics find little to cheer about in UCITA's 
control of standard terms. According to one, "UCITA's approach to form 
contracts in commercial transactions can be captured in one word 
(enforced)." 1 12 Another characterizes it as "anything goes."ll3 
When the Proposed Article 2B-Licenses Drafting Committee backed 
off the reasonable expectations test of the Restatement, it considered 
proposals for stricter review of license terms than the unconscionability 
standard of 2-302, including one dubbed "unconscionability lite.,,114 But those 
against a more stringent test had one argument at their ready disposal: Article 
2B-Licenses was supposed to codify existing law and not create new law. I1S 
They had only to point to that law. The Reporter, Professor Ray Nimmer, 
himself observed: "With very few exceptions, standard form contract terms 
are enforceable.,,116 
The argument that the proposed law tracks existing law was more 
persuasive with the Proposed Article 2B-Licenses Drafting Committee and 
with the NCCUSL Annual Meeting than it has been with consumer advocates 
and others in the public sector. 117 Outside the rarified air of drafting 
committees and annual meetings, critics continue to attack UCITA as too 
friendly to software suppliers and too unfriendly to consumer interests. They 
include library associations who fear that suppliers will use standard terms to 
111. UCIT A §§ 105 (preemption by federal law; contracts contrary to public policy); 111 
(unconscionability); 209 (same). 
112. Leo L. Clarke, Performance Risk. Form Contracts and UCITA, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. 
TECH. L. REv. 1,33 (2000). 
113. Reichman & Franklin, supra note 99, at 906. They propose that UCITA include a standard 
of "public interest unconscionability" which would read: "All mass-market contracts, non-negotiable 
access contracts, and contracts imposing non-negotiable restrictions on uses of computerized 
information goods must be made on fair and reasonable terms and conditions, with due regard for the 
public interest in education, science, research, technological innovation, freedom of speech, and the 
preservation of competition." Id. at 930 (emphasis omitted). 
114. See Report of the Nov. 13-15, 1998 Drafting Committee meeting, 
http://www.2bguide.com/nov98rpt.htrnl. At the meeting, 
[a] committee member argued in favor of placing some kind of "reasonableness" restriction 
around mass market license terms, referring to the Hazard memo. Other committee members 
disagreed, noting that the refund right in this section was the tradeoff for allowing terms to be 
made available after acquisition. The Reporter agreed, and noting that 2B built in the right to say 
no to the terms, stated that the committee should not allow courts to throw out terms that were 
neither unconscionable nor in violation of a fundamental public policy .... A committee member 
responded by asking whether people were satisfied with the unconscionability doctrine or not. 
Some seemed to want to reject a "refusal term" in a license with the beneficial part of the bargain 
still being held to be enforceable. If there were problems in the real world, the unconscionability 
doctrine would have been expanded in the last 50 years. The lack of controversy around the 
unconscionability standard did not support the argument that a refusal term standard is necessary. 
Another committee member disagreed, stating that unconscionability issues were mostly raised 
in small claims court, so there was no data to say that people were satisfied with the standard .... 
The comment was then made that earlier there seemed to be an intent to have a new standard on 
unconscionability (unconscionability lite) but it no longer seemed to be included. 
115. The Drafting Committee Chair, Carlyle Ring, in several conversations with the author at 
different drafting sessions emphasized that in his experience, a proposed uniform law is most likely to 
be accepted if it can be presented as merely a codification of existing law and practice. 
116. Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract And Intellectual 
Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827,847 (1998). 
117. Speidel argues that NCCUSL is more concerned with getting a law enacted, while ALI is 
more interested in getting it right. See Speidel, supra note 2, at 608. 
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limit use of materials in ways not presently limited by copyright law. 118 Only 
some critics recognize that VCIT A, in upholding standard terms, is not 
departing from existinff law. 119 Prospects for nationwide enactment of VCIT A are uncertain at best. 12 
2. Absence a/Comparative Law Inquiries 
Both the Revised Article 2-Sales and the Proposed Article 2B-
License Drafting Committees spent a great deal of time considering 
alternatives to section 2-302. The Revised Article 2-Sales Drafting 
Committee in particular discussed possible new solutions to the problem 
seemingly endlessly. One can hardly help but wonder whether those 
discussions might have been quicker and ultimately more productive if only 
the committees had had knowledge of foreign approaches. They would have 
been able to observe standard terms control systems more extensive than 
section 2-302 in actual operation; they would not have had to guess whether 
such a system was even possible. The Committees would have had models for 
ways to implement such systems; they would not have been limited to 
considering only general clause approaches. Comparative law inquiries could 
have helped overcome our limited abilities either to conceive of or to 
experiment with alternatives. 
At no time during the decade long u.C.C. reform project did either of 
the Drafting Committees (or anyone else at ALI or NCCVSL) study foreign 
experiences with standard terms laws. Indeed, the Drafting Committees were 
118. See, e.g., Free Software Foundation, Why We Must Fight UCITA, 
http://www.gnu.orgiphilosophy/ucita.html(..UCITA will allow the publishers to impose the most 
outrageous restrictions on you."); Americans for Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions, What's Wrong 
With UCITA?, http://www.4cite.orglwhat...problems.html; Letter from American Library Association 
and four other library associations, to Gene N. Lebrun, President of the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 3 (July 12, 1999), 
http://www.arl.orgiinfo/letters/lebrun7.12.html( .. [UClTA]legitimiz[es] shrink wrap or click on licenses 
which may include terms that inappropriately restrict use by the purchaser or user."). For the concerns of 
libraries, see James R. Maxeiner, The New Commercial Law And Public Information Policy: The 
Libraries and UCITA, 219, 233 in UNDERSTANDING ELECTRONIC CONTRACTING: UCITA, E-SIGNATURE, 
FEDERAL, STATE AND FOREIGN REGULATION (Practising Law Institute, 2001). For opposition generally, 
see the website on UCITA for Laura N. Gasaway's cyberspace law course at 
http://www.unc.edulcourses/law357c/cyberprojects/springOllucita.htm. 
119. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 112, at 4: "[T]he National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws ... has promulgated a comprehensive commercial statute that fails to remedy or 
even modify the law of form contracts in purely commercial transactions." See also Cern Kaner, Why 
You Should Oppose UCITA, 17 COMPUTER LAWYER, 20, at 21-22 (May 2000): 
You might try arguing that the term is unconscionable under UClTA Section Ill, but courts are 
rarely receptive to a business' plea for relief from a contract term on grounds of 
unconscionability. You might try arguing that this term should not be enforced because 
something about it violates a fundamental public policy, but I'm not sure which one you would 
cite. 
But see Law Library Association of Maryland, Testimony In Opposition To Maryland House Bill 19, 
Senate Bill 142, Feb. 3, 2000, http://www.lI.georgetown.edulaallwashltm020300b.html. ("UClTA's 
explicit endorsement of shrink-wrap licenses will make many unfair terms enforceable in court, 
whereas today many such terms are thrown out."). 
120. See Michael L. Rustad, Making UCITA More Consumer-Friendly, 18 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 547, 550 (1999). For further information on UCITA and standard terms, see 
Clarke, supra note 112. Even if UClTA is not adopted nation-wide, it may still have helped industry 
obtain validation of use of standard terms in shrink-wrap and clickwrap licenses. 
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hardly aware of them. Foreign readers who are accustomed to comparative 
law studies being made when new legislation is under consideration are sure 
to be surprised. Their surprise is all the more justified when one considers that 
(1) at least one American comparativist called the Committees' attention to 
those solutions,121 (2) existing American law may have had a foreign 
inspiration, and (3) just as the Committees began their work, the International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) adopted Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts that include some special rules for 
standard terms. 122 The Reporter for the post-1999 version of Revised Article 
2-Sales, Professor Henry Gabriel, explained that the lack of interest in 
foreign approaches is to be attributed to the law revision process itself, which 
is focused on the existing law: "This focus tends to be inward-Iooking-
always focused on the existing Code itself, and therefore, the comparisons 
with other codes, such as the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CIS G) and the UNIDROIT principles, tend to be 
incidental as opposed to deliberate.,,123 
Only recently and outside of the U.C.c. reform process has the United 
States seen approaches to standard terms that do more than provide variations 
on a familiar melody. In 1998 the New Jersey Law Revision Commission 
proposed a new statute to govern standard terms. 124 The proposed statute is 
unlike anything else ever seen in the United States. Its goal is to protect 
freedom of contract from pernicious standard terms; it is not a consumer 
protection statute. It is not limited to a general clause,125 but identifies specific 
types of contract issues, which it then approves, prohibits or marks for 
evaluation. 126 The similarities to European laws are unmistakable. 127 Other 
121. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14. 
122. UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994), deals with 
what is known in the United States as the "battle of the fonns" and is not relevant here. Of the other 
three, article 2.19 defines standard tenns. Articles 2.20 and 2.21 provide limited incorporation controls. 
The fonner provides that "(1) No tenn contained in standard tenns which is of such a character that the 
other party could not reasonably have expected it, is effective unless it has been expressly acceptcd by 
that party." Id. at 58. The latter merely provides that in case of conflict, a tenn that is not a standard tenn 
prevails over a standard tenn. 
123. Henry D. Gabriel, The Inapplicability of the United Nations Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods as a Model for the Revision of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1995, 2001 (1998). See also Richard E. Speidel, The Impact of 
Internationalization of Transnational Commercial Law: The Revision of UCC Article 2, Sales in Light of 
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 J. INT'L L. & Bus. 
165 (1995). 
124. NEW JERSEY LAW REVISION COMMISSION, FINAL REpORT RELATING TO STANDARD FORM 
CONTRACTS § I (g), at 2 (1998), available at http://www.lawrev.state.nj.us. The Commission's Report 
concluded that existing law does not provide "unifonn and flexible standards" and has neither "protected 
consumers against the opportunism of certain sellers nor has it provided sellers with legal rules based on 
the logic of the mass market." 
125. Id. § 8(a). "[AJ tenn is enforceable unless, at the time of sale, the tenn would have caused 
a reasonable buyer to reject the sale." 
author: 
126. /d. § 9-12. 
127. For example, the New Jersey Commission's associate counsel, John J.A. Burke, wrote the 
In reply to your question, the Commission reviewed the European Directive on Unfair 
Tenns in Consumer Contracts as well as the French and German Codes. The Commission 
followed the European approach in so far as identifying specific issues for legislative 
governance. However, unlike the European approach, the Commission's Standard Form 
Contract Act (SFC) is not consumer protection legislation. Rather, it is an attempt to set 
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than introducing the proposed Act as a bill, the New Jersey legislature has not 
acted on it. The Commission itself did not produce a study of European laws 
and presumably did not have the resources to do so. The balance of this article 
seeks to make a start in that direction. 
III. EUROPEAN UNION LAW 
Part III addresses control of standard terms in the law of the European 
Union. Part IV goes on to consider the law in one Member State, Germany. 
Part IV is necessary because the E.U. law of unfair terms is not directly 
applicable. There, as in most areas of law, the European Union has chosen to 
harmonize national laws rather than to adopt a single E.U. law. The device to 
accomplish harmonization is the directive. Directives are instructions to 
Member States to adopt laws with particular content. But directives are 
binding only as to result, and not as to form and method of implementation.12s 
The focus of this Part is on the European Union's Council Directive 
93/13IEEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts. Adopted in 
1993, the Unfair Terms Directive is the basis ofE.U.-wide control of standard 
terms. It requires Member States to conform their laws to the directive's 
model. 129 
A. Origin in Consumer Protection 
The Unfair Terms Directive is consumer protection legislation. The first 
Europe-wide efforts to address standard terms accompanied the growth of the 
consumer movement in the 1970s. Even before the European Union looked at 
unfair terms, a broader and looser group of European States, the Council of 
Europe, began looking at the issue in 1973. On November 16, 1976, it adopted 
Resolution (76) 47 on "Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts and an 
Appropriate Method of Control" and issued an explanatory memorandum. 130 
the limits of "freedom of contract" in an area where one party to the contract is the single 
author seeking to pass virtually all risk to the other party. The SFC Act makes no 
distinction between merchants and consumers nor does its application depend on the 
nature of the product that is the subject of the contract, thus unifying the law of contracts 
for goods, services and intellectual property. 
E-mail from John J.A. Burke, Associate Counsel to the New Jersey Law Review Commission, to author 
(July 8, 2002) (on file with author). See also John J.A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction 
Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285 (2000). 
In 2002 Professor Larry Bates made an even more radical proposal: standard terms should be 
presumed invalid; the relationship between user and the other party should be regarded as a "status 
relationship" subject to regulation; and that an administrative body should approve use of standard 
terms. Significantly, he drew inspiration from foreign experiences. Bates, supra note 15, at 90-105. 
128. !d. at 326-31, 792-94. Directives contrast with "regulations," which are applicable 
generally, are binding in all respects and are directly applicable. [d. at 324. See generally Peter-Christian 
MUller-Graff, EC Directives as a Means of Private Law Unification, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CNIL 
CODE (Arthur Hartkamp et al. eds., 2d rev. ed. 1998). 
129. Report from the Commission on the Implementation of Council Directive 93/13IEEC of 5 
April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, COM (2000) 248 final (noting that Germany, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and the Nordic countries had only to amend their laws) [hereinafter E.U. 
Commission Report). 
130. Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts and an Appropriate Method of Control, Resolution 
(76) 47 of the Comm. of Ministers, Council of Europe, 262d Meet. (1977). 
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The Resolution noted that consumers were increasingly offered goods and 
services on terms that prejudice their interests but which they had no power to 
amend. The resolution's first recommendation was to encourage Council 
members to adopt legislation to protect consumers "against unfair terms in 
contracts based on standard texts and in other contracts where the consumer 
has little, if any, possibility of negotiating or influencing their content." The 
scope of the resolution was limited to consumers, but with respect to 
consumers it applied to consumer contracts generally and not just to standard 
terms. The resolution addressed both incorporation and content. 
The accompanying explanatory memorandum found the source of the 
problem in the essence of standard terms. Suppliers generally have the 
advantage in drafting standard contract forms. Individual consumers rarely 
negotiate those terms and, if they do, they seldom have bargaining power 
sufficient to protect their interests. The principle of freedom of contract 
permits suppliers through use of standard terms to impose on consumers terms 
that "satisfy the suppliers' interests but disregard the interests of the 
consumers. ,,131 The explanatory memorandum gives a non-exhaustive list of 
twenty-eight terms considered to be unfair in the majority of member States. It 
classes those terms into six broad general classes: terms regarding formation, 
termination, and performance; terms limiting the liability of the supplier; 
terms limiting the consumer's rights or remedies; terms relating to security; 
terms relating to disputes; and other terms. The specific terms are familiar. A 
few examples from the list are given in the margin. 132 
The European Union itself first raised the issue of one-sided standard 
terms in 1975 when the Commission, the E.U.'s principal governing body, 
issued its first consumer protection proposals. In the 1970s a number ofE.V. 
131. Id.atll. 
132. Examples include: 
4. Terms whereby a contract will continue in being for an unreasonably long period 
unless terminated by the consumer by a specified date .... 
6. Terms whercby the supplier reserves the right to decide unilaterally whether the goods 
are in conformity with the contract or not. ... 
8. Terms whereby the goods need not correspond with those elements of their description 
which are essential to the consumer or with the sample or need not be fit for the purpose 
communicated by the consumer and accepted by the supplier or in default of such 
communication with their normal use .... 
9. Terms whereby the supplier can without reasonable grounds withhold the fulfillment 
of his obligations .... 
12. Terms whereby the liability of the supplier is either excluded or limited to an 
unjustified extent. ... 
14. Terms whereby the right of the consumer to repudiate a contract under which the 
supplier is bound to repair the goods and does not do so within a reasonable time is 
excluded .... 
18. Terms whereby the withholding by the consumer of all or part of the payment due, if 
the supplier does not fulfil his obligations, is prohibited .... 
21. Terms whereby a consumer is prohibited from claiming a right of set-off against the 
supplier .... 
25. Terms which impose a burden of proof on the consumer which normally would lie on 
the supplier .... 
26. Terms which impose on the consumer an unreasonably short period of time to make 
complaints to the supplier .... 
27. Terms whereby, without good reason, the consumer is required to have goods 
repaired by the supplier exclusively or to obtain replacement parts only from him. 
Id. at 14-16. 
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Member States adopted national standard terms legislation. 133 Only weeks 
after the Council of Europe issued its recommendations, the German 
legislature adopted the Standard Terms Statute. 134 In 1976 the Commission 
issued a preliminary draft directive of standard clauses in consumer contracts. 
That proposal died. 135 
Throughout the legislative processes in Europe comparative law played 
a part. In 1978 the Council of Europe made standard terms the subject of its 
Eighth Annual Legal Colloquy on European Law. The colloquy included 
reports on standard terms law in the United Kingdom, Germany, Israel, 
Sweden, Cyprus, and Ireland. 136 In 1984 the Commission of the European 
Union returned to the issue of unfair terms and issued a working paper on 
abusive clauses in consumer contracts. 137 Before issuing a draft directive, it 
commissioned a comparative study of the law in the Member States of the 
European Union and elsewhere. 138 
In 1990 the Commission again proposed a draft directive on unfair 
terms. The Union adopted the final version of the Unfair Terms Directive on 
April 5, 1993. 139 It required Member States to implement it by December 31, 
1994. Adoption of the Unfair Terms Directive was part of a larger initiative in 
the consumer protection area. In 1992 a new article was added to the E.U. 
Treaty that specifically directs the Union to address the interests of 
consumers. 140 Several other directives also provide consumers protection. 141 
B. The Unfair Terms Directive 
The Unfair Terms Directive is a "minimum" directive, that is, it sets out 
minimum standards. Article 8 explicitly permits Member States to maintain or 
133. See Ewoud H. Hondius, Unfair Contract Terms: New Control Systems, 26 AM. J. COMPo 
L. 525, 525-26 (1978). 
134. AGB-Gesetz, supra note 10. See Otto Sandrock, The Standard Terms Act 1976 of West 
Germany, 26 AM. J. COMPo L. 551 (1978). 
135. Ulmer in ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 82, margin no. 66. 
136. Standard Terms in Contracts: Proceedings of the Eighth Colloquy on European Law, 
Council of Europe, (1979). 
137. See E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 5; Hermann-Josef Bunte, Zehn Jahre 
AGB-Gesetz-Riickblick und Ausblick, NJW [Neue Juristische Wochenschrift] 1987, 921, 921. 
138. Note, Commission of the European Communities Amended Proposal for a Council 
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 15 J. CONSUMER POL'y 97 (1992), (citing EWOUD 
HONDIUS, UNFAIR TERMS IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS (1987». See also HONDIUS, 
STANDAARDVOORWAARDEN: RECHTSVERGELIJENKE BESCHOUWINGEN OVER STANDAARDISERING VAN 
KONTRAKTSBEDINGEN EN OVERHEIDSTOEZICHT DAAROP (1978) (with summaries in French at 835-44, in 
English at 845-54, and in German at 855-65). 
139. Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L. 95) 29 [hereinafter Unfair Terms Directive]. 
For a briefrecounting of the chronology, see E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 5. 
140. Now Article 153 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (incorporating the 
changes made by the Treaty of Amsterdam amending the· Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts). Its paragraph 1 provides: 
In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer 
protection, the Community shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic 
interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information, education and 
to organise themselves in order to safeguard their interests. 
141. See PJ.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLoREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: FROM MAASTRICHT TO AMSTERDAM 1108 (Lawrence W. Gormley ed., 3d ed. 
1998). 
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to adopt "more stringent provisions" in order to ensure "a maximum degree of 
protection for the consumer.,,142 
The Unfair Terms Directive is limited to contracts with consumers, i.e., 
natural persons acting for purposes outside their trade, business, or 
profession.143 It does not require that Member States control standard terms 
that are used between non-consumers, although the laws of some Member 
States dO. I44 As originally proposed, it would have applied to all terms in all 
contracts with consumers. As a result of Member State criticism, the scope of 
the directive was narrowed. As adopted it does not apply to terms that have 
been "individually negotiated.,,145 "[P]re-formulated standard contracts" are 
not individually negotiated. 146 It excludes from content review the "main 
subject matter of the contract" and the "adequacy of the price and 
remuneration." 147 
The Unfair Terms Directive has no specific provision that governs 
incorporation into contracts. It is debated whether the "transparency" 
provision of Article 5-which requires that when in writing "terms must 
always be drafted in plain, intelligible lanf.uage"-should be regarded as an 
incorporation control or a content control." 48 The principal problem with that 
interpretation is practical: as presently structured, for a term to be invalidated, 
it must be unfair under the content control of Article 3. 149 
Control of the content of terms is the heart of the Unfair Terms 
Directive.15o The control consists of a general clause, essentially in Article 3, 
and a list of exemplary unfair terms in an Annex. Article 6(1) provides that 
"unfair terms" as defined in Article 3 shall not be binding on consumers in 
contracts with sellers or suppliers. Article 3(1) requires that a contract term 
shall be regarded as unfair "if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it 
causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising 
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.,,151 Although the 
language of Article 3(1) suggests that two separate criteria must be met, i.e., 
142. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 139, art. 8. 
143. Id. art. 2(b). The European Court of Justice rejected the idea that "consumers" includes 
non-natural persons. Joined Cases C-541 & 542/99, Cape Snc v. Idealservice Sri, 2001 E.C.R. I-09049. 
144. Gennany, for example. See infra text accompanying notes 243-44. 
145. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 139, art. 3(1). See infra text accompanying notes 325-
33. 
146. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 139, art. 3(2). 
147. Id. art. 4(2). Terms dealing with those issues must still be "in plain intelligible language." 
148. Workshop 4: Obligation of Clarity and Favourable Interpretation to the Consumer (Art. 
5), in The Integration of Directive 93/13 into the National Legal Systems 158 (1999), available at 
http://europa.eu.intlcomm/dgs/health_consumer/events/event29 _ 04.pdf [hereinafter Integration of 
Directive 93/13]. The same article further provides that when in doubt, terms are to be given the 
interpretation most favorable to the consumer. In favor of regarding Article 5 as an incorporation control 
is the twentieth recital of the Preamble of the Unfair Terms Directive, which states: ''whereas contracts 
should be drafted in plain intelligible language, the consumer should actually be given an opportunity to 
examine all the terms .... " Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 139, art. 5. 
149. Id. Item (i) in the Annex to the Unfair Terms Directive, which provides that a term may be 
found unfair if it precludes an opportunity to review prior to the contract becoming binding, raises the 
same issue. See also infra note 336 (discussing German Code placement of transparency under the 
content control). 
ISO. See Workshop 3: The Definition of "Unfairness": The Application of Art. 3(1), 4(1)-and 
of the Annexes of the Directive, in Integration of Directive 93/13, supra note 148, at 132 [hereinafter 
Workshop 3]. 
lSI. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 139, art. 3(1) 
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significant imbalance and action contrary to good faith, the official position is 
that any clause that causes a significant imbalance is by definition contrary to 
the principle of good faith. 152 Perhaps because the Unfair Terms Directive is 
not directly applicable law, this point has not been as significant an issue as it 
might otherwise have been. It is in effect resolved by the implementing 
language that a particular Member State uses. Article 4(1) provides that the 
unfairness of a term is to take into account "all the circumstances attending 
the conclusion of the contract." But, as already noted, national law is not to 
judge whether the contract itself is unfair. 153 
A separate Annex lists seventeen different specific types of terms that 
may be considered unfair. 154 The list is "indicative" only, that is, a contractual 
term on the list is not automatically deemed unfair but only subject to 
evaluation. 155 The terms identified in the list, rather than the language of the 
general clause itself, are to serve as "the first and the essential reference point 
in answering the questions: what is unfairness? when are there grounds for 
considering a clause as unfair?,,156 Since the Unfair Terms Directive is a 
minimal directive, Member States may completely prohibit terms in the 
Annex. Some Member States have done so. There have been proposals that 
the Unfair Terms Directive itself should be amended to consist of both a list of 
terms subject to evaluation and a prohibited list. ls7 A few of the items on the 
list may be discussed briefly here. 
Item (b) of the Annex to the Unfair Terms Directive has been the most 
frequently litigated class of term. 158 It permits finding a term unfair and thus 
unenforceable if the term has the object or the effect of inappropriately 
excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-a-vis the seller or 
supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or 
inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of any of the contractual 
obligations, including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the seller or 
supplier against any claim which the consumer may have against him. Item 
(b) recently lost significance when the European Union took a still more 
aggressive approach to the issue of guarantees. In Directive 1999/44IEC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of25 May 1999 on certain aspects of 
the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees (the "Guarantees 
Directive"), it made certain guarantees mandatory. No review of terms for 
unfairness is necessary where the law makes the terms mandatory.159 
Item (i) of the Annex to the Unfair Terms Directive is particularly 
significant in connection with shrink-wrap and click-wrap licenses. It provides 
that a term may be found unfair if it has the object or effect of "irrevocably 
binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of 
152. See id. at 141. 
153. See infra text accompanying note 147. 
154. The European Court of Justice has held that it is not necessary that the list itselfbe enacted 
into positive law. See infra text accompanying note 170. 
155. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 16. 
156. Workshop 3, supra note 150, at 137. 
157. Id. at 138. 
158. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 16. 
159. For a discussion of the effect of the Guarantees Directive on German law, see infra text 
accompanying notes 357 to 359. 
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becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract." This 
incorporation control is at odds with the original version of UCITA section 
209 that authorized this very type of term. 160 
Item (q) of the Annex to the Unfair Terms Directive calls for evaluating, 
among other terms, a term "excluding or hindering the consumer's right to 
take legal action or exercise any other legal remedy, particularly by requiring 
the consumer to take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal 
provisions." The European Court of Justice held that this provision renders 
invalid forum selection clauses with consumers. 161 The court found that a 
clause that selected the seller's principal place of business which was far from 
the consumer's domicile (but in the consumer's home country) "must be 
regarded as unfair within the meaning of Article 3 of the Directive in so far as 
it causes, contrary to the requirement of good faith, a significant imbalance in 
the parties' rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment 
of the consumer.,,162 
As noted Article 6 provides that unfair terms shall not be enforced. But 
the Unfair Terms Directive is concerned with more than invalidating 
objectionable terms. It seeks affirmatively to stamp them out. Article 7(1) 
requires Member States to ensure that "adequate and effective means exist to 
prevent the continued use of unfair terms." The Unfair Terms Directive does 
not limit the means chosen. It does not require a particular form of judicial or 
administrative proceeding. Leaving aside measures not available throughout 
the European Union, two procedures that are available in all countries to help 
stamp out unfair terms might strike American lawyers as unusual. The 
European Court of Justice held recently that effective protection of consumers 
requires that national courts of their own motion determine whether a term is 
unfair.163 The second measure is the consumer association action required by 
Article 7. Its Paragraph 2 requires that consumer grouRs be authorized to bring 
actions "to prevent the continued use of such terms." 64 It requires further that 
these actions may be directed against sellers collectively and not just against a 
single seller. 165 These measures are designed to overcome the infirmities of 
private litigation where ordinarily the judgment affects only the party before 
160. See supra text accompanying note 105. 
161. Case C-240/98, Oceano Grupo Editorial SA v. Rocio Murciano Quintero, 2000 E.C.R. 1-
4941. 
162. [d. at 1-4973. 
163. [d. at 1-4976. The Court reasoned that "the system of protection introduced by the 
Directive is based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-a-vis the seller or supplier, as 
regards both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge." It noted that "[i]n disputes where the 
amounts involved are often limited, the lawyers' fees may be higher than the amount at stake, which 
may deter the consumer from contesting the application of an unfair term." [d. at 1-4973. 
164. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 139, art. 7(2): 
The means referred to in paragraph 1 shall include provisions, whereby persons or 
organizations, having a legitimate interest under national law in protecting consumers, 
may take action according to the national law concerned before the courts or before 
competent administrative bodies for a decision as to whether contractual terms drawn up 
for general use are unfair, so that they can apply appropriate and effective means to 
prevent the continued use of such terms." 
165. Unfair Terms Directive, supra note 139, art. 7(3). 
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the court, and not the world at large (i.e., inter partes, but not ergo omnes), 
and only for that one specific term. 166 
Article 6(2) of the Unfair Terms Directive requires that Member States 
take steps to ensure that the directive's protections are not circumvented by 
choice of non-European Union law. This requirement, however, applies only 
if the consumer has a close connection "with the territory of the Member 
States." 
C. Implementation in the Member States of the Unfair Terms Directive 
Member States must conform their laws to the requirements of 
directives. Conformity does not mean uniformity; the actual implementation 
of directives varies significantly from Member State to Member State. 
Although directives are often quite detailed, a review of their provisions can 
give only a partial picture of the applicable law. This is the case with the 
Unfair Terms Directive, which is less specific than some other directives. Part 
IV of this article discusses the application of the Unfair Terms Directive in 
Germany and gives a picture of how the directive actually works in practice in 
one country. This section provides an overview of the steps that have been 
taken to implement the directive throughout the Euror,ean Union, but does not 
address the actual law in each of the Member States. 1 7 
The Unfair Terms Directive instructed the Commission to report on the 
directive's implementation after five years. The Commission delivered its 
report in April 2000 ("Commission Report"). The Commission Report 
includes a list of the implementing statutes in the Member States. 168 Detailed 
reports on implementation in the individual Member States were included in 
the papers ofa conference held prefatory to the issuance of the Commission's 
Report. 169 
The Commission reported that it had brought proceedings before the 
European Court of Justice against all the Member States for infractions in 
implementing the directive, but that most of these proceedings had been 
concluded without the Court having to issue a judgment. Subsequent to the 
Commission Report, the Court has issued several judgments on 
implementation. The only judgment of the Court that went against the 
Commission was the case against Sweden, where the Court held that Sweden 
did not need to include the Annex of the Unfair Terms Directive verbatim in 
its positive law, since the Annex was merely exemplary and since Sweden 
both included the Annex in the legislative history and actually dealt directly 
with most ofthe terms contained in the Annex in its law.l70 
166. See E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 22-23. 
167. For a short survey of the law in all E.U. Member States plus Switzerland, see Ulmer in 
ULMERlBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 99-120. See also Integration of Directive 
93/13, supra note 148 (with reports in English and French on many Member States). 
168. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 38 
169. See Integration of Directive 93/13, supra note 148. 
170. Case C-478/99, Commission v. Kingdom of Swed., 2002 E.C.R. 1-04147. The Court held 
for the Commission in C-144/99, Commission v. Kingdom of the Neth., 2001 E.C.R. 1-03541 (finding 
that the Netherlands failed to fulfill its obligations under the Unfair Terms Directive by not transposing 
Articles 4(2) and 5, concerning transparency, into Dutch law) and in Case C-372/99, Commission v. 
Italy, 2002 E.C.R. 1-00819 (finding that Italy failed to fulfill its obligations under the Unfair Terms 
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The Commission also reported on its own efforts to implement the 
directive. These included subsidizing dialogues between consumers and 
industry at both the national and European levels, subsidizing legal actions for 
injunctions brought by consumer groups to eliminate unfair terms, conducting 
information campaigns, sponsoring a conference on implementation of the 
directive in Member States, and working to develop empirical data on unfair 
terms. 171 The last mentioned is among the more interesting from an American 
perspective. 
While in the United States a wel1-represented view holds that the 
incidence of "unconscionable" terms in contracts is low, there is no 
comparable position in Europe. Nevertheless, on both sides of the Atlantic 
participants in discussions of standard terms have lamented the absence of 
empirical data that might confirm the existence of a problem and disclose its 
extent. 172 The Commission undertook as part of its mission of implementing 
the directive a program to fil1 that gap. There were two basic components to 
that effort: market studies and a case-law database. Its report summarizes the 
results of seven different market studies that examined use of unfair terms in 
contracts in a variety of industries and countries. 173 
In order to monitor implementation of the directive, the Commission set 
up for an initial five-year period a data base, accessible to the public, to 
include al1 known legal decisions regarding unfair terms (the "CLAB" 
Database). The CLAB database includes files based on specific contractual 
terms chal1enged in legal action as unfair. Although the col1ection focuses on 
consumer contracts, CLAB also includes decisions regarding terms strictly 
between non-consumers. In its initial five years of operation the database 
accumulated 7649 cases. 174 About 3000 of these cases predated the directive. 
About one third of the Commission Report is devoted to an annex giving 
statistics from the CLAB database. 175 The Commission has now asked for bids 
to carry on the CLAB database for five more years. 176 
In its report the Commission left no doubt that it believes that unfair 
terms in consumer contracts are a real problem. It concluded that "balanced 
contractual relations are anything but the rule, that unfair terms are widely 
Directive by only prohibiting the actual use of unfair terms, and not the recommendation of the use of 
unfair terms, as required by Article 7(3». Looking to the Netherlan~s case, the German legislature 
adopted into statutory law a rule that had been applied through judicial interpretation. See infra note 337. 
171. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 9-12. The conference took place in Brussels 
July 1-3, 1999. The Papers are collected in Integration of Directive 93/13, supra note 148. The 
proceedings are an exercise in practical comparative law, including both reports on the laws governing 
unfair terms in most of the Member States as well as special sector reports and comparative overview 
reports. 
172. See, e.g., KOtz, supra note 18, at AII-Al2; Llewellyn, supra note 41, at 700 n.3, 703-04. 
See supra text accompanying notes 82-83. 
173. See E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 9,39-41. 
174. Consumer Policy: Commission Aims To Update Unfair Terms Data Base, EUR. REp., 
section 2583, Apr. 7, 2001. 
175. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 43-62. 
176. See Consumer Policy, supra note 174; Allgemeine Ausschreibung Nr. DG SANCO 
20011B3/002 beziiglich der Sammlung und Analyse von "Fallrecht" in den Staaten des EWR belreffend 
mi13brauchliche K1auseln in Verbrauchervertragen flir die Jahre 2001-2005, 
http:// europa.eu.intlcomm/dgs/health _consumer/library/tenders! ca1l24 _de. pdf. 
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used, and that new types of unfair terms arise by the day.,,177 The market 
studies demonstrated, it contended, not only "the ubiquity of unfair terms in 
standard-form contracts but also the enormous difficulty of getting hold of the 
contractual terms before concluding a contract.,,178 
D. The Future of the Unfair Terms Directive 
The Commission Report is not limited to stating the law at the turn of 
the century. The Commission in its report also raised questions designed "to 
trigger the widest and most fruitful possible debate on the subject.,,179 The 
Commission referred its report, including its questions for comments, to the 
Economic and Social Committee, a formal body of the European Union 
established under the Treaty of Amsterdam to give non-binding advisory 
opinions. While the Commission Report on a whole was rather upbeat, the 
Committee's response was less so. Its first conclusion was: "Rather than 
merely 'approximating' legislation, the main objective of any future revision 
of Directive 93/13/EC-which is hopefully not far away-must be to truly 
harmonise and standardise legislation in the Member States in this area.,,180 
The Commission revisited the limitations on the directive's scope. It 
noted that the implementation laws in some Member States did not include all 
three exclusions contained in the directive, i.e., of non-consumers, of 
individually negotiated terms, and of the main subject matter of a contract. 181 
It asked whether one or more of these limitations should be eliminated. The 
Economic and Social Committee answered yes: get rid of all three. 182 
The Commission raised relatively few questions about the future of the 
content control. It noted that in practice, it had not made much difference 
whether a member state had chosen to adopt the general clause of Article 3(1) 
almost verbatim or had rephrased it to a greater or lesser extent. More 
important in the Commission's view was the way in which Member States had 
transposed the Annex list of suspect terms into national law. The Commission 
stated its view that the practical effect of the content control would be greater 
if all Member States would adopt the list and do so in a way that minimized its 
vagueness and led to published "black lists" of prohibited terms. It asked 
whether the contents of the indicative list should be given in greater detail or 
number and whether its nature should be altered. 183 The Economic and Social 
Committee answered that the list should not be lengthened, but tightened up 
177. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 13. 
178. Id. at 9. 
179. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 2. 
180. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the Report from the Commission on 
the Implementation of Council Directive 93/13IEEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts, 2001 O.J. (C 116) 116, 124 at 10.1 [hereinafter Opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee]. 
181. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 14-15, 31. 
182. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 180, at 124,10.2 and, 10.3. 
See infra text accompanying notes 252-260. 
183. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 16-17. Subsequent to this plea, the 
Commission lost its case seeking to require Sweden to adopt the Annex. The argument the Commission 
summarized against adopting the Annex was that then the list might limit enforcement of the general 
provision. One problem in reaching uniformity throughout Europe is that unfairness is measured based 
on the law otherwise applicable, which varies from Member State to Member State. 
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and simplified. A "black list" should be created to stand beside the "gray" 
list. 184 
The Commission noted deficiencies in the transparency requirement. It 
asked whether changes were needed and whether consumers should be given 
the right to review terms before concluding a contract. 185 The Economic and 
Social Policy Committee replied that "[a]ll necessary steps" should be 
taken. 186 
Many of the Commission's questions, and its most provocative 
suggestions, relate to what the Commission termed "positive" enforcement. 
The problem, the Commission asserted, is that the existing system of 
"negative" enforcement is not enough. While a particular term in a particular 
contract is deemed unfair, the system of negative enforcement does not 
prevent others from using the same term found to be unfair or the user of the 
unfair term from adopting a similar term. Colorfully the Commission 
commented: "Unfair terms are like the Hydra: cut off one head and others 
.. I ,,187 grow In Its pace. 
The Commission posed a whole series of questions related to improving 
the existing system of negative enforcement and to adopting a new system of 
positive enforcement. Among the more provocative: Should penalties be 
introduced to discourage use of unfair terms?188 Should a procedure be 
established to declare court decisions to have an effect against everyone?189 
Should an administrative body be established to analyze and prohibit terms?190 
Should actions be taken at a Europe-wide level to eliminate unfair terms?191 
The Economic and Social Committee was less receptive to changes in 
enforcement. It found unjustified the Commission's suggestion that civil 
penalties be applied. 192 It did encourage the Commission to explore the 
possibility of establishinfiprocedures to make a finding that a term is unfair 
binding on everyone. 9 It endorsed creating a Community level 
administrative arrangement and greater use of administrative mechanisms. 194 
It stated, however, that a prior approval system was generally inappropriate 
because it would be "extremely bureaucratic" and still would not guarantee an 
absence of unfair terms. 195 
The Economic and Social Committee observed a need to clarify the 
principle of good faith so that it would not lead to different national 
provisions. Of its own motion the Committee recommended a comparative 
law inquiry. It asked the Commission and the member states "to jointly 
184. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 180, at 121 ~5 and 124-25 
~10.6. 
185. E.D. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 18. 
186. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 180, at 124 ~10.4. 
187. E.D. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 24. 
188. !d. at 20, 23 
189. !d. at 23. 
190. Id. at 23-25. 
191. !d. at 25-27. 
192. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 180, at 122 ~6.4. 
193. Id. at 123 
194. Id. at 123 
195. Id. at 124~8.2.1. 
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explore the possibility of adopting a new approach to this whole area, drawing 
on U.S. experience with the drafting of framework or standard laws.,,196 
The future of these proposals is uncertain. What is clear, however, is that 
the European Union has taken a strong position that it will protect consumers 
against unfair terms. Just how that position is implemented in one country is 
the subject of the next part of this article. 
IV. GERMAN LAW 
The Unfair Terms Directive, just as any other directive of the European 
Union, has force only insofar as the fifteen-soon to be twenty-five-member 
states implement it. In proceedings before the European Court of Justice, the 
Commission of the European Union acts vigorously to assure that member 
states implement directives fully and completely. To see how the Unfair 
Terms Directive actually applies, one must examine national law. 
Because directives leave to each member state the form and methods of 
its implementation, each implementing law is unique to the country adopting 
it. Ideally, this article would examine the law in each of the member states of 
the European Union. But no one author could know all the languages and 
legal systems involved necessary for an: examination of fifteen, let alone 
twenty-five, member states. A consortium would be necessary. For the 
purpose ofthis article, it is sufficient to focus on the law of one Member State. 
Hopefully, similar studies of the laws of other member states will follow 
publication of this article. 
While the law of any Member State could illustrate the implementation 
of the Unfair Terms Directive, this article examines the law of Germany. 
There are several reasons for the choice. An obvious economic reason is that 
Germany, with over eighty million inhabitants, has the largest population of 
any country in the European Union. Its law presumably governs the most 
transactions of any Member State's law. But there are more important 
intellectual reasons to look at the law of Germany first. The German legal 
system was among the first European legal systems to identify the issue of 
standard terms and was the first to address the issue systematically. Its 
Standard Terms Statute was very influential in the drafting of the European 
directive. As has been noted, its law also may have had a significant influence 
on American law in its formative stages. 197 
Part IV examines German law and its development in detail. Section A 
considers the judge-made law that controlled standard terms through 1976. 
Section B sets out the contract model for controlling standard terms that was 
developed by the courts and that became the basis of the Standard Terms 
196. Id. at 121 ~4.4. Not everyone in Europe is enthusiastic about comparative law inquiries, at 
least comparative studies with the United States. By a vote of 46 for to 73 against, with 6 abstentions, 
the Committee voted down a proposal that would have deleted the recommendation quoted in the text 
for the reason that "U.S. experience with the drafting of framework or standard laws cannot be 
transposed directly to the European Union. In contrast to the European Union, the United States share 
uniform legal concepts." Id. at 127. 
197. Besides such objective factors, there are also important SUbjective factors: the author 
knows German and the German legal system. 
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Statute of 1976. Section C summarizes the principal provisions of the 1976 
Standard Terms Statute as it became part of the German Civil Code in 
2002. 198 Section D examines how the initial proposals for the E.D. Unfair 
Terms Directive challenged the contract model in Germany and how German 
commentators influenced the final form of the Unfair Terms Directive. 
Finally, Section E discusses how German law applies to American Internet 
licenses. 
A. German Judge-Made Law 
The German legal system has long provided some control over the use 
of standard terms. American jurists are used to thinking of the United States as 
a country of judge-made law, while they see Germany as a country of 
legislation, yet for three quarters of the last century, German law controlling 
standard terms was judge-made. 199 In Germany, as in the United States, form 
agreements achieved widespread use by the end of the nineteenth century. 
Already in 1871 a statute that imposed liability on railroads also prohibited 
agreements excluding that liability.200 Given German insistence that judges 
have a basis in statute to act, German judges were not quick to challenge 
standard terms. In 1883 the German Supreme Court (then known as the 
Reichsgericht) held that freedom of contract-in the absence of any 
legislation-precluded courts from intervening to control standard terms no 
matter how offensive the terms might be.201 
When the German Civil Code came into force in 1900, the courts 
acquired a statutory basis for intervention. That basis was in the general 
clauses of the Code, especially in sections 138 and 242. The first paragraph of 
section 138 provides: "A transaction that offends good morals (gute Sitten) is 
void.,,202 One might translate "offend good morals" as "unconscionable.,,203 
Section 242 provides: "Obligations shall be performed in the manner required 
by good faith [Treu und Glauben] , with regard to commercial usage.,,204 
Using these two general clauses, German courts limited enforcement of 
standard terms. 
198. Gesetz zur Modemisierung des Schuldrechts, Statute for Modernizing the Law of 
Obligations, v. 26.11.2001 (BGBI. I s. 3138). 
199. ZWEIGERT & Ki.'>TZ, supra note 23, at 336 (noting that the German law on standard terms 
is "judge-made law of the purest kind, and in creating it the German courts have done a remarkable and 
praiseworthy job without parallel elsewhere"). Accord Baudenbacher, supra note 10, at 341-42 (noting 
that the law was codified in the AGB and contributed to the E.U. Unfair Terms Directive: "Essentially, 
all of Europe (with the exception of Switzerland) lives-or will in the near future live-under a law that 
originated from freely developed judge-made law of the German Supreme Court"). 
200. See Keitz, supra note 18, at A38 (discussing Section 5 of the Imperial Liability Statute 
[Reichshaftpflichtgesetz] of 1871). 
201. Judgment of June 16, 1883, RGZ II, 100 110 (enforcing English language-English law 
based exclusions ofliability). See Kotz, supra note 18, at A30; Brandner in ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN, 
AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 531. 
202. Dawson, supra note 13, at 1046 (providing a comparison of U.C.C. Section 2-302 
unconscionability with the general clauses mentioned here). 
203. For a discussion of the difficulty of translating Section 138, particularly in connection 
with standard terms, see OTTO PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN 
ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW 106-07 (1937) (noting the various translations, ranging from "good 
morals," "boni mores," "public policy" and "unsocial"). 
204. Dawson, supra note 13, at 1044. 
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Through the 1930s German courts relied princ~ally on the good morals 
provision of section 138 to police standard terms.20 Their focus then tended 
to be on monopoly situations where the party presented with the terms had no 
choice but to accept them. 206 In 1935 Ludwig Raiser moved the discussion a 
major step forward by the publication of his post-doctoral dissertation 
(Habilitationsschrift), Das Recht der Allgemeinen Geschiiftsbedingungen, 
which provided a thorough analysis of the problems involved under the then-
applicable law.207 Raiser's book was reprinted in 1961 and to this day is cited 
as a principal source of inspiration in the field.208 Raiser asked whether there 
was a misuse of the freedom of contract not only where the user of standard 
terms has a monopoly position, but also where the user depends upon the 
indifference or legal inexperience of the other party. 209 
Soon after the reestablishment of a democratic government following the 
Nazi dictatorship, the reconstituted German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichts-
hoj) addressed the issue of control of standard terms. While building on the 
work of the old Court, the new Supreme Court put its own stamp on standard-
terms contro1.210 From a technical viewpoint, it shifted from relying on the 
good morals provision of section 138 to the good-faith provision of section 
242.211 But in addition to this seemingly technical change, the Court's 
decisions of the 1950s and 1960s set in motion broader changes in thinking 
that culminated in the Standard Terms Statute. These changes are discussed 
below in Section B. 
Notwithstanding the active role German courts had taken in controlling 
form contracts,z12 by the early 1970s there was consensus that it was time for 
legislation. The consumer movement had gathered stren~th and parties on 
both sides of the legislative aisle sought its approva1.21 The Ministry of 
205. See LUDWIG RAISER, DAS RECHT DER ALLGEMEINEN GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN 280-83 
(1961) (discussing reliance on both provisions and suggestion made to use Section 242). 
206. See Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 531. 
207. Although Raiser's book appeared in the third year of the Nazi dictatorship, it is based on 
the law in force before 1933. Cf PRAUSNITZ, supra note 203, at 106 (noting the "great change" in 
German law since 1933, that the law discussed pre-dated that change, and that as of 1937 no definite 
alternative line of decisions in standard terms had developed). Raiser's crucial point of departure that 
was followed in the 1950s, but since abandoned, was the similarity of standard terms to legal norms. 
Raiser, supra note 205, at 5; see also Schmidt-Salzer, supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
208. See, e.g., Ulmer in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 37-38 
(calling it the "path-breaking investigation"); Hans Erich Brandner, Wege und Zielvorstellungen auf dem 
Gebiet der Allgemeinen Geschiiftsbedingungen, JZ 1973, 613 (noting that in his "unsurpassed work" 
Raiser had recognized all the fundamentals of the issues and often the details); ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, 
supra note 23, at 336 ("pathbreaking"). 
209. RAISER, supra note 205, at 284. See also Kotz, supra note 18, at A31; Ludwig Raiser, 
Vertragsfreiheit heute, JZ 1958, 1,7. 
210. See ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, supra note 23, at 336. 
211. Judgment of Oct. 29, 1956, BGHZ 22, 91. See Helmut Heinrichs, Umsetzung der EG-
Richtlinie iiber mif3briiuchliche Klauseln in Verbrauchervertriigen durch Auslegung Erweiterung des 
Anwendungsbereichs der Inhaltskontrolle, NJW 1995, 153, 156; Manfred Wolf & Thomas Pfeiffer, Der 
richtige Standort des AGB-Rechts innerhalb der BGB, ZRP [Zeitschrift fiIr Rechtspolitik] 2001, 303, 
304. 
212. See Dawson, supra note 13, at 1103. 
213. See ZWEIGERT & K6TZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 358 (Tony Weir, 
trans., 2d ed. 1992). For the history of adoption of the law, see MARIANNE SCHATZ-BERGFELD, 
VERBRAUCHERINTERESSEN 1M POLITISCHEN PROZESS: DAS AGB GESETZ 62-119 (1984); Brandner, supra 
note 208; Wolfgang Eith, Zum Schutzbediirfnis Gegeniiber Allgemeinene Geschiiftsbedingungen, NJW 
1974, 16; Kotz, supra note 18, at A9-Al1. 
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Justice established a working group that proposed legislation, while the 
opposition Christian Democrats prepared a competing proposal. Both drafts 
were available when, in September 1974, the German Jurists' Association 
(Deutscher Juristentag) considered the issue of standard terms contracts at its 
biennial meeting.214 Professor Rein Katz, one of Germany's leading 
comparative-law scholars, was commissioned to write a 100-page review of 
standard terms for the meeting, which he titled "Which Legislative Measures 
Recommend Themselves for the Protection of the Consumer Against General 
Terms and Form Contracts?,,215 The title of Professor Katz's report-provided 
to him by the Association-is significant. It is "which le~islative measures" 
and not, "whether legislative measures" are called for.2 6 There was little 
opposition to having some form of strengthened control. Indeed, the political 
parties all agreed on the final bill and it passed both houses of the German 
I . I . I 217 egIS ature unammous y. 
Dissatisfaction with judge-made law was grounded not in its content but 
in its efficacy. The problem was one of judge-made law generally and not just 
of judge-made law of standard terms. Above all, judge-made law is limited in 
its scope. Courts can act only in cases that are brought to them, so their 
decisions have a limited effect. Court control of terms often did not take place 
because of the risks of litigation (in Germany, the losing party pays the costs). 
Courts could control only the most flagrant abuses; they were not seen as well 
suited to deal with more subtle abuses. Even parties subject to adverse 
decisions could readily reformulate their standard terms. Judge-made law was 
criticized for an absence of concrete provisions and for uneven application by 
lower COurtS.218 
Judge-made law also posed a risk that the German legal system takes 
particularly seriously: that judges might make political decisions. In German 
214. Rolf StUmer, Die Verhandlungen der Abteilung Allgemeine Geschiiftsbedingungen, JZ 
1974,720. 
215. Kiitz, supra note 18, at AI. 
216. Manfred Wolf, Gesetz und Richterrecht bei Allgemeinen Geschiiftsbedingungen, JZ 1974, 
465 (making the same point). 
217. Ulmer in ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 43, margin no. 19. 
Bunte notes that between 1974 and 1977, the conviction that there was a need for legislative action was 
"firmly anchored" in the public, the political parties, and the scholarly community. Bunte, supra note 
137, at 921-22. Even a foreign observer noted the consensus months before the statute was passed. See 
Dawson, supra note 13, at 1117 ("It seems that all now agree on the need for comprehensive 
legislation."). See also Amtliche BegrUndung zum Regierungsentwurf eines AGB-Gesetztes, 
Drucksache 7/3919, Teil AS, at 11, reprinted in ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, 
KOMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ ZUR REGELUNG DES RECHTS DER ALLGEMEINEN GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN 
22-24 (1st ed. 1977) (discussing the political climate and steps taken toward a law). For a contrary view 
of the law's adoption, see MANFRED THAMM & GERHARD PILGER, TASCHENKOMMENTAR ZUM AGB-
GESETZ 41 (1998) (describing the hearing given business interests as a "pure alibi event"). 
218. For discussions of the problems of using judge-made law, see THOMAS BECKER, DIE 
AUSLEGUNG DES § 9 ABS. 2 AGB-GESETZ 19-20 (1986); Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, 
AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 567, margin no. 63; Bunte, supra note 137, at 922; Dawson, supra 
note 13, at 1117; Max Dietiein, Neues Kontrollverfahrenfor Allgemeine Geschiiftsbedingungen?, NJW 
1974, 1065, at 1065 (calling such an action "a lottery with a very high price"); Kl:itz, supra note 18, at 
A47-A56 (noting that protection by the courts would be really effective only if the party could bring an 
action against the use of the terms and that action would be effective against all who use such terms); 
Manfred Wolf, Vorschliige for eine gesetzliche Regelung der Allgemeinen Geschiiftsbedingungen, JZ 
1974, 41, at 41. See also Amtliche Begrilndung zum Regierungsentwurf eines AGB-Geseztes, supra 
note 217, at 20-21. For a comparable discussion of American law, see Bates, supra note IS. 
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understanding, political decisions are for the legislature and for politically 
responsible executors and administrators. The application of law should be 
objective. Categorizing certain types of standard tenns as unlawful might 
constitute political decision-making if the illegality of the tenns were not 
already sufficiently set out, explicitly or implicitly, in a statute.219 
Legislation offered a remedy for these deficiencies and a way to avoid 
this risk. Legislation is proactive. It can be systematic and have universal 
effect. 220 It can bring about a reconsideration of standard tenns generally in a 
way that single court decisions cannot. Legislation can thus bring a breadth of 
application and reduce the incidence of objectionable standard tenns. 
Legislation can provide increased legal certainty. 221 Legislation is the 
appropriate place for political decisions that approve or disapprove use of 
particular provisions. In a democratic state, the affected social groups have an 
opportunity to participate in these political decisions.222 
Typically in Gennan and other continental legal systems, comparative 
law inquiries precede substantial legislation.223 That was the case with the 
Standard Tenns Statute, where such inquiries had an important role in the 
movement from judge-made law to legislation.224 In 1967 the Association for 
Comparative Law (Gesellschaft for Rechtsvergleichung) sponsored a 
symposium at its biennial convention in which experts presented papers 
setting out the treatment of standard tenns in Gennany, France, Great Britain, 
Italy, Switzerland, Scandinavia, and Israel. Ludwig Raiser himself presented 
the final overall report.225 He began his report lamenting that he could not 
219. See James R. Maxeiner, u.s. "Methods Awareness" (Methodenbewufltsein) for German 
Jurists, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER 114, (Bernhard GroBfeld et al. eds., 1998); JAMES 
R. MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY (1986). 
220. Wolf, supra note 216, at 465. Cf Dietlein, supra note 218; Katz, supra note 18, at A47. 
221. Bunte, supra note 137, at 922 (noting ten years later a breadth of effect not possible with 
judge-made law); Stiirner, supra note 214. 
222. Stiirner, supra note 214. Robert E. Scott, Is Article 2 the Best We Can Do?, 52 HASTINGS 
L.J. 677, 689 (2001) (explaining the death of Revised Article 2: "I think it's naive to believe that a non-
governmental, non-elected, elitist body of insiders can ever get those kind of rules right, whatever we 
mean by 'right.' Consumer issues raise important value choices and difficult normative questions that 
are best resolved through the ordinary legislative and judicial process."). See also MAXEINER, supra note 
219. 
223. See Schlesinger, supra note 37, at 14-15. 
224. See Hans Erich Brandner, Wege und Zielvorstellungen auf dem Gebiet der Allgemeinen 
Geschiiftsbedingungen, JZ 1973, 613, 613, 618 (noting the comparative law inquiries as one of the 
distinguishing characteristics of this as the second "generation" of standard terms law and describing 
them as "important"). 
225. Ludwig Raiser, Die richterliche Kontrolle von Allgemeinen Geschiiftsbedingungen, in 
RICHTERLICHE KONTROLLE VON ALLGEMEINEN GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN 123 (Ernst Caemmerer ed., 
1968). There were many other comparative studies. Raiser's nephew did one devoted to the United 
States. RAISER, supra note 42. For other studies from the 1960s that include the United States, see 
EUGEN AUER, DIE RICHTERLICHE KORREKTUR VON STANDARDVERTRAGEN (1964) (comparing judicial 
review of standard form contracts in Germany, Switzerland and the United States); EIKE VON HIPPEL, 
DIE KONTROLLE DER VERTRAGSFREIHEIT NACH ANGLO-AMERlKANISCHEM RECHT (1963); Eike von 
Hippel, The Control of Exemption Clauses-A Comparative Study, 16 lNT'L & COMPo L.Q. 591 (1967). 
For book-length studies of English law from that time, see THEO KADE, RICHTERLICHE KONTROLLE VON 
FORMULARMASSIGEN HAFTUNGSFRElZEICHNUNGEN 1M ENGLISCHEN RECHT (1970) and STANISLAUS 
PRINZ zu SAYN-WITTGENSTEIN-BERLEBURG, ALLGEMEINE GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN 1M ENGLISCHEN 
RECHT: EINE VERGLEICHENDE UNTERSUCHUNG (1969). The Swiss study concluded that the supposedly 
flexible common law system was much less flexible than the supposedly formalistic civil law system. 
AUER, supra. The Standard Terms Statute did not put a stop to such comparative studies. For two book-
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provide empirical studies of the incidence of standard terms and their abuses. 
Their ubiquity, however, could not be doubted. And so too, Raiser said, was 
the need for judicial control of their abuses.226 
Raiser discussed in particular how the presence or absence of content 
controls impacted controls on incorporation and interpretation. He observed of 
the courts of different countries that the less emphasis they placed on 
incorporation and interpretation, the more they were inclined to control 
content of standard terms directly; and, the more timid they were in 
controlling content directly, the more likely they were to scrutinize strictly-
perhaps too strictly-incorporation and interpretation.227 While most countries 
tended to focus on incorporation and interpretation, Raiser reported that 
German and American courts, the latter with perhaps some reluctance, were 
increasingly resorting to direct content control. Responding to criticisms that 
control under section 242 of the German Civil Code was too indefinite, he 
pointed to the newly adopted section 2-302 of the U.C.C. as another example 
I 228 of a very broad cause. 
The legislative history of the Standard Terms Statute demonstrates the 
importance of comparative inquiry in the legislation. The official government 
report on the proposed bill devoted a subsection to foreign experiences. It 
drew attention to the then relatively few statutes that expressly regulated 
standard terms, in particular the Israeli Standard Contracts Law. It noted that 
in Sweden and the United States general prohibitions of inequitable terms 
applied. It took particular note ofU.C.C. section 2-302, which it observed was 
used principally and increasingly against form contracts. It observed that 
contrary to fears that section 2-302 would endanger legal certainty, groups of 
cases and approaches were giving the general clause firm contours. 229 
B. The Contract Model 
Consensus that action was needed contributed to the adoption of the 
Standard Terms Statute. Equally helpful was a large measure of consensus as 
to how the statute should limit unfair standard terms without excessively 
restricting freedom of contract. 
Control of standard terms challenges freedom of contract: how can 
courts control terms in parties' contracts without throwing freedom of contract 
overboard?230 Default provisions in contract law permit parties to agree to 
length studies since that have included the United States, see MUNZ, supra note 33; WILFRID 
SCHLOCHTERMEYER, DAS RECHT DER ALLGEMEINEN GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN IN KANADA MIT 
BEZUGEN ZUM DEUTSCHEN, ENGLISCHEN, FRANZOSISCHEN UND US-AMERIKANISCHEN RECHT (1985) 
(discussing Canadian law with references to American, English, French, and Gennan law). 
226. Raiser, supra note 225, at 141 (noting that control was "essential"). 
227. !d. at 138-39. Accord Brandner, supra note 224, at 614 (noting with a comparison to Italy, 
that when there are high demands for knowledge of tenns, once knowledge is shown, there is an 
inclination to treat standard fonn contracts as negotiated contracts); ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 23, 
at 335-36. For a recent, similar comment about drafting in America, see Amelia H. Boss, Taking UCITA 
on the Road: What Lessons Have We Learned?, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 167, 192 (2001). 
228. RAISER, supra note 42, at 127-28. 
229. Amtliche Begriindung zum Regierungsentwurf eines AGB-Geseztes, supra note 217, at 
21-22. 
230. See RAISER, supra note 42, at 25-35 (discussing the transition from Section 138 to Section 
242 and the problems arising from using Section 242 to set limits on private autonomy). 
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results different from those prescribed by law. If parties assent to those 
differing results, they are bound by them. If parties use standard terms, when 
should they be bound by them? The German answer, which the Supreme 
Court had already begun to develop in the 1950s, is referred to here as the 
"contract model.,,231 
German standard terms law recognizes that when standard terms are 
used there is little freedom of contract for the party subject to them.232 While 
the user typically consults legal counsel to draft them and takes care that the 
terms work to his or her benefit, the other party rarely does. Thus, though the 
terms are typically the focus of the user's daily life, the other party is engaged 
in many transactions, each different from the other. The cost to the other party 
of exercising the right of freedom of contract is excessive. 
Standard terms problems arise because some users exploit their control 
over drafting to resolve all issues in their favor in order to override results 
provided by law. Yet,the parties have never agreed on these points. Instead, 
parties subject to standard terms take those terms as givens. Parties accepting 
standard terms negotiate principal issues of price and performance and then 
allow users to provide 'appropriate terms. In effect, they delegate to users the 
responsibility to draft terms. Users take upon themselves the obligation to 
provide suitable terms in good faith.233 Good faith requires that those terms be 
even-handed. As the German Supreme Court explained in an early decision: 
[IJt depends upon how to evaluate the statements as the expression of the intention of 
judicious and honest parties, who want to give their business dealings a general 
contractual framework. The circumstance has to be taken into account, that the principal 
[AuftraggeberJ need not know in detail the content of the standard terms. Since, on the 
other hand, it needs his assent to be bound, his agreement can relate only to such terms as 
he can reasonably and fairly expect to be asserted. 234 
231. Cj Hermann-Josef Bunte, Gedanken zur Harmonisierung in der EG auf dem Gebiet der 
mif3briiuchlichen Klauseln in Verbrauchervertriigen, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR HORST LOCHER ZUM 65. 
GEBURTSTAG, 325, 331 (Peter Uiffelmann & Hermann Korbion, eds., 1990) (referring generally to the 
Vertragsmodell of German private law). 
232. KARL LARENZ, LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDRECHTS, ERSTER BAND, ALLGEMElNER TElL, 68 
(10th ed. 1970). 
233. Brandner in ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 616 (citing 
BGHZ 54, 106, (109)). 
234. Judgment of Mar. 8, 1955, BGHZ 17, 1 (3) (citations omitted). Dawson hinted that 
Llewellyn might have drawn on the Court's decisions from the 1950s for his idea of "blanket assent." 
See supra text accompanying note 32. The parallels to this very case are remarkable. Consider that only 
five years later Llewellyn wrote on "blanket assent": 
There has been accompanying that basic deal another which, ifnot on any fiduciary basis, 
at least involves a plain expression of confidence, asked and accepted, with a 
corresponding limit on the powers granted: the boiler-plate is assented to en bloc, "sight, 
unseen," on the implicit assumption and to the full extent that (I) it does not alter or 
impair the fair meaning of the dickered terms when read alone, and (2) that its terms are 
neither in the particular nor in the net manifestly unreasonable and unfair. 
LLEWELLYN, supra note 32, at 370-71. Further, "Any contract with boiler-plate results in two separate 
contracts: the dickered deal, and the collateral one of supplementary boilerplate." [d. at 371. Todd 
Rakoff, who reviewed only Llewellyn's comments, concluded that "[hJe apparently means that the 
adherent assents in the sense of reposing confidence, within limits, in the drafting party to fill in the 
terms of the deal." Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. 
REv. 1174, 1200 (1983). Rakoff found that assumption "very weak" and recommended abandoning it. 
[d. It is, however, the basis of the German law. Cj John Dawson, The General Clauses, Viewed from a 
Distance, in RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FOR INTERNATIONALES UND AUSLANDISCHES PRIVATRECHT 41, 441, 
452-53 (1977) ("[I]t came to be seen that most of the text on printed forms was not read and, if so, was 
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Good faith requires that the user of standard tenns not subject the other party 
to an unreasonable disadvantage.235 
German standard tenns law sets limits on the freedom of users to exploit 
their position as drafters to their sole benefit. It prohibits them from taking 
inappropriate advantage of other parties. Thus, the issue is not controlling the 
freedom-of-contract (Vertragsfreiheit) of parties, but of preventing abuse by 
one party, the user, of that party's freedom of contract-drafting (Vertrags-
I '.(;·h· ) 236 gesta tungsJrel elt. 
In Gennan theory, the contract model does not limit freedom of contract. 
The parties may agree to the tenns they like. What the contract model does is 
prevent one party from using the drafting device of standard tenns to 
introduce tenns that unreasonably disadvantage the other party. The contract 
model does not ask whether the deal or a particular tenn between the parties is 
fair; it asks whether the standard tenns provided by the user are a good faith 
basis for the parties' contractual relationship. . 
The contract model compares a challenged standard tenn to two 
principal measures of validity: the essential basic principles ofthe statute from 
which the standard tenn deviates and the essential rights or duties necessary to 
achieve the purposes of the contract.237 Unlike the potentially far-reaching 
inquiry mandated by American law,m the scope of the contract model is 
largely limited to the standard tenn challenged, the relevant statutory default 
rules, and the contract concerned. It requires only review of transactions of the 
type and classes of participants concerned, but not of the circumstances of the 
individual parties to the particular transaction.239 The relevant statute serves a 
"classifying and guiding function" (Ordnungs-und Leitbildfunktion). 240 This 
approach of the contract model is tenned "abstract-universal" (abstrakt-
seldom understood by the signers, that this made nonsense of the usual tests of mutual assent, that the 
draftsmen of such documents were in substance and effect law-makers. So the conclusion took firm hold 
that there should be cast on them the responsibility oflaw-makers to distribute even-handed justice."). 
235. § 307(1) BDRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [Civil Code] [hereinafter BGB]. 
236. See Gesetzesentwurf-Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modernisierung des Schuldrechts [Draft 
Legislation for the Modernization of Contract Law], May 14, 2001, Drucksache 14/6040 at 149 (2001); 
Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 529, margin no. 1; 
Hermann Josef Bunte, Die EG-Richtlinie iJber miJ3briiuchliche Klauseln Verbrauchervertriigen und ihre 
Umsetzung durch das Gesetz zur A"nderung des AGB-Gesetzes, DB [DER BETRIEB] 1996, 1389, and text 
accompanying note 22; Bunte, Zehn Jahre, supra note 137, at 923; Reinhard Damm, Europiiisches 
Verbrauchervertragsrecht und AGB-Recht, JZ 1994, 161, 166-67; Heinrichs in PALANDT, GESETZ ZUR 
MODERNISIERUNG DES SCHULDRECHTS, ERGANZUNGSBAND ZU PALANDT, BDRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 
101, margin nos. 8-9 (61st ed. 2002) [hereinafter PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB]; Horst Locher, Das 
AGB-Gesetz und VOB Teil B, in VOB-Teile A und B-Kommentar, 506 margin no. 3 (Heinz Ingenstau & 
Hermann Korbion, eds., 14th ed. 2001); see also AVER, supra note 225, at 99-100, 102 (making the 
same point before the statute was adopted). 
237. § 307(2) BGB, supra note 235; see Gesetzesentwurf-Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Modernisierung des Schuldrechts, supra note 236, at 149; Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, 
AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 617 (noting that deviation from default law is not the basis for the 
control, but the measure); Eike Schmidt, Inhaltskontrolle von Schuldvertriigen, DRiZ [Deutsche 
Richterzeitung] 1991, 81, 83. 
238. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
239. See Judgment of Oct. 29,1956, BGHZ 22, 91 (98); Judgment of Mar. 8,1955, supra note 
234 at (3); Kiitz, supra note 18, at A51; Schmidt-Salzer, supra note 99, at 1262 (commenting that to a 
foreign observer not familiar with the "dogmatic-conceptual" phase of German standard terms law, this 
appears as "a simply incomprehensible approach to the problem"). 
240. JOACHIM SCHMIDT-SALZER, ALLGEMEINE GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN 186-89 (2d ed. 1977). 
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generellen) rather than "particular-personalized" (konkret-individuellen).241 It 
has pennitted German law, through a combination of statutory rules and 
judicial decisions, to develop a ~udicature of specific prohibited terms in each 
of their multiple manifestations. 42 
The contract model is oriented on general contract law. As a result, 
although the catalyst for passage of the Standard Terms Statute was the 
consumer movement, it was not limited, as the Unfair Terms Directive is, to 
consumer contracts. The German law exists to prevent abuse of the freedom 
of contract drafting by those controlling the drafting of terms. The German 
law accordingly protects all parties against misuse of standard terms.243 The 
law requires no finding of weakness in the party subjected to the terms or 
oppression by the user. German standard terms law thus is not a special law 
protecting consumers against overbearing suppliers. It is a general law that 
governs a particular contract practice, i.e. standard terms.244 The legislation is 
an explicit approval of the use of standard terms and an acknowledgment of 
the rationalization benefits they bring. It defends the freedom of contract. 245 
C. German Standard Terms Legislation 
The Standard Terms Statute, Das Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der 
Allgemeinen Geschiiflsbedingungen (AGB-Gesetz), entered into force on April 
1, 1977. The law quickly assumed a central role in German contract law.246 
From 1977 to 1999 the German Supreme Court alone, not to speak of the 
lower courts, decided more than 1500 cases dealing with the Standard Terms 
Statute.247 The Standard Terms Statute remained a separate statute until 
241. See Judgment of July 4, 1997, V ZR 405/96, CR 1998, 286 (287); Damm, supra note 236, 
at 172-174; Helmut Heinrichs, Die EG-Richtlinie iiber mij3briiuchliche Klauseln in 
Verbrauchervertriigen, NJW 1993, 1817, 1820; Joachim Schmidt-Salzer, Transformation der EG-
Richtlinie iiber mij3briiuchliche Klauseln in Verbrauchervertriigen in deutsches Recht und AGB-Gesetz, 
BB [BE1RlEBS-BERATOR] 1995, 734-36. 
242. Even before the Standard Terms Statute, Kiitzjudged the effort a success. See Kiitz, supra 
note 18, at A51 (noting that the courts did not rely on unchecked control using indefinite general 
clauses, but developed case groups, clause varieties, and contract types). 
243. This legislative decision is consistent with practice prior to the adoption of the law, which 
policed standard terms without regard to whether a consumer was involved. Most leading cases before 
the statute was adopted, in fact, involved contracts between merchants. See Eith, supra note 213, at 17; 
accord Bunte, supra note 137, at 925. Eith's article is a contemporary argument against limitation to 
consumer protection. While in principle it protects all parties equally, as will be discussed, it does allow 
for treatment of businesspersons that is different from that of consumers. See infra text accompanying 
notes 294-96. The provisions of the Civil Code on standard terms, i.e., Sections 305 to 310, are written 
in terms of general applicability and refer to the user of the terms and the other party to the contract. 
Section 310 then provides that certain provisions do not apply to contracts with a businessperson 
(Unternehmer). Businessperson is defined in Section 14 I to be "a natural or legal person or a legally 
capable association of persons, at the conclusion of a legal transaction, acting in exercise of a 
commercial or independent professional activity." 
244. Schmidt-Salzer, supra note 241, at 734-36. 
245. Markus Stoffels, Schranken der Inhaltskontrolle, JZ 2001,843,844 (discussing AGB § 8, 
the provision that became § 307(3) BGB without change, and noting the limitations of § 307(3) that 
keep price and performance terms firmly in the hands of the contracting parties). 
246. Oliver Remien, AGB-Gesetz und Richtlinie iiber mij3briiuchliche Verbrauchervertrags-
klauseln in ihrem europiiischen Urnfeld, ZEuP 1994, 34 ("Since the Standard Terms Statute was passed, 
contract law in Germany is above all the law of the control of standard terms."). 
247. The cases are listed at ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETz, supra note 54, at 1735-
88 .. 
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January 1, 2002, when its substantive provisions became part of the Civil 
Code and its procedural provisions became part of a new procedural statute. 248 
No major changes were made in the substantive law as it stood at the end of 
2001.2 9 During its 25-year life, while certain details were adjusted, the law 
experienced no major amendments. The most noteworthy event in its life was 
its harmonization with the E.U. Directive.25o The law is widely regarded as a 
success.251 In some sectors of the economy, use of standard terms increased 
upon adoption of the law.252 
This article refers to the standard terms legislation by the new Civil 
Code section numbers rather than by the section numbers of the Standard 
Terms Statute. Set out below is a transposition table that identifies those 
provisions by their section numbers in the Standard Terms Statute. Attached 
as an Appendix to this article is an English translation of the Civil Code 
provisions. 
248. The Standard Tenns Statute was made part of the Law of Obligations, i.e., Book 2 of the 
Civil Code. Some commentators argued that it should remain a free-standing law or should be made part 
of the General Part, i.e., Book 1 of the Civil Code, since its effect is not limited to contracts falling under 
Book 2, Law of Obligations. See, e.g., Peter Ulmer, Das AGB-Gesetz-ein eigenstiindiges 
Kodifikationswerk, JZ 2001, 491. Wolf & Pfeiffer, supra note 209, at 303, 304. Complete transposition 
tables are given at Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, and in the supplement to 













§§ 1 and 2 
§ 23 (part) 
§4 
§§ 3 and 5 
§6 
§7 
§§ 8 and 9 
§ 10 
§11 
§ 23 (part) 
249. Heinrichs in Palandt, BOB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236 at 100, margin no. 2. For a 
comprehensive review of the changes, see Friedrich Graf von Westphalen, AGB-Recht ins BGB-Eine 
erste Bestandsaufnahme, NJW 2002, 12. 
250. See infra text accompanying notes 332-39. 
251. Twice in the last decade there was cause to evaluate the success of the law: first, when it 
was amended to implement the E.U. Unfair Tenns Directive, and second, when it was incorporated into 
the Civil Code in the obligations law refonn. With respect to the fonner, see, for example, Martin W. 
Huff, Kleingedrucktes for Europa, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZElTUNG, May 17, 1993, at 15. Huffs 
editorial, appearing in the business section of a leading conservative newspaper, argued that the call for 
narrowing the Gennan law as part of the hannonization with E.U. law was not a good idea, since the 
Gennan law had proven to be a success. See also Gesetzeentwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines 
Gesetzes zur Anderung des AGB-Gesetzes [Draft Legislation to Change the Standard Tenns Law], Feb. 
10, 1995, Drucksache 13/2713 at III; Hans W. Miklitz, AGB-Gesetz und die EG-Richtlinie iiber 
mifibriiuchliche Vertragsklauseln in Werbrauchervertriigen, ZEP [Zeitschrift filr Europliisches 
Privatrecht] 1993, 522, 524 (stating so "sounds the canon in unison"). With respect to the latter, see, for 
example, Horst Locher, Das AGB-Gesetz und VOB Teil B, in VOB-Teile A und B-Kommentar, 505 
margin n.3 (Heinz Ingenstau & Hennann Korbion eds., 14th ed. 2001); see also Ulmer, in 
ULMERIBRANDNERlHENSEN, supra note 54, at 491 (noting general recognition that it was one of the 
more successful laws of the last several decades). For one dissonant voice-and that quite so-see 
THAMM & PILGER, supra note 217, at 47 ("overwhelmingly, materially negative"); id. at 49 ("a 
defectively designed statute"). 
252. Bunte, supra note 137, at 922. 
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The standard terms law consists of two principal parts: an incorporation 
control in sections 305 to 305c, and a content control in sections 307 to 309.253 
The definition of "standard terms" in section 305(1) largely determines the 
scope of the law. Standard terms are terms prepared beforehand for a multiple 
number of contracts and are presented (stellt) by the user to the other party at 
the contract's conclusion.254 The form in which the terms appear does not 
matter and they mayor may not be separate from the rest of the contract. 
section 305 provides that terms separately negotiated between the parties are 
not standard terms and are not subject to control under the standard terms 
I . I· 255 egIs attOn. 
1. Incorporation Controls 
Besides defining standard terms, section 305 provides the general rule 
for when standard terms become part of a contract as a body. Sections 30Sa 
through 30Sc modify the general rule of section 305. Section 30Sa provides 
special rules for the transportation and telecommunication industries; Section 
30Sb provides that individually negotiated terms take priority over standard 
terms, and section 30Sc provides incorporation and interpretation rules for 
individual terms. 
Section 305(2) requires that users of standard terms give other parties 
notice and an opportunity to review the terms. Standard terms do not become 
part of the contract unless they comply with these formalities and the other 
party assents to their use. The notice may be oral or in writing. If, for certain 
types of contracts, an express notice creates disproportionate difficulties, a 
suitable sign at the place of contracting may suffice. The notice must be 
apparent to an average customer. Thus, for example, if a reference in a 
contract to the terms is to be sufficient notice, that reference must be so 
conspicuous that it could not be overlooked even in a fleeting review of the 
contract. 256 The reference must be made at the same time as the contract and is 
not effective if made only once the contract is concluded. Thus, for example, a 
reference on a ticket of admission to a theatre is insufficient, since the ticket is 
provided only after the contract is reached.257 The user of standard terms must 
provide the other party with an opportunity to review the standard terms, but 
is not required to provide the terms unsolicited.258 The critical moment is 
253. In the Standard Terms Statute the statutory subdivisions made the separation explicit. The 
four sections dealing with content control (§§ 8-11) were collected together in a separate second 
subdivision, "Invalid Terms"; the first section in the subdivision, Section 8, had the caption "Limits of 
the Content Control." Sections relating to definition, incorporation, interpretation, and legal effect of 
invalidity were collected together in a first subdivision, "General Provisions." 
254. This is the general rule, but to comply with the Unfair Terms Directive, the law has been 
revised to ease these requirements in consumer transactions. See infra text accompanying note 266. 
255. Although they are still subject to the general clauses of the Civil Code. See MUNZ, supra 
note 33, at 240-41. . 
256. Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 305, at 106, margin no. 29 
(with case citation); Ulmer in ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 2, at 207, 
margin no. 27. 
257. Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 305, at 106, margin no. 30 
(with case citations). 
258. The legislature did not adopt a proposal to require furnishing a copy of the terms without 
awaiting a request. See Ulmer in ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN, supra note 54, § 2, at 220, margin no. 46. 
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when the customer makes the contractual commitment; sending the terms after 
the commitment is made will ordinarily not suffice.259 
Section 31 O( 1) provides that neither the notice nor the opportunity to 
review requirements apply directly to contracts between businesspersons.26o 
They are subject to the general rules of the Civil Code for contracts generally. 
Often in contracts between businesspersons both parties use standard terms, 
which leads to the problem known in the United States as the "battle of the 
forms" and governed by section 2-207 of the u.C.c. 26 \ 
Section 305c(1)(1) provides that surprising terms do not become part of 
the contract. A term is surprising if, under the circumstances, in particular in 
view of the external appearance of the contract, it is so unusual that the other 
party would not expect it. Decisive is not a term's unfairness, but its 
unusualness.262 A classic example of a clause prohibited as surprising is one 
that requires a bu:?t;er of a product to obtain necessary service for the product 
from the seller. 63 Businesspersons receive the full protection of this 
provision.264 Section 305c(2) provides that any doubts in construction of a 
standard term are to be resolved against the user. Section 305b provides that 
individually negotiated terms take priority over standard terms. Thus, for 
example, if the parties agree on a delive~ date, that agreement is not 
superseded by a standard term allowing delay. 65 
2. Content Control 
The heart of German standard terms legislation is its control of the 
content of standard terms. 266 The content control consists of three parts: a 
general clause (section 307); a list of terms that may be prohibited (section 
308, sometimes called the "gray list"); and a list of terms that are prohibited 
(section 309, sometimes called the "black list"). 
A court reviewing challenged terms is first to confirm that the 
challenged terms have become part of the contract under sections 305 through 
305c. It is then to test them against the content controls, looking first to the 
prohibited list, then to the suspect list, and only finally to the general clause.267 
259. See id. § 2 at 222-23, margin no. 48. 
260. § 310(1) BGB, supra note 235. 
261. See KARL LARENZ, ALLGEMEINER TElL DES DEUTSCHEN BORGERLICHEN RECHTS 489 (4th 
ed. 1977); Ulmer in ULMER/BRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 2, at 245-63 
(discussing when standard terms become part of agreements between businesspersons). 
262. Ulmer in ULMER/BRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 3, at 302, margin 
no. 1 308, margin no. 12; Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236 § 305c at 112, 
margin no. 3 (with case citation). The test for unusualness is with respect to contracts of that type. Ulmer 
in ULMER/BRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 3, at 310, margin no. 14; Schmidt in 
ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 12, at 1453, margin no. 11. 
263. Ulmer in ULMER/BRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GEsETz, supra note 54, § 3, at 319, margin 
no. 26. 
264. Id., § 3, at 345, margin no. 54. 
265. Id., § 4, at 363, margin no. 22 (with case citations). 
266. Brandner in ULMER/BRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54 at 490 ("das 
Kernstuc!c"); Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 307, at 119, margin no. 2. 
267. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 539, margin 
no. 15. 
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Section 307(3) explicitly limits the content control to standard terms that 
provide for changes and additions to default law. It thereby excludes from the 
content control the fundamental terms of the bargain, namely performances 
and price?68 The limitation of the content control to standard terms is 
designed to insure that the control does not itself interfere with the free market 
d . 269 an pnvate autonomy. 
The question of validity is a question of law. Fact questions and the 
burden of proof playa subordinate role. The facts necessary to decide whether 
a term improperly creates a material disadvantage are usually undisputed. The 
determination that the disadvantage is unreasonable is purely a matter of law 
and allows for no taking of proof.270 To a substantial extent, the evaluation 
can be abstract and objective. 
Sections 308 and 309 list prohibited and suspect terms. The two sections 
are considered to be applications of the general clause of section 307.271 
Section 309 lists eight types of prohibited terms.272 It voids without evaluation 
terms on the list. Thus, for example, section 309(7) voids a term that excludes 
or limits liability for personal injury ("life, body, health") or for gross 
negligence.273 Section 308 lists thirteen types of suspect terms. It does not 
presume that terms of the types listed are invalid but requires an evaluation of 
the particular term.274 For example, section 308(1) requires determination of 
whether a period of time reserved to accept or reject an offer or to perform is 
"inappropriately long or not sufficiently definite." 
Sections 308 and 309 are intended to increase legal certainty. While few 
would doubt they have made a positive contribution, the extent to which they 
have done so may be debatable. Their catalogues provide fixed points of 
departure. If a term falls under section 309, no further examination is 
necessary. If a term that falls under section 308, it is tested under specified 
measures. 
Section 31 O( 1) removes standard terms used with businesspersons from 
the direct controls of sections 308 and 309. However, it leaves those terms 
subject to testing under the general clause of section 307. Its practical effect is 
to let courts decide whether section 308 and 309 controls make sense in 
business contexts. 275 In practice, courts tend to apply them anyway to 
268. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 8, at 495, margin 
no. 1; Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 307 at 125, margin no. 54. 
However, this does not exclude from the content control terms that relate to price. [d. at 125, margin no. 
60; cf E.U. Unfair Terms Directive art. 4(2). 
269. Stoffels, supra note 245, at 844. 
270. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 635, margin 
no. 162; LARENZ, supra note 261, at 501. See Decision of Oct. 24, 2001, VIII ARZ 1101, BGHZ 8, 
1(01), available at http://www.bgh-free.de. 
271. Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 307, at 119, margin no. 2. 
272. The introduction to the list alerts readers that the list assumes that the term in question is 
not already prohibited by some other provision oflaw. 
273. The entire list is in the Appendix. 
274. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 538, margin 
no. 12. 
275. The extent to which the courts, in applying the general clause to agreements between 
businesspersons, should look to Sections 308 and 309 is controversial. See Brandner in 
ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 538, margin no. 13. For a book 
devoted solely to the question, see REINHARD LUTZ, AGB-KoNTROLLE 1M HANDELSVERKEHR UNTER . 
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standard terms with business~ersons, by analogy.276 In some areas, that 
application is nearly automatic. 77 
The general clause, section 307, tests standard terms not caught by 
sections 308 and 309. The first sentence of subsection (1) of section 307 
makes invalid (unwirksam) certain standard terms "if, contrary to the 
requirement of good faith, they place the contractual partner of the user at an 
unreasonable (unangemessene) disadvantage." 
Application of section 307(1) to a particular standard term looks to what 
the legal positions of the parties would be if there were no such term.278 
Courts determine whether the user of the term has one-sidedly exploited 
control over drafting. Courts focus on the default solution and on the change 
in legal result. They are not supposed to be concerned with the situation of 
individual parties.279 Courts find users have not complied with the good faith 
requirement when terms are entirely one-sided and take no account of the 
other parties. They require that obligations imposed by standard terms be 
reasonable in relation both to the user's own interests and the burden imposed 
on the other party. In making these determinations, courts rely on other 
fundamental principles of German law such as necessity (Erforderlichkeit) 
and proportionality (Verhiiltnismiifiigkeit).28o They do not void terms simply 
because the terms impose burdens. For example, they do not find that a party 
subject to a standard term is unreasonably disadvantaged if the term is not 
very burdensome281 or if it im~oses an obligation that would be expected of 
the party in good faith anyway. 82 
Section 307 does not consist solely of the general clause prohibition in 
its first sentence. The balance of the section guides application of the general 
clause. The second sentence of the first paragraph provides that an 
unreasonable disadvantage may be found in contract language that is not clear 
BERUCKSICHTIGUNG DER KLAUSELVERBOTE (1991). 
276. Gerald Spindler, Haftungsklauseln in Provider-Vertriigen: Probleme der Inhaltskontrolle, 
CR 1999, 626, 627. 
277. Christian Schubel, Schuldrechtsreform: Perspektivenwechsel im Bargerlichen Recht und 
AGB-Kontrolle for den Handelskauf, JZ 2001, 1113, 1115. See also Hans Erich Brandner & Peter 
Ulmer, EG-Richtlinie aber mifibriiuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverttiigen: Kritische Bemerkungen 
zum Vorschlag der EG-Kommission, BB 1991,703 (finding extensive uniformity). 
278. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETz, supra note 54, § 9, at 571 margin 
no. 70 (with case citations); Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 307, at 120 
margin no. 8 (with case citations). Presumably this process is regarded simply as construction of the 
statute and not as law-making itself. While German courts routinely rely on judge-made law, it is not for 
the judges to make policy decisions. See MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN 
ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 219, at 39-44. 
279. Judgment of July 4, 1997, supra note 241 at 287 (requiring instead an "iiberindividuell-
generalisierende, typisierende, von den konkreten Umstanden des Einzelfalls absehende Betrachtungs-
weise"). See Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 571 margin 
no. 70. 
280. Bunte, Die EG-Richtlinie, supra note 236, at text accompanying note 13. Regarding 
necessity and proportionality and their general importance, see James R. Maxeiner, Constitutionalizing 
Forfeiture Law-The German Example, 27 AM. J. COMPo L. 635, 649 (1979). For proportionality, see 
generally HANS KUTSCHER ET AL., DER GRUNDSATZ DER VERHALTNISMASSIGKEIT IN EUROpAISCHEN 
RECHTSORDNUNGEN (1985). 
281. Schubel, supra note 277, at 1114-15 (discussing the tendency to avoid any departure from 
dispositive law). 
282. For this paragraph generally, see Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, 
supra note 54, § 9, at 571-74, margin nos. 70-74. 
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and comprehensible. The second paragraph provides for two situations when 
an unreasonable disadvantage is to be presumed. Section 307(2)(1) presumes 
an unreasonable disadvantage when a standard term makes a material 
departure from a fundamental principle of otherwise applicable law. Section 
307(2)(2) presumes an unreasonable disadvantage if the term takes away or 
limits a material benefit that the contract is designed to provide.283 Sections 
307(2)(1) and 307(2)(2) complement each other. In practice a clear distinction 
is not always made between them.284 Section 307(2)(1), which focuses on the 
law, is considered clearer and more predictable than section 307(2)(2), which 
focuses on the contract itself.285 Section 307(2)(1)does not presume an 
unreasonable disadvantage merely because the standard term changes the 
outcome provided by law.286 It requires that the change be fundamental; that 
the standard term displace a material interest of the other party or of the 
society at large protected by the law.287 Section 307(2)(2) typically is used to 
test liability limitations and warranty exclusions that are not otherwise 
prohibited by sections 308 and 309-for example, a liability limitation for 
d· l' 288 or mary neg Igence. 
In the United States there is a certain resignation that a trade-off between 
"certainty of contract and fairness of terms" is necessary in the control of 
standard terms. 289 In Germany, there is no such resignation. There the control 
of standard terms has come a long way from its beginnings in a couple of 
general clauses. Under German law there now exists what might be termed a 
matrix of content control. It provides numerous orientation points for those 
283. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 619, margin 
no. 142. Larenz notes that nos. 1 and 2 substantially cover each other. LARENZ, supra note 261, at 501. 
284. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 609-10, 
margin nos. 131-32. 
285. Friedrich Graf von Westphalen, Der Software-Entwicklungsvertrag-Vertragstyp-
Risikobegrenzung, CR 2000, 73, 76. 
286. Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 307, at 123, margin no. 28. 
287. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GEsETz, supra note 54, § 9, at 611, margin 
no. 133; LARENZ, supra note 261, at 500 (discussing when legal provisions incorporate material values 
and when they only have an ordering role). Where statutory guidance is absent, there are increased 
difficulties in applying the control. Locher, supra note 251, 505, margin no. 2 (Heinz Ingenstau & 
Hermann Korbion eds., 14th ed. 2001). 
288. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 625 margin 
no. 150. How does such a review work in practice? The decision of the German Supreme Court of Oct. 
24,2001, VIII ARZ 1101, JZ 2002, 1001, available at http://www.bverfg.de. can serve as an example. 
At issue was the validity of a term that disclaimed the landlord's liability to a tenant for ordinary 
negligence. A leaky roof damaged the tenant's furniture. The court considered whether such a 
contractual limitation of liability would eviscerate one of the main duties (a so-called cardinal duty) of 
the lease agreement, the fulfillment of which the tenant could justly rely on. The court turned to the 
lessor's obligations under the Civil Code, which provides that lessors are responsible for maintaining the 
premises in a suitable condition. Excluding liability that the lessor is responsible for, the court 
continued, limits the obligation of the lessor to maintain the premises and works to the material 
disadvantage of the tenant. The court held that the purpose of a lease of living quarters is to provide a 
place for the tenant to live and that a tenant cannot be expected to guard against defects in house 
construction. The court further found that no insurance was available to tenants to guard against the risk 
of defective construction, while such insurance was available to the lessor as the owner of the building. 
The court therefore held that the standard term was invalid. It impermissibly disadvantaged tenants 
contrary to the requirement of good faith. The court did not concern itself with whether the party subject 
to the term had read it, knew what it meant, or had sought to obtain insurance against the risk of a leaky 
roof. 
289. See, e.g., Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 83, at 144, 148. 
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who would judge the validity of standard terms. Sections 308 and 309 provide 
relatively fixed points. Section 307 guides its own application, which has 
passed from general abstract statements to the dominance of "case law" in 
concrete, specific situations.29o Precedents and commentary can now fill in the 
spaces. 
The number of precedents and publications in the area is enormous. The 
German Supreme Court alone has decided more than 1500 cases.291 Not.a 
month goes by without an article on standard terms. Books devoted to 
standard terms appear frequently. These books have different approaches to 
coverage. Some are detailed commentaries on the law. Some are practical; 
others are theoretical. Dissertations examine particular legal aspects or effects 
in particular sectors of the economy. Practical guides profile particular 
industries: a 395-page tome for the construction trade is now in its ninth 
edition.292 And the construction trade is just one of many industries to have its 
own volume. There are even guides for the general public. One, a widely-
distributed, 4S0-page popular paperback, now in its fifth edition, promises to 
help the general public in "drafting and controlling of the 'fine print. ",293 
These guides could not be produced if the law did not provide predictability. 
Professional commentaries adopt a matrix approach to their discussions 
of content control. First, they give explanations of each of the three principal 
statutory controls, now sections 307-309. That is the usual approach of a 
German statutory commentary. But then, deviating from the usual, they 
catalogue specific terms across all three controls categorizing the terms either 
by their legal nature (e.g., choice-of-Iaw clauses, mandatory writing clauses) 
or by the business sector in which they are used (e.g., construction contracts, 
hospital contracts).294 This matrix permits precision in identifying when terms 
are likely to be valid and when they are not. 
3. Enforcement 
As does its American counterpart, German standard terms law provides 
that impermissible terms are unenforceable. 295 That remedy recently received 
290. Friedrich Graf von Westphalen, Die Entwicklung des AGB-Rechts im Jahr 2001, NJW 
2002, 1688, 1695-96. German judges and scholars already had experience in developing such case 
groups under the "good faith" provisions of Section 242 of the Civil Code. The process even has a 
name: "concretisation." Simon Whittaker & Reinhard Zimmermann, Good Faith in European Contract 
Law: Surveying the Legal Landscape, in GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 7, 23 (Reinhard 
Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker eds., 2000). 
291. See supra note 247. 
292. LUDWIG GLATZEL, OLAF HOFMANN & ECKHARD FRIKELL, UNWIRKSAME 
BAUVERTRAGSKLAUSELN NACH DEM AGB-GESETZ: RECHTSPRECHUNG - SCHNELLUBERSICHT, 
MUSTERBAUVERTRAG, GESETZESTEXT (9th ed. 2000). 
293. JORGEN NIEBLING, GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN (AGB) VON A - Z: NEUES SCHULDRECHT -
NEUE AGB (5th ed. 2002) 
294. One commentary gives nearly five hundred pages to this review and treats it in a separate 
section designated appendix to §§ 9-11. ULMERiBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETz, supra note 54, at 
957-1446. A "pocket" commentary to the law devotes nearly half of its 478 pages to its § 9 appendix. 
THAMM & PILGER, supra note 217, at 90-319. The leading "short" commentary to the entire civil code 
devotes more than a dozen pages and one hundred margin numbers to this aspect of the catalogue under 
the discussion of Section 307. Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 307, at 
127-41, margin nos. 68-169. 
295. §§ 305, 306 BGB. Section 306(1) provides that in those cases the contract remains 
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new teeth when the European Court of Justice held that national courts of the 
European Union must of their own motion examine whether material contract l'..... 296 terms are unlau m actions agamst consumers. 
Unlike American law, however, German standard terms law, ever since 
the legislature first took up the issue in the 1970s, has been concerned with 
what the European Commission later called "positive enforcement," i.e., 
measures designed to prevent the use of unfair terms. When the legislature 
first took up a standard terms law, it considered several alternative approaches 
to enforcement. One widely discussed proposal called for a "preventive 
administrative control." Parties who wished to use standard terms would file 
terms for review and approval with a new administrative agency.297 In the end, 
however, the legislature rejected every form of administrative oversight. 298 
Instead of adopting an administrative oversight, at the last moment, the 
legislature introduced a novel procedural solution: the institutional action, i.e., 
the Verbandsklage. 299 Consumer groups and trade associations have the right 
to brinBi suit against those who use or recommend use of unlawful standard 
terms.3 0 These institutional suits exist not to protect individual customers or 
users of impermissible standard terms, but the contracting public generally 
from application of impermissible terms. 3D! Originally a part of the Standard 
Terms Statute, since January 1,2002 that right of action is now governed by 
the new Law of Actions for Injunctions for Violations of Consumer and Other 
Law (Gesetz fiber Unterlassungsklagen bei Verbraucherrechts-und anderen 
otherwise effective. It protects the other party to the contract by reversing the usual presumption that the 
entire contact is void. Schmidt, in ULMERIBRANDNERlHENSEN, AGB-Gesetz supra note 54, § 6 at 427, 
margin no. 1. Unlike American law, German law theoretically allows for damages for intentional or 
negligent use of invalid terms. Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERlHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 
9, at 565, margin no. 57. 
296. Case C-240/98, supra note 161. In the German legal system, the holding affects more than 
just private litigation. It also requires that notarieS-Who have an important role in many contracts-
examine contract term unfairr.ess. It may also impose similar obligations on the land registry office. 
Brandner in ULMERIBRANDNERlHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 9, at 563-64, margin nos. 54-
55. 
297. Brandner, supra note 224, at 617. The most extreme of these would have made 
administrative approval a necessary prerequisite to use of any standard terms. Somewhat less extreme 
proposals included suggestions for registering terms and creation of a special administrative body 
similar to the Federal Cartel Office to enforce the new law. The Israeli Standard Contracts Law, 1964, 
13. L.S.1. 152, (1964-65), served as a model for an administrative approach, but also as a warning, since 
it did not seem to work too well. See Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERlHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 
54, at 1457, margin no. 4; Uri Yadin, Legislative Control of Standard Contracts, in RICHTERLICHE 
KONTROLLE VON ALLGEMEINEN GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN 143, 154 (1968) (noting only one opinion 
under the law-a decision denying Dun & Bradstreet's request for approval of a liability exclusion). The 
original Israeli statute, which can be considered the world's first standard terms statute, is printed in 
RICHTERLICHE KONTROLLE VON ALLEGEMEINEN GESCHAFTSBEDINGUNGEN 175. See also Ewoud H. 
Hondius, Unfair Contract Terms: New Control Systems, 26 AM. J. COMPo L. 525, 529-32 (1978). 
298. Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERlHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 1457-58, margin 
nos. 5-7. 
299. Id. at 1457-58, margin no. 9. 
300. Bunte, supra note 137, at 922. The Verbandsklage was understood as a substitute for a 
farther-reaching administrative control. Eike Schmidt, Verbraucherschutzende Verbandsklagen, NJW 
2002, 25, 28. The original German provisions for a collection action apparently served as inspiration for 
Article 7 of the E.U. Unfair Terms Directive. Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERlHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, 
supra note 54, § 13, at 1482, margin no. 23. 
301. Bassenge in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, UklaG at 413; Hensen in 
ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 13, at 1482, margin no. 23 (citing half a 
dozen Supreme Court decisions). 
158 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 28: 109 
Verstoj3en [UklaGJ), hereafter referred to as the "Injunctions Act." The 
institutional action is Germany's closest analogue to an American class 
action.302 
Section 1 of the Injunctions Act provides that whoever uses or 
recommends the use in commerce of standard terms that are invalid under 
Civil Code sections 307 to 309 is subject to an injunctive action to cease and 
desist. Sections 2 and 3 of the Injunctions Act provide that qualifying 
consumer groups, trade associations and chambers of commerce officially 
recognized by the European Union or by the German federal government are 
authorized to bring suit. Trial courts, however, spend no time in determining 
whether a particular association is qualified. Section 4 provides that 
administrative authorities are to maintain lists of qualified organizations and 
update them regularly. 
Most institutional legal complaints do not require judicial involvement. 
They follow the "warning" (Abmahnung) procedure of German competition 
law. Under this procedure a potential plaintiff sends a formal letter demanding 
that the user of the terms cease-and-desist. The demand letter must include the 
terms claimed to be invalid and the basis for the claim of invalidity. If the user 
accepts the demand, the user makes a legally binding declaration that it is 
ceasing and desisting from use of the tenns (Unterlassungserkliirung). 
Typically in such a declaration the user commits to treat such terms in its 
contracts with third parties as invalid and agrees to pay a penalty for each later 
use of a prohibited or comparable term (in cases known to the author, about € 
1,000 per term, with a maximum of about € 2,500 to € 9,000 per contract). If 
the recipient of the demand letter rejects the demand, the plaintiff may then 
sue and, if the plaintiff wins, recover the costs of the suit. 30 The cost shifting 
provisions of section 5 of the Injunction Act have the effect of making use of 
the warning procedure practically if not legally required. 
Section 6 of the Injunctions Act provides that plaintiffs ordinarily must 
sue in the defendant's home jurisdiction. Of importance for American 
companies, however, section 6 provides further that if the defendant is not 
located in Germany, the plaintiff may sue in any district where the defendant 
uses the invalid tenns. Section 7 provides as an additional sanction that an 
eventual judgment is to be published.304 
Sections 9 and 11 of the Injunctions Act give the institutional action its 
real teeth. Section 9 requires that a judgment against the defendant must recite 
the invalid term, identify the type of transaction in which its use by the 
defendant is prohibited, and prohibit the use of terms having the same content. 
In ordinary civil litigation, a judgment has effect only for the parties to the 
suit. But section 11 of the Injunctions Act changes the normal rule and gives 
302. See generally Harald Koch, Non-Class Group Litigation Under E. U. and German Law, II 
DUKE J. COMPo & INT'L L. 355 (2001). 
303. Bassenge in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, UklaG § 5, at 421, margin no. 
7; Hensen in ULMERlBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ., supra note 54, § 13 at 1496-1502, margin nos. 
49-66. For a description in English of the Abmahnung procedure general\y, see Georg Jennes & Peter 
Schotthlifer, Germany, in ADVERTISING LAW IN EUROPE AND NORTII AMERICA 203, at § 26, 228-30 
(James R. Maxeiner & Peter SchotthOfer eds., 2d ed. 1999). 
304. This is a meaningful sanction in Germany where legal proceedings are not as public as in 
the United States. 
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the judgment a broader effect. Terms found invalid in such an action are 
invalid with respect to all of the users' customers.305 Those customers may 
rely on the judgment. Defendants who continue to use terms held invalid are 
subject under section 890 of the Code of Civil Procedure to fines of up to € 
250,000 and imprisonment for up to two years. 306 
Consumer associations initiate many actions against standard terms. In 
Berlin and Stuttgart, two consumer or~anizations are reported each to give 
several hundred warnings each year. 30 Not counting cases resolved at the 
warning stage, in a little more than twenty-four years, consumer associations 
brought 3523 suits.308 Consumer associations account for more than half of all 
reported cases applying the Standard Terms Statute.309 Their suits can have a 
broad impact. In one recent case, a consumer association successfully 
challenged thirteen terms in a standard form recommended by the automobile 
. d d I 310 m ustry to new car ea ers. 
Consumer associations might bring even more injunction actions were it 
not for the costs of such actions and their litigation risks.311 To help 
associations bring more actions, the European Union provides the associations 
with funds. 312 The normal rule of German civil procedure-that the loser 
pays-helps defray costs when associations win, but exposes them to risks 
when they lose. To reduce the discouraging effect of the rule, it has been 
modified for association actions. The law limits the maximum nominal 
amount in dispute in such cases to € 250,000. In practice, the usual amount is 
much lower: it ranges from € 1500 to € 2500 per clause in dispute. 313 
Critics of the institutional action believe it to be only a transition 
measure. They observe that it serves not a private institutional interest, but a 
public interest. Civil procedure, however, is designed for settlement of private 
disputes. For example, it gives parties complete right to continue or abandon 
their lawsuits at will. According to this view, the kind of public interest 
litigation that the Injunctions Act permits would be better conducted in an 
d ... d' 314 a mlmstratIve procee mg. 
305. Bassenge in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, UklaG § 11, at 426. 
306. Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, supra note 54, at 1564, margin no. 14 (stating that 
someone who uses the terms contrary to a judgment is subject to the sanction of ZPO § 890). 
307. Ulmer in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, at 77, margin no. 62. 
308. [d. 
309. See Hans-W. Micklitz, Rapport sur ['application pratique de la Directive 931131CEE dans 
la Republique Federale d'Allemagne, in The Integration of Directive 93/13 into the National Legal 
Systems 238, 239, 242 (1999) (noting that from 1976 to 1993, individual actions accounted for one-third 
of all actions brought, while group actions accounted for two-thirds, and from 1993 to date, the share of 
individual actions increased to 43% (therefore implying that group actions accounted for 57%». On the 
other hand, suits by trade associations have proven to be unusual. 
310. Judgment of Sept. 27, 2000, VIII ZR 155/99, BGHZ 145 (203). 
311. Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 13, at 1503, 
margin no. 69. 
312. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 9. 
313. Bassenge in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, UklaG § 5, at 422, margin no. 
14; Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ., supra note 54, § 15, at 1524, margin no. 31. 
314. Schmidt, supra note 300, at 25. 
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D. The E. U. Directive: The Contract Model Meets the Consumer Model 
The German Standard Terms Statute by all accounts had a profound 
influence on the Unfair Terms Directive.315 In popular perception the directive 
was considered to be narrower, since it applied only to consumer contracts, 
while the German statute applied to contracts generally.316 Yet for all the 
similarities between the two laws,317 the directive as originally proRosed 
turned out to be something of a challenge to the German contract model. 18 
Alongside the contract model of German law, there is another approach 
that presses for favor in Europe. This approach was fully realized, or nearly 
so, in the initial draft of the Unfair Terms Directive, but only partially, if at 
all, in the text actually adopted. The alternative approach might be called the 
"consumer protection model." The contract model applies tb contracts 
generally without limitation as to personal characteristics of the contracting 
parties. The content controls it imposes are abstract and generalizing. The 
consumer protection model, on the other hand, is limited to consumer 
contracts. Its content controls are personalized and particularized. 319 The 
contract model protects freedom of contract; the consumer protection model 
protects consumers.320 , The Unfair Terms Directive as finally adopted is a 
compromise between the two models.321 
The Commission's first draft of the Unfair Terms Directive anticipated a 
comprehensive control of all consumer contracts without regard to whether 
the terms appeared in standard forms whether they were individually 
negotiated, or whether they concerned the fundamental substance of the 
contract. The draft was anathema to German scholars. They contended 
nothing less than that the proposal would cause a "considerable dilution of the 
p'rinciple of a free market economy, which is safeguarded by the EEC 
Treaty.,,322 It would bring about a "drastic restriction" in private autonomy 
315, See supra note 10. 
316. See, e.g., Huff, supra note 251, at IS. See also supra note 10. 
317. While here we focus on differences, the basic similarities are substantial. That the Member 
States could agree on a general clause was a triumph in itself See Miklitz, supra note 251, at 525. The 
two laws are considered "closely-related," and that is one reason why no separate law was considered 
necessary. Remien, supra note 246, at 65. See also Peter Ulmer, Zur Anpassung des AGB-Gesetzes an 
die EG-Richtlinie aber. mif3briiuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucher vertriigen, EuZW [Europliische 
Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht] 1993, 337, 337-38 (listing similarities and differences). 
318. One long-time expert on standard terms law observed that the very similarity of the 
directive and German law "concealed nothing less than a fundamental difference in institutional 
conceptions." Schmidt-Salzer, supra note 241, at 734. But see Ulmer, supra note 317, at 341 (noting the 
differences in purposes of the two laws, but observing that a law's purpose does not always expressly 
appear in the statute). 
319. Damm, supra note 241, at 172. 
320. Within one legal system, both models theoretically could co-exist. According to one view, 
however, they might lead to "schizophrenia" if included within one and the same statute. See Schmidt-
Salzer, supra note 241, at 740. 
321. Hans Schulte-Niilke, panf Jahre AGB-Richtlinie 93/13/EWG Weitere 
Rechtsetzungspliine der Kommission?, NJW 1999, 3176 [report of the 1999 conference of the 
Commission on the Directive]. 
322. Hans Erich Brandner & Peter Ulmer, The Community Directive on Unfair Terms in 
Consumer Contracts: Some Critical Remarks on the Proposal Submitted by the EC Commission, 28 
COMMON MKT. 1. REV. 647,652-53 (1991) [hereinafter Brandner & Ulmer, The Community Directive 
on Unfair Terms]. This is an English version, although not an exact translation, of Hans Erich Brandner 
& Peter Ulmer, EG-Richtlinie aber mif3briiuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverttiigen: Kritische 
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and would wholly upset freedom of contract. 323 The German standard terms 
law did not threaten private autonomy, they argued, but honored it. The 
predicate for invoking the German content control was the absence of 
agreement between the parties as to the content of the terms. When standard 
terms are presented unilaterally and are not negotiated, the legitimacy of their 
claim to be enforced is slight. The principle of freedom of contract counsels 
not their free application, but close scrutiny. Where the parties actually 
negotiate a term, then the principle of private autonomy demands recognizing 
their choice.324 
German scholars criticized the draft directive for its control of individual 
contracts. They argued that the directive should not apply to "individually 
negotiated terms;" the parties' own negotiations should be recognized to 
safeguard freedom of contract. Similarly, they urged that the directive not 
apply to the "principal obligations" of the contract; in a free market economy, 
the market should determine the price-performance relationship. German 
scholars stressed that control of standard terms is different from control of 
individually negotiated terms. Above all, control of standard terms can be 
"abstract," that is, it does not examine the particular circumstances of the 
individual contract. 325 Control of individually negotiated terms, on the other 
hand, requires consideration not only of the specific term in question, but of 
the entire contract and of all the circumstances of its conclusion. Standard 
terms thus are suitable for abstract control procedures involving third parties 
such as consumer groups, whereas individually negotiated terms can be 
reviewed only in the course of a concrete legal action between the parties.326 
At first the Commission was reluctant to embrace the German scholars' 
proposals. But the scholars persisted. Practically on the eve of adoption, in the 
Bemerkungen zum Vorschlag der EG-Kommission, BB [Betriebs-Berater] 1991, 701, 703-04 
[hereinafter Brandner & Ulmer, EG-Richtlinie]. See also Bunte, supra note 231, at 331 (considering a 
July 1989 proposal of the Commission and noting that the E.U. proposal is based on a model of 
"contractual justice" (Vertragsgerechtigkeit)); Peter Hommelhoff, Zivilrecht unter dem Einjlufi 
europiiischer Rechtsangleichung, AcP [Archiv fur die civilistische Praxis] 1992, 71, 90-91 (noting that 
control of individual contracts encountered sharp opposition because it "buries" private autonomy and 
disturbs the ordering function of the free market). The Brandner & Ulmer article is regarded as the most 
influential of German contributions and covers all the core questions. Christian Jorges, Die 
Europiiisierung des Privatrechts als Rationalisierungsprozefi und als Streit der Disziplinen, ZeuP 1995, 
181,193. 
Brandner and Ulmer grouped their criticisms into four categories: (I) the fact that the draft 
created a special law for consumers; (2) the scope of the directive; (3) the standard of control; and (4) 
control procedures. Only their second criticism is addressed here. The first is an issue much broader than 
the Unfair Terms Directive itself. See Miklitz, supra note 251, 532 n.74 (noting that the discussion "fills 
volumes" and with citations thereto). 
323. Brandner & Ulmer, The Community Directive on Unfair Terms, supra note 322, at 652-54. 
324. Edgar Zoller, Dogmatik, Anwendungsprobleme und die ungewisse Zukunft des Vorrangs 
individueller Vertragsvereinbarungen von Allgemeinen Geschiiftsbedingungen (§ 4 AGBG), JZ 1991, 
850,853, 855. 
325. These criticisms were made by, inter alia, Brandner & Ulmer, The Community Directive 
on Unfair Terms, supra note 322, at 651-54; Brandner & Ulmer, EG-Richtlinie, supra note 322, at 703-
04; Bunte, Gedanken zur Harmonisierung, supra note 231, at 329,331,333; Hommelhoff, supra note 
322, at 90-93 (with further citation). 
326. Brandner & Ulmer, The Community Directive on Unfair Terms, supra note 322, at 654. 
They contended that any control of individually negotiated terms should be permitted only if an "urgent 
real necessity" is shown and only if the control is subject to different rules. Brandner & Ulmer, EG-
Richtlinie, supra note 332, at 704. 
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fall of 1992, the Commission largely gave in and changed the text of the 
Unfair Terms Directive.327 As adopted, paragraph 1 of Article 3 excludes from 
the directive's application terms that have been "individually negotiated.,,328 
Paragraph 2 provides that "pre-formulated standard contracts" are not 
individually negotiated.329 Article 4, paragraph 2, provides that findings of 
unfairness shall "relate neither to the definition of the main SUbJect matter of 
the contract nor to the adequacy of the price and remuneration." 30 With these 
revisions, German scholars pronounced that the directive preserved the 
principle of party autonomy as the "Basic Institution of all European legal 
systems. ,,331 
Even with the changes, German scholars recognized that differences in 
outlook remained. The directive's orientation remains consumer protection; 
the German law's orientation is general contract law.332 Germany had no 
choice but to implement the directive. The question was how to do it. German 
scholars considered two possibilities: amending the old law or adopting a new 
one to exist parallel to the old.333 The legislature looked only at the former 
possiblility and considered no draft legislation that would have created a new 
law.334 The close similarity between the Unfair Terms Directive and the 
Standard Terms Statute counseled against implementing the directive through 
a statute separate from the Standard Terms Statute.335 Restricting the scope of 
the Standard Terms Statute also did not make sense, since the directive itself 
set only a minimum standard and explicitly allows Member States to provide 
protection that reaches further. In Germany, that additional protection consists 
of the incorporation control and the protection of non-consumers. 
The German legislature held fast to the German law and took a 
minimalist solution that the existing law "should be retained so far as 
possible," since, in its view, the German Standard Terms Statute was largely 
in compliance even without revision.336 The legislature passed relatively 
minor changes. It modified the conflicts of law rule and added a new section 
327. Heinrichs, supra note 241, at 1817 (discussing the history of the adoption of the directive). 
See Miklitz, supra note 251, at 523 (noting how the Gennan side managed to get individual contracts 
removed even after the last draft). 
328. Council Directive 93/l31EEC, art. 3(1),19930.1. (L 95/29). 
329. /d. art. 3(2). 
330. Id. art. 4(2). 
331. Heinrichs, supra note 241, at 1817. 
332. See Schmidt-Salzer, supra note 241, at 733. 
333. This choice is presented explicitly by Heinrichs, supra note 211, at 153. See also Schmidt-
Salzer, supra note 241, at 735; Miklitz, supra note 249, at 532-34 (noting that this directive, more than 
any others before it, posed the issue of a separate law for consumers). 
334. Cf Heinrich, Die Entwicklung des Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschajtsbedingungen im 
Jahre 1995, NIW 1996, 1381, at 1381; Umsetzung der Richtlinie des Rates vom 5.4.1993 fiber 
mif3brauchliche Klauseln in Verbrauchervertragen: Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes zur A:nderung des 
AGB-Gesetzes, BB 1995, 111. 
335. Heinrichs, supra note 241, at 1818. 
336. Gesetz Entwurf der Bundesregierung, Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Anderung des AGB-
Gesetzes [Draft of a Statute to Amend the Standard Tenns Statute], Oct. 20, 1995, Drucksache 13/2713 
at points B, available at http://www.bundestag.de. When Gennany delayed past the deadline for 
implementing the Unfair Tenns Directive, one leading expert in the Standard Tenns Statute proposed 
that almost all required measures could be implemented simply by construing existing law in confonnity 
with the Directive. Heinrichs, supra note 211, at 153. Supporting the view of minimal changes, see 
Remien, supra note 246, at 65-66; Ulmer in ULMERlBRANDNERlHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, 
at 346-47 (warning against using the implementation as an opportunity to narrow the law). 
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for consumer contracts. That section, now Civil Code section 310(3), applies 
the content control to certain consumer contracts that otherwise exceptionally 
would not be covered. 337 
Section 310(3) makes yet another change that may seem minor to an 
outside observer, but illuminates the differences in concepts at stake. It now 
requires that in consumer contracts, "[w]hen deciding whether there has been 
unreasonable detriment under sections 307(1) and 307(2) the circumstances 
surrounding the conclusion of the contract must also be taken into account." 
German scholars vary in how significant they view the change,338 but all 
recognize what this provision means. No longer is the standard terms law 
exclusively a shield against imposition of improper contract terms, but now it 
is also a protection of consumers in their typical position of inferiority.339 
The Unfair Terms Directive and the German standard terms law are both 
subject to broader European law developments. Further E.D. action in the 
consumer area is likely and might result either in changes in the directive 
itself or in adopting legislation that would prevail over the directive. The latter 
has already occurred in the Guarantees Directive, which obviated any need for 
control of consumer warranties under Unfair Terms law by substituting 
d 1 '1' 340 man atory egIS atIve terms. 
Whether the Unfair Terms Directive will be revised to reverse the 
compromises of fall 1992 and introduce the consumer protection model is 
unclear at the time of this writing. At the July 1999 conference sponsored by 
the Commission there was interest in extending the directive to principal 
obligations as some Member States had already done.341 While the 
Commission in its April 2000 Report did not formally endorse such a step, it 
raised the possibility and observed that no problems in practice had arisen in 
those Member States that had taken this step.342 The Economic and Social 
Committee was not so restrained. It recommended that the directive be 
337. The exceptional situations arise when a fonn contract is used only once or originates with 
a third person. The new section also applied section 305c(2) to consumers. That section construes 
standard tenns against the user. The new section did not subject these consumer contracts to the 
incorporation control. Subsequent to the adoption of the implementing legislation, the European Court 
of Justice rejected the argument of the Netherlands that it need not adopt a statutory transparency 
requirement to implement Article 5 of the directive, because judicial interpretation of the general clause 
reached the same result. Gennany had done the same thing. As part of the obligation refonn law, Section 
307(1) was added to meet the decision of the court. Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 
Rechtsauschusses: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Modemisierung des Schuldrechts, Oct. 8, 2001, 
Drucksache 1417052 at 188; Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236 § 307 at 121, 
margin no. 16. 
338. See Miklitz, supra note 251, at 528 (discussing different views); Remien, supra note 246, 
at 52-57 (arguing that the Unfair Tenns Directive did not adopt a ''particular-personalized,'' i.e., konkret-
individuelIen, approach). 
339. LOCHER, supra note 287, at 506, margin no. 3; Bunte, supra note 137, at 1389; Reinhard 
Damm, Privatautonomie und Verbraucherschutz-Legalstruktur und Realstruktur von 
Autonomiekonzepten, VersR 1999, 129 n.91. 
340. For example, the Guarantees Directive displaces the Unfair Tenns Directive and provides 
mandatory law for consumer guarantees. See infra text accompanying notes 357-59. 
341. Hans Schulte-No Ike, Funf Jahre AGB-Richtlinie 93/13/EWG Weitere 
Rechtsetzungspliine der Kommission?, NJW 1999,3176. 
342. E.U. Commission Report, supra note 129, at 14-15,31. 
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amended to include individually negotiated tenns and the main subject matter 
of the contract. 343 
E. The American License in Germany 
American standard tenns are no strangers to Gennany. It used to be that 
American businesses operating in Gennany simply translated their U.S. tenns 
into Gennan and handed them over to their Gennan customers unchanged. 
Today that still happens more frequently than one would like to think.344 But 
such foolishness requires a near reckless lack of attention to businesses 
located in Gennany. However, with ever more American companies doing 
business worldwide on the Internet, it is understandable that licensors located 
in the United States and accustomed to doing business at home offer products 
and services without thinking about foreign law. 345 
Nor are American standard tenns strangers to Gennan controls. Not long 
after the Internet became available in Gennany, Gennan consumer groups 
challenged the Internet tenns of major U.S. service providers America Online 
and CompuServe. The fonner agreed to a cease-and-desist declaration; the 
latter suffered a default judgment. In its declaration, America Online agreed to 
stop using nineteen tenns in its standard agreement and promised to pay DM 
2,000 (now about € 1,000) each time it uses one of the same tenns or a tenn 
having comparable content, with a maximum of DM 19,000 (now about € 
10,000) per contract. CompuServe, if it uses again any of twenty-three tenns 
in its fonner standard agreement, is subject to a civil fine of up to DM 
500,000 (now about € 250,000) and its Chief Executive Officer to civil 
commitment for contempt of court for up to six months. The same association 
of consumer groups also took on Microsoft Corporation's license for its 
Windows 2000 operating system. Microsoft also agreed to a binding cease-
and-desist declaration. As a result these three American finns are committed 
not to use in Gennany many tenns that are similar to tenns that they continue 
to use in the United States. These tenns govern such matters as: liability 
343. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, supra note 180, at 124, conclusion 10.3. 
The Committee also recommended that the Unfair Terms Directive be extended to professionals, i.e., 
non-consumers. [d. at 124, conclusion 10.2. 
344. See Thomas Hoeren & Dirk Schuhmacher, Verwendungsbeschriinkungen im 
Softwarevertrag, CR 2000,137. It even happens that German companies copy the terms of U.S. market 
leaders. 
345. That model-a mass market software license delivered from an American owner over the 
Internet directly to the end user-is the only one considered here. Use of shrink-wrap licenses or third 
party distributors raises additional questions. In the case of shrink-wrap, is the act of opening the 
software a sufficient manifestation of assent? In German law it is, if the attention of the customer is 
called to the fact that the software package contains a notice that the license terms are contained within 
and the license terms are made available to the customer before opening the package. In the case of third 
party distribution there is an issue as to whether there is an agreement between the computer information 
producer and the customer or only between the customer and the distributor. The former is now 
generally accepted, provided, possibly, that a reference to the relationship with the supplier is noted to 
avoid that relationship being regarded as surprising. See Jilrgen Weyers, Die Wirksarnkeit von 
Schutzhtillenvertrtlgen bei Standardsoftware in Deutschland und den USA \9-84 (2000) (unpublished 
dissertation, Universitat Koln) http;lIwww.ub.uni-koeln.de/ediss/archiv12000/\\v3852.pdf.This 
discussion is also limited to software; German law has not yet followed the UClTA model of referring to 
"computer information" to include both software and information. The next paragraph in the text, 
however, shows that the law applies to online services as well. 
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limitations, warranty disclaimers, licensee obligation to indemnify licensor, 
unlimited licensee obligation, acceptance of incorporation of other terms, 
choice-of-law and forum, retention of unilateral right to change terms 
accepted by subsequent use, agreement that additional terms be incorporated, 
restriction on right of licensee to terminate, retention of payment on 
termination, and legal characterization of relationship. 346 
Other American licensors likewise are in for unpleasant surprises if they 
fail to pay attention to German law. If a licensee is a consumer, almost 
certainly the license is subject to German standard terms law.347 If the licensee 
is a businessperson, a more complicaeted conflicts of law analysis is necessary 
to determine which controls apply.348 Yet, in the case of a license to a 
346. The author did not attempt to determine the extent to which American companies have 
already been subjected to standard terms control in Europe. The information in this paragraph comes 
from a single inquiry of an association of German consumer groups, the Verbraucherzentral 
Bundesverband e.V. ("VzBv"), about proceedings that it was aware of in Germany against American 
Internet companies. In a letter to the author dated November 4, 2002; it provided copies of the relevant 
papers from its actions against America Online, CompuServe and Microsoft. The documents consist of: 
(I) for America Online, Inc., a demand letter from VzBv dated May 21, 1997, and a "Cease-and-Desist 
Declaration with Promise to Pay . Contract Penalties" (Unterlassungserkliirung mit 
Vertragsetrafsverspreche) from America Online dated February 18, 1998 (on file with The Yale Journal 
of International Law); (2) for CompuServe, Inc., a Default Judgment (Versiiumnisurtei/) dated June 2, 
1998, Landgericht Berlin, File No. 26.0.364/97 (same); (3) for Microsoft Corporation, a demand letter 
from VzBv dated April 17, 2000, and a Cease-and-Desist Declaration (Unterlassungserkliirung) from 
Microsoft dated October 9, 2000 (same). 
347. CISG does not apply to transactions in goods bought for personal, family, or household 
uses. German conflicts law has special rules for consumers that make it unlikely that an American 
licensor could avoid the standard terms law even by a choice of law provision. Notwithstanding choice 
oflaw, under Article 29(2) No. I, German standard terms law applies to transactions where a contract 
follows "an express offer or advertisement" in Germany and the consumer completes the contract in 
Germany. That will be the case in an Internet transaction where the user has in any sense targeted the 
German market, e.g., through a presence separate from the Internet or through tailoring its Internet site 
for German customers. It might even be the case for Internet sites in the United States that make no 
effort to service the German market. Georg Borges, Geschiifte per Internet und deutscher 
Verbraucherschutz, Zeitschrift flir Wirtschaftsrecht 1999, Issue 14, http://www.rws-
verlag.de/volltextlborges.htm, at 2.2. 
348. Whether CISG applies to software licenses is disputed and depends upon whether 
software should be characterized as "goods." See Boss, supra note 227, at 180-82. German law treats 
mass market licenses as sales of goods under domestic law. Judgment of Nov. 4, 1987, VIII ZR 314/86, 
CR 1988, 124, 125-26. See infra text accompanying notes 355-56. Accordingly German courts have 
treated transactions in software as sales of goods under CISG. See, e.g., Judgment of Feb. 8, 1995, 
Landgericht Miinchen I, 8 HKO 24667/93, available at http://www.jura.uni-
freiburg.de/iprl/cisglurteile/textl203.htm. Whether they would do so for software delivered over the 
Internet rather than in a tangible medium is uncertain but considered by some as probable. 
Grenzuberschreitende Softwareuberlassung und E-Miingelriige nach dem CISG, at B.l.2. (1999), 
RAUSCHHOFER ONLINE, at ht!p:llwww.rechtsanwalt.de/cisg.html. If CISG does apply, its contract 
formation rules, Articles 14 et seq., apply. See Judgment of Oct. 31, 2001, VIII ZR 60/01, available at 
http://www.bgh-free.de. where the German Supreme Court held that CISG provides the rules regarding 
incorporation and implied from CISG formation rules an opportunity to review obligations comparable 
to that required by German law. Article 4 of CISG leaves to local law "[t]he validity of the contract or 
any of its provisions;" national law provides the rules regarding content control. Schmidt in 
ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, app. § 2 at 276, margin no. 12. 
If CISG does not apply, in the absence of an effective choice of a law, a German court would 
probably apply American law to contracts with non-consumers. Article 28 of the German conflicts law, 
Einflihrungsgesetz zum Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuch (EGBGB), provides that in the absence of an 
agreement, the law of the state having the closest connection to the contract applies. The law with the 
closest connection is presumed to be the law of the party who has to provide the "characteristic 
performance" of the contract. That means the law of a foreign supplier ordinarily applies. Schmidt in 
ULMERIBRANDNERiHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, app. § 2, at 269, margin no. 2. One might 
argue that even ifCISG applies, this rule directs application of American content law. 
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businessperson, an attentive licensor can make an effective choice of 
American law, probably even in a standard term license.349 
1. Incorporation 
A "mass-market license" under UCITA350 ordinarily constitutes standard 
terms in the sense of Civil Code section 305(1).351 If the licensee is not a 
businessperson, under section 305(2) the license's standard terms become part 
of the contract only if the licensee is expressly advised of them and is given 
the opportunity to review them. That review must be at or before the 
conclusion of the license.352 If the licensee is a businessperson, then the 
stringent requirements of section 305(2) do not apply and the laxer rules of the 
Civil Code governing conclusion of contracts generally govern. Under those 
rules the reference to the standard terms might be implied by conduct.353 A 
procedure whereby the licensee is given access to the terms before committing 
to the license by clicking ("click-wrap") should be sufficient, at least if the 
average customer cannot click through without having noticed and decided 
whether to take the opportunity to review the terms.354 "Browse-wrap," i.e., a 
notice given by a site that by using it, the user agrees to certain license terms, 
is said not to comply with the law's requirements.355 The individual terms are 
subject to the other incorporation controls, Le., individually negotiated terms 
take priority (section 305b), surprising terms are invalid (section 305c(1)), and 
ambiguous terms are construed against the licensor (section 305c(2)). Use 
restrictions are not ordinarily surprising. 
2. Content Control 
With the exception of licenses between businesspersons that include an 
effective choice of non-German law, UCITA licenses between American 
349. Party autonomy is the basic rule of German conflicts law, i.e., the parties are free to 
choose the law they wish to apply to their agreement. It is laid down in EGBGB Article 27 and requires 
that the choice of law either be express or follow with reasonable certainty from the terms of the contract 
or the circumstances of the transaction. That choice of law could be made in a standard form. Under 
Articles 27(4) and 31(1) its validity would be determined by the law chosen (e.g., New York law). 
German Standard Terms law would not apply. Schmidt in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, 
supra note 54, app. § 9-11, 1124, at 1227-29. Under Article 31(2), however, a party may challenge 
whether there was an agreement on the point. !d. at 1226-28, margin nos. 576-77. 
350. UCITA § 102(a)(43) & (44). 
351. See Schmidt in ULMERIBRANDNERiHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, app. §§ 9-11, at 
1051-52, margin no. 269. It would not constitute standard terms if it were uniquely used with a party 
that is not a consumer. 
352. Dirk Schuhmacher, Wirksamkeit von typischen Klauseln in 
Softwareiiberlassungsvertragen, CR 2000, 641, 644 (noting that this requirement is "essential" and is 
not satisfied if the terms are contained only in a sealed box). Thus the approach sanctioned by UCIT A 
Section 209(b) would not work. Cf id. at 643 n.16 (expressing skepticism regarding software producer 
practice of providing for licensee to return product). See also Ulmer in ULMERIBRANDNERiHENSEN, 
AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § 2, at 230-31, margin no. 55. 
353. Ulmer, supra note 54, § 2, at 246, margin no. 80. 
354. See Weyers, supra note 345, at 85-91. The author observed that a leading German 
antiquarian book exchange Internet site in summer 2002 altered its procedures to require a "click-wrap" 
acceptance of each individual bookseller's standard terms. See Zentrales Verzeichnis Antiquarischer 
Bucher, http://www.zvab.com. 
355. Schuhmacher, supra note 352, at 643. 
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licensors and German licensees are subject to German content controls. 
Application of those controls depends upon the nature of the software license 
involved, i.e., how it is classified under German law and whether it is with a 
businessperson or not. 
Software can fall into anyone of three different classes of contract under 
German law. A software license where the license term is unlimited is known 
as a Standardlizenz ("standard license") and is treated as a sales contract 
(Kaufvertrag). If the license term is for a limited time period (and typically, 
although not necessarily, there are recurring payments), then the license is 
known as a Dauerlizenz ("duration license") and is treated as a lease 
(Mietvertrag). Finally, if the software is developed as part of the agreement, 
then the license is treated as part of a service contract (Werkvertrag).356 
UCIT A mass market licenses are usually standard licenses in the German 
sense, and that is the only variety treated here. 
Except for separately negotiated terms under section 305b and terms 
respecting fundamental performances under section 307(3), licenses with 
consumers are subject to testing first under the prohibited list of Section 309, 
then under the list of suspect terms under section 308, then finally under the 
general clause of section 307. In the case of licenses with businesspersons, 
sections 308 and 309 have no formal applicability, but in practice, application 
of the general clause of Section 307 usually follows the application of sections 
308 and 309.357 
The introductory language to the prohibited list of section 309 makes 
explicit that it assumes that a contract term reviewed is one about which the 
parties might agree otherwise, at least in negotiated terms. The legislature 
added this language when it integrated the Standard Terms Statute into the 
Civil Code. It was necessary to take account of the changes in the civil law 
made to comply with the E.U. Guarantees Directive, which requires that many 
aspects of consumer contracts-among them warranties-be made mandatory 
and not subject to modification by agreement. 
3. Warranty Disclaimers and Limitations of Remedy 
Pursuant to the E.U. Guarantees Directive, most issues of consumer 
warranties and remedies are now mandatory law. Review under standard 
terms law is foreclosed. 358 American standard licenses with German 
consumers must comply with this mandatory law.359 
356. Bettina Goldmann & Rebecca Redecke, Gewiihrleistung bei SoJtwarelizenzvertriigen nach 
dem Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz, MMR [Multimedia und Recht] 2002, 3 (noting that the new 
legislation had significant changes for Kaufoertrag but not for the Mietvertrag). Schmidt in 
ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, app. §§ 9-11 at 1051-52, 1057 margin nos. 
269, 272. The idea of treating software licenses as sui generis was rejected. !d. See also Hoeren & 
Schuhmacher, supra note 344, at 137-38. 
357. See supra text accompanying notes 294-96. 
358. See Goldmann & Redecke, supra note 356, at 6. Civil Code Section 475 invalidates 
agreements made prior to notification of a defect that limit the consumer's rights under Sections 433-35, 
437, and 439-43. Section 475 leaves only a few points open for deviation through standard terms and 
thus for review under the content controls. For example, a standard term may reduce the warranty period 
from two years to one. This was no great victory for business, since before the new law came into effect 
the mandatory warranty period was six months. A standard term might also require that the dissatisfied 
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Warranties and limitations of remedy in licenses with businesspersons 
remain subject to testing under standard terms law. Formally, this is only 
through the general clause of section 307.360 Practically, the extensive 
provisions in section 309(8)(b) (reprinted in the Appendix) governing 
warranties are likely-but not necessarily-to find application.361 Subdivision 
(aa) provides a general rule that a term which excludes warranty claims 
completely or for relevant parts of defective products is invalid.362 
Subdivisions (bb) through (dd) govern terms that limit remedies to repair or 
replacement: (bb) invalidates such terms unless they expressly reserve the 
right, should repair or replacement fail, to cancel the contract or to reduce the 
contract price; Subdivision (cc) precludes a user from imposing costs of repair 
or replacement on the other party; Subdivision (dd) prevents the user from 
setting certain pre-conditions on repair or replacement. Subdivisions (ee) and 
(ft) restrict use of terms imposing deadlines on claims limitation: subdivision 
(ee) provides that notice requirements for non-obvious defects may not be 
shorter than the applicable statute of limitations for claims. Subdivision (ft) 
provides that the l~~ally required statute of limitation may not be reduced to 
less than one year. 
4. Damage Exclusions and Limitations 
The same provision of the Civil Code that makes warranty provisions in 
consumer contracts mandatory and withdraws them from disposition by the 
parties explicitly excludes from its coverage damage exclusions and 
limitations. The provision provides that they shall continue to be reviewed 
recipient of a defective product accept damages in lieu of perfonnance. Westphalen, supra note 249, at 
24. 
359. The mandatory provisions are the following: Section 433 requires the seller to provide the 
buyer with the product free of physical or legal defects. Sections 434 and 435 respectively define those 
defects. Scction 437 defines thc rights of the buyer in the case of defects. Sections 439-41 govern the 
parties' rights respecting repair or replacement, rescission and contract price reduction. Section 442 
governs the buyer's knowledge of defects. Section 443 governs express warranties. Restructuring 
standard licenses as duration licenses probably would not help the licensor. Not only are duration 
licenses generally more demanding, the attempted re-characterization of standard licenses as duration 
licenses would run up against the probation on circumvention in the second sentence of Civil Code 
Section 475{l). 
360. Now that businessperson to consumer contracts are subject to mandatory law, No. 8b has 
lost most of its significance. It applies directly only to construction contracts and contracts between 
consumers. Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236, § 309, at 152, margin no. 53. 
Practically the only purpose for keeping it in the law was for its effect on contracts between 
businesspersons. Schubel, supra note 277, at 1117. 
361. Bjorn Gaul, Standardsoftware: Veriinderung von Gewiihrleistungsanspriichen durch AGB, 
CR 2000, 570, 571 (noting the "radiant" effect of the two sections on application of the general clause 
and citing a Supreme Court decision for the proposition that even between merchants a standard tenn 
would be invalid if it led to loss of warranty claims); Goldmann & Redecke, supra note 356, at 6, 7 
(noting uncertainties brought by the modernization law but concluding that the new consumer rules will 
act as Leitbild for application of Section 307 to contracts among businesspersons). 
362. Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERIHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, § II (1O)(a), at 855, 
margin no. 9; Heinrichs in PALANDT, BGB 61st ed. ErgB, supra note 236 § 309, at 152-53, margin nos. 
53, 56. The law, as recently amended, explicitly provides that those characteristics may include 
representations made in advertising. § 434(1) BGB. 
363. Westphalen, supra note 249, at 25. For an extensive discussion of product and inspection 
requirements in the context of standard software licenses, see Gaul, supra note 361, at 571-76. 
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under the standard terms law.364 The prohibited list of section 309 governs 
two types of damage exclusions and limitations. Section 309(7)(a) invalidates 
standard terms that exclude or limit liability for negligent injury to "life, 
person or health." Section 309(7)(b) invalidates standard terms that exclude or 
limit liability for gross negligence or intentional violation of contractual 
obligations. These same restrictions apply to licenses with businesspersons 
through application of the general clause.365 Neither section 309 nor section 
308 governs limitations and exclusions of liability for simple negligence. That 
does not, however, permit the conclusion that they are always permissible. 
Standard terms that exclude or limit liability for simple negligence, or 
for other grounds not covered in section 309(7), are subject to review under 
the general clause of section 307(2). This principally occurs under section 
307(2)(2) which can lead to invalidation of a term that "restricts essential 
rights or duties resulting from the nature of the contract in such a manner that 
there is a risk that the purpose of the contract will not be achieved." As the 
decision of the German Supreme Court of October 24, 2001 holds, the test is 
"whether the exclusion of liability leads to evisceration of those contractual 
duties (so-called cardinal duties), which originally made possible the 
performance of the contract and on the fulfillment of which the contract 
partner trusted and may rely.,,366 It is debated whether an exclusion of liability 
for damages for typical computer software problems, such as data loss, or the 
reduction of disk capacity or processing speed, would fulfill that test.367 
Rather than try to identify which duties a court may later determine to be 
"cardinal," typical disclaimers accept liability for intention, gross negligence, 
and negligence affecting cardinal duties, excluding all other liability. 368 
Alternatively, or additionally, licenses may limit liability. Limitations on the 
amounts of damages for ordinary negligence are generally permissible. In the 
case of ordinary negligence affecting cardinal duties, however, the amount of 
the limitation provided must correspond to the foreseeable amount of 
damages. Limitations on damages may also restrict liability to direct damage 
and exclude indirect damage or untypical consequential damages. 369 In either 
364. § 475(3) BGB. 
365. Gerald Spindler, Haftungsklauseln in Provider-Vertriigen: Probleme der InhaltskontroIIe, 
CR 1999, 626, 631 (referring to AGB § 11, the predecessor of Section 309); Goldmann & Redecke, 
supra note 356, at 7. 
366. Judgment of Oct. 24, 2001, supra note 288. 
367. Schmidt in ULMERIBRANDNERiHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, app. § 9, at 1060-
61, margin no. 66. 
368. Spindler, supra note 276, at 631. 
369. Hensen in ULMERIBRANDNERiHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54,§ 11(7), at 819-20, 
margin no. 27. One model clause is: 
Schadenersatzanspriiche konnen Sie gegen uns nur dann geltend machen, wenn der Schaden von 
uns, unseren gesetzlichen Vertretern oder Erfilllungsgehilfen vorslitzlich oder grob fahrllissig 
verursacht wurde, oder wenn wir einen Schaden dadurch verursacht haben, daB wir eine fur die 
Vertragsdurchfuhrung wesentliche Pflicht vorslitzlich oder grob fahrlassig verIetzt haben. [You 
can validly assert claims for damages against us only if the damage was caused by us, our legal 
representatives or our fulfillment partners intentionally or with gross negligence, or we caused 
damages through an intentionally or grossly negligent violation of an obligation material to 
fulfilling the contract.]. 
Marcus Werner, CD-Rom Nutzungsbebedingungen, CR 1998, 391, 392. 
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case, such a term is invalid if it includes damages caused by intent or gross 
negligence.37o 
5. Copy, Use, and Transfer Restrictions 
The Copyright Statute (Gesetz fiber Urheberrecht und Verwandte 
Schurtzrechte), in particular sections 69a to 69g governing software, impose 
certain mandatory requirements affecting standard terms limiting copying or 
use. Section 69d(2) permits licensees to make back-up copies necessary for 
future use. A standard term that required the licensee not to make an archival 
copy, but to rely on such a copy held by the licensor, was held invalid as not 
recognizing the licensee's interest in having available an archival copy even if 
the licensor should go out of business. Section 69d(3) permits licensees to 
observe and test the functioning of software. Section 6ge permits licensees to 
de-compile software when such de-compiling is "indispensable to obtain the 
information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently 
created computer program with other programs," provided that certain 
conditions are met. Section 69g(2) provides that contract terms that contradict 
any of these three sections are invalid. 
Other copy, use, and transfer restrictions are subject to the general clause 
of section 307. The Copyright Statute provides the measure against which 
departures from the statutory scheme are judged.37J Section 69d provides that 
unless the parties provide otherwise, copying and translating programs do not 
require authorization "where they are necessary for the use of the computer 
program by any person entitled to use a copy of the program in accordance 
with its intended purpose, including for error correction.,,372 So-called CPU 
clauses that restrict use to a single computer constitute an unreasonable 
disadvantage, since they prevent licensees from updating their hardware 
without having to pay additional charges.373 Restrictions that limit licensees of 
standard licenses from sub-licensing the software are effective. Restrictions 
that prohibit such licensees from transferring such software and all their rights 
to a third party, however, are not.374 As a result of the close supervision of 
terms, it is said that strict license terms in practice often have only minimal 
effectiveness.375 
6. Enforcement 
An American licensor is likely to discover that it has violated German 
standard terms law when a consumer association sends it a warning letter 
370. Spindler, supra note 276, at 632. 
371. Schmidt in ULMERiBRANDNERiHENSEN, supra note 54, app. § 9, at 1062-64, margin no. 
278; Schuhmacher, supra note 352, at 645-46 (addressing particularly copyright law). 
372. Translations from the Copyright Statute are from the translation of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization, http://www.iuscomp.org/glaJ. For the scope of permissible restrictions, see 
Hoeren & Schuhmacher, supra note 344, at 139 (noting that Section 69(d) can be departed from only 
within certain bounds}. 
373. Schuhmacher, supra note 352, at 646-47. 
374. Schmidt in ULMERiBRANDNERiHENSEN, AGB-GESETZ, supra note 54, app. § 9, at 1062-
64, margin no. 278. 
375. Schuhmacher, supra note 352, at 650. 
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demanding that it cease using unlawful terms or face penalties. The American 
licensor will then scurry to its American attorney, who hopefully will be well-
versed enough to contact a German attorney to confirm that, yes, indeed, a 
lawsuit and penalties could follow a failure to comply. The German attorney 
will point out that section 6 of the Injunctions Act permits a German plaintiff 
to sue a defendant not domiciled in Germany in any district where the 
defendant uses the unlawful terms. The cease-and-desist declaration a 
defendant must sign not only will subject it to penalties for using these terms 
again, but will also prohibit use of similar terms and invalidate all such 
existing terms. Thus an American licensor cannot blithely assume that it can 
use prohibited terms free of risk. Should that licensor nevertheless use the 
terms, it runs the risk that in seeking expansive exclusions of liability, it may 
fail to take advantage of those limitations on liability that would have been 
available to it. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
National laws that implement the Unfair Terms Directive are a reality 
throughout Europe. Americans---especially those doing business on the 
Internet-should take account of them. With the impending enlargement of 
the European Union, American standard terms will be subject to scrutiny from 
Ireland to Poland and from Malta to Finland. Failure to revise American 
standard terms accordingly could have serious consequences. There is every 
reason to believe that many standard terms that are common in the United 
States are unlawful in Europe.376 While this article has not attempted a 
comparative catalogue of such invalid terms, a future work that does so would 
be useful. 
Functioning systems for control of unfair standard terms exist in Europe. 
These systems are more ambitious than the present-day American system. 377 
Their very existence challenges complacency with current American law. 
Their existence undermines the two principal arguments raised to support 
American law: there is no problem, and no system could better balance the 
competing interests of certainty of contract and fairness of terms. Obviously, 
our European colleagues think that there is a problem, and they have taken 
action to deal with it. The apparent success of the German contract model 
376. For an example of choice of forum clauses, compare Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 
499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing a choice of Florida forum for Washington state consumer) with Oceano 
Grupo Editorial SA v. Rocio Murciano Quintero, 2000 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 2894 (decision of the 
European Court of Justice invalidating choice of Spanish forum for Spanish consumer); to see the 
diverging standards for warranty exclusions and remedy limitations, compare U.C.C. Sections 2-316 and 
2-791 (validating such terms) with German Civil Code Section 309(7), (8), and (11) (controlling such 
clauses) and the E.U. Guarantees Directive (mandating minimum warranties); for the differences in 
integrated writing and no oral modification requirements, compare U.C.C. Sections 9-202 and 9-209(2) 
(validating such terms) with Brandner in ULMERiBRANDNERlHENSEN, ABG-GESETZ, supra note 54, app. 
§ 9-11, at 1266-1273 (discussing German law's controls on such terms). 
377. One attorney with Baker & McKenzie who is admitted to the bar in both California and 
Germany reports to German readers that, as a rule, American courts do not undertake content control 
similar to that under the German standard terms law or the E.U. Unfair Terms Directive. Lothar 
Determann, Electronic Business in den USA, in ELECTRONIC BUSINESS, ANBAHNUNG, GESTALTUNG, 
PRAXIS, 9, margin no. 13 (Georgios Gounalakis, ed. 2002). 
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suggests that there may not be a necessary trade-off between control of unfair 
terms and predictable contracting. 
If the American system is less ambitious than its European counte~arts 
and is largely limited to striking down terms that "shock the conscience," 78 it 
has not been by design. When American legislatures enacted U.C.C. section 
2-302, they adopted a provision that its drafters hoped would allow American 
courts to develop "machinery,,379 for "policing,,380 contract terms. The 
German Supreme Court's development of such machinery from essentially the 
same starting point largely confirms the vision of the drafters of the u.e.e.38 \ 
In the United States there has been no national debate about whether the 
present restrained application ofU.e.e. section 2-302 is preferred. The closest 
that the United States has come to such a debate is the ongoing struggle over 
reform of the U.C.C. That is a toss-up so far. Business interests blocked the 
original revision of U.C.e. Revised Article 2-Sales, while consumer groups 
blocked u.e.c. Proposed Article 2B-Licenses and are threatening UCITA. 
How did the German legal system-beginning from a very similar 
starting point-develop a considerably more ambitious review of standard 
terms than did the American legal system? A number of explanations come to 
mind. Surely larger social and political factors were at work. As has been 
shown, in Germany there was a national consensus to limit oppressive 
terms. 382 That consensus was rooted in views about society, the individual, 
and the role of government in society. Where an American might see control 
of standard terms as government meddling in relations between private parties 
and as a limitation on freedom of contract, a German might see the choice not 
to intervene as government toleration of exploitation of one private party by 
another, and government complicity in that exploitation-by providing 
contract law upholding, and a legal system enforcing, form contracts. 
But there are other, more strictly legal explanations for how the German 
legal system, from a similar starting point, was able to develop an ambitious 
program of standard terms control and the American legal system was not. In 
the area of standard terms, the German legal system has limited authoritative 
sources of the law, has furnished abstract definitions of unlawful terms, and 
has provided for proactive enforcement of controls. In contrast, the American 
legal system has multiplied the sources of the law, has individualized the 
inquiry, and has limited enforcement to retrospective invalidation of 
challenged terms. 
In both the German and the American legal systems the starting point for 
development of control of unfair terms was application of general clauses by 
judges. Yet the German legal system had an advantage from the start: it has 
one Supreme Court that could and did develop and direct evolution of judge-
378. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Industries, Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
379. See supra note 74. 
380. Supra note 26 (V.C.C. quoting Section 2-302, Official Comment 1). 
381. One cannot read the section on boilerplate in THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-Llewellyn's 
last word on the subject-and reasonably believe that he would have found the anemic application of 
Section 2-302 a sufficient response to a problem he found so serious and pervasive. See LLEWELLYN, 
supra note 32, at 362. 
382. See supra text accompanying notes 213 to 217. 
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made law. German standard terms law is federal law. The pronouncements of 
its single federal Supreme Court are authoritative.383 In the American legal 
system, on the other hand, although the Uniform Commercial Code provides 
one uniform rule in the general clause in section 2-302, fifty different courts 
are the sources for interpretation and application of it. It is no wonder that 
there is no authoritative statement ofunconscionability.384 
Moreover, already more than a quarter of a century ago, while the 
United States was struggling with judges applying that single general clause, 
the German legislature chose to build a statutory structure on that judge-made 
law foundation. That new structure provided additional authoritative points for 
application of unfair terms control, while maintaining a general clause to 
respond to the need for flexibility. In contrast, American scholars, including 
Llewellyn, have mostly assumed that control of unfair terms is necessarily a 
task for judge-made law with little room for statute law.385 Obviously the 
apparent success of the German Standard Terms Statute challenges that 
assumption. It demonstrates that statute law can facilitate control of unfair 
terms. 
Another reason that German control of unfair terms has been able to 
develop to be more robust than its American counterpart is that it is abstract 
rather than personalized. The German system of control was purposely limited 
to control of standard terms so that it could provide standard solutions t6 
standard problems. Inquiry into all the individual circumstances of particular 
parties is not necessary or desired. In this way the work of courts in finding 
facts is reduced. But still more important is that abstract application 
"concretizes" the general prohibitions into groups of cases and types of terms. 
It facilitates a universal application of the resulting control. Accordingly, the 
German legal system rejects the less concrete consumer model. The German 
legal system avoids control of the main subject of the contract and of 
individually negotiated terms for fear of infringing on the parties' freedom of 
contract and interfering with their presumptively sound economic decisions. 
What the European Commission calls "positive enforcement,,386 explains 
how the German legal system has been more successful than its American 
counterpart in deterring use of unfair terms. An American court's decision 
finding a term unconscionable cannot do more than invalidate the use of the 
specific term in a particular contract. It thus has little effect beyond that 
individual case.387 A German court's decision, on the other hand, can not only 
383. The Court's constitution helps it provide authoritative decisions to develop and direct law 
creation. It has about one hundred judges, but is spared the burden of deciding constitutional cases, 
which are the province of the Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht). Its judges decide most 
cases in panels of five judges ("Senates") specialized by area of law. As a result the Court is able to 
provide numerous and consistent decisions. 
384. Accord Dawson, supra note 13, at 1126. 
385. See, e.g., LLEWELLYN, supra note 32, at 370 ("[I]n our system an approach by statute 
seems to me dubious, uncertain, and likely to be both awkward in manner and deficient or spotty in 
scope."); SLAWSON, supra note 17, at 174 ("The history of the reforms demonstrates the superiority of 
judicial law-making over legislation for contract law."); Woodward, supra note 81, at 1004 ("Any effort 
formally to classify the enormous range of commercial contracts subject to article 2 will be labor 
intensive, incomplete, temporary, and very contentious."). 
386. See supra text accompanying notes 163-66. 
387. Cf Klock, supra note 6, at 332 (quoting HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 233 
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invalidate specific terms in a particular contract, it can compel users to cease 
using those terms and comparable terms in all similar contracts. Further, 
German law simplifies these procedures so that consumer groups can achieve 
these results without having to go to court. 388 
Even if the German and American legal systems have gone their 
separate ways in controlling unfair terms following similar beginnings, there 
is still much for American jurists to learn from European experiences as they 
contemplate how to make American law the best it can be for American 
conditions. This article has discussed two models for control of unfair terms in 
Europe: the contract model of German law and the consumer protection model 
of the first draft of the Unfair Terms Directive. It has shown the German 
contract model in practice as one example of standard terms laws at work in 
the European Union. Future studies of the law in the other fourteen Member 
States would disclose variations on these models and possibly different 
models. Consideration of those models by American jurists could inform the 
American debate over unfair terms both with respect to whether a farther-
reaching control is desirable and, if desirable, how best to implement it. 
Even without change in American law, application of present U.c.c. 
section 2-302 would benefit from attention to European experiences and 
particularly to the conceptual clarity of the German contract model. The 
essential discovery of the German contract model-that when standard terms 
are involved there are two transactions, the dickered deal and the 
supplementary standard terms-has long been known in America. According 
to Llewellyn, "Rooted in sense, history, and simplicity, it is an answer which 
could occur to anyone.,,389 The German contract model distinguishes 
separately negotiated terms from standard terms. In the former, it defers to the 
parties' choice and the principle of party autonomy. In the latter, it finds little 
exercise of party autonomy and intervenes to protect freedom of contract. It 
also provides a rationale, i.e., preventing abuse of the freedom of contract-
drafting, for that contro1.390 
The German contract model disentangles rather than confounds 
incorporation and content controls. It recognizes the two as separate issues 
and imposes separate expectations of each. In the case of incorporation 
control, it insists that users provide other parties with an opportunity to review 
the terms. In the case of content control, it rejects the idea, common in the 
United States, that an opportunity to review can substitute for deficient terms. 
German parties do not have to read the standard terms to be safeguarded from 
overreaching. 
The German contract model is not content to place confidence in a 
single general clause to control content. American attempts to write a suitable 
general clause for Revised Article 2-Sales suggest that such a task is 
virtually unachievable. Instead, the German contract model guides the content 
(1999)). See also supra text accompanying note 68. 
388. See supra text accompanying notes 305 and 346. 
389. LLEWELLYN, supra note 32, at 371. 
390. Cf MUNZ, supra note 33, at 225 ("American law controls the basis for unjust contract 
rules, namely disparate bargaining power; German law [controls] the consequences, the unjust contract 
rules."). 
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control of the general clause with presumptions and supplements it with 
"gray" and "black" lists that treat explicitly specific types of terms. Thus it has 
successfully concretized control in a way that has eluded American courts. 
American law already has concepts similar to those found in German 
law. For example, it distinguishes "procedural unconscionability" from 
"substantive unconscionability," and negotiated contracts from standard terms 
(or adhesion) contracts. The German experience suggests a benefit in courts 
using those concepts more consistently. American courts, even without 
legislative action, could do that in their application of existing U.C.C. 2-302. 
Other important aspects of the German contract model might require 
legislation. For example, legislation would probably be necessary to add 
"black" and "gray" lists or to a create a more proactive, deterring control 
along the lines of the E.U. 's "positive" enforcement.39l Where legislation is 
required, American experiences in revising the U.C.C. caution against 
underestimating the difficulties of reaching a solution capable of enactment.392 
Yet the work of the New Jersey Law Revision Commission shows that the 
possibility of standard terms legislation is not beyond conception.393 
Reform begins with the conception that things can be otherwise. 
Comparative inquiry is one of the best ways there is to broaden the scope of 
the possible. Reform of existing law is limited by one's ability to conceive of 
alternatives. Through examination of how other legal systems treat similar 
problems, one can not only conceive of new alternatives, one can see how 
they work. One need not adopt or even adapt foreign models to learn from 
them; comparative examination puts one's own law in a critical light. 
For more than forty years the United States has denied itself the benefit 
of foreign experiences with standard terms. For the last dozen years two of the 
most influential organizations in American law and legions of lawyers have 
looked at the controversial issue of unfair terms in standard form contracts 
with no one systematically studying-indeed, with hardly anyone even 
noting-that a trading bloc comparable in size to the United States and a 
major trading partner is itself addressing the very same issues and is applying 
its laws to Americans. This Article shows that in Europe the scholarly and 
legislative discussion of standard terms has always had a comparative 
component to it and is better for it.394 The attempted reforms of the Uniform 
Commercial Code undertaken to date could have benefited from the European 
experiences had only those reforms paid attention to those experiences. 
Today, thanks to global electronic commerce, European and other foreign 
standard terms law are on American laptops. And American licenses are on 
391. See supra text accompanying note 187. 
392. There are opportunities here for research into comparative law reform. Compare Speidel, 
supra note 2, and Greenfield & Rusch, supra note 83 (discussing the difficulties of finding political 
compromise in the uniform laws process) with SCHATZ-BERGFELD, supra note 213 (discussing finding a 
political compromise in Germany). 
393. See supra text accompanying notes 124-27. 
394. Micklitz, supra note 251, at 534 n.83 (U[T]here is hardly an area of the law, in which such 
thorough comparative law inquiries have been produced."). For the general attitude in Europe, see Abbo 
Junker, Rechtsvergleichung als Grundlagenfach, JZ 1994, 921, 921 (UWhoever today advocates turning 
one's view across borders-'to substitute a global for a national horizon'--can be sure of broad ap-
proval. He is riding a mighty wave of the Zeitgeist."). 
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European laptops. The United States can afford to ignore foreign law no 
longer.395 
395. Cj Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Why Are u.s. Lawyers Not Learning from 
Comparative Law?, in THE INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE OF LA W 213 (Nedim Vogt et al. eds., 1997); Ernst 
C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the United States-Opportunity for Learning 
from Civilized European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation?, 42 AM. 1. CaMP. L. 164 (1994); James 
R Maxeiner, 1992: High Time for American Lawyers to Learn from Europe, or Roscoe Pound's 1906 
Address ReVisited, IS FORDHAM lNT'LL.J. I (1991). 
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ApPENDIX 
Standard terms provisions of the German Civil Code effective January 1, 
2002, as translated by Geoffrey Thomas and Gerhard Dannemann.396 
[Reprinted by Permission] 
Section 2: Shaping contractual obligations by means of standard terms 
§ 305 Incorporation of standard terms397 into the contract 
(I) Standard terms are all contractual terms pre-established for a multitude of contracts which one party 
to the contract (the user) presents to the other party upon the conclusion of the contract. It is irrelevant 
whether the provisions appear as a separate part of a contract or are included in the contractual 
document itself, how extensive they are, what script is used for them, or what form the contract takes. 
Contractual terms do not constitute standard terms where they have been individually negotiated 
between the parties. 
(2) Standard terms are incorporated into the contract only if, during the conclusion of the contract, the 
user 
I. expressly draws the other party's attention to them, or if, on account of the way in which the 
contract is concluded, an express reference to them is unreasonably difficult, he draws his 
attention to them by means of a clearly visible sign at the place where the contract is concluded 
and 
2. gives the other party, in a reasonable manner that also appropriately takes account of any 
physical handicap of the other party discernible by the user, the possibility of gaining knowledge 
of their content, and if the other party agrees that they are to apply. 
(3) Subject to observance of the requirements set out in subsection (2) above, the parties may agree in 
advance that particular standard terms will apply to a particular type oflegal transaction. 
§ 305a Incorporation in special cases 
Even if the requirements set out in § 305(2) Nos 1 and 2 are not observed, if the other party agrees to 
their application: 
I. railway tariffs and regulations adopted with the approval of the competent transport authority 
or on the basis of international conventions and terms of transport, authorised in accordance with 
the Passenger Transport Act, of trams, trolley buses and motor vehicles in scheduled services are 
incorporated into the transport contract; 
2. standard terms published in the official journal of the regulatory authority for Post and 
Telecommunications and kept available in the user's business premises are incorporated 
(a) into contracts of carriage concluded away from business premises by the posting of 
items in post boxes, 
(b) into contracts for telecommunications, information and other services that are 
provided directly and in one go by means of remote communication and during the 
provision of a telecommunications service, if it is unreasonably difficult to make the 
standard terms available to the other party before conclusion of the contract. 
396. German Law Archive (2002), at http://www.iuscomp.org/glalstatutesIBGB.htm#b2. 
397. The original of the translation into British English translates Allgemeine 
Geschiiftsdedingungen as "standard business terms." This article prefers "standard terms" as the more 
idiomatic American usage. 
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§ 30Sb Precedence of individually negotiated terms 
Individually negotiated terms take precedence over standard terms. 
§ 30Sc Surprising and ambiguous clauses 
(I) Provisions in standard terms which in the circumstances, in particular in view of the outward 
appearance of the contract, are so unusual. that the contractual partner of the user could not be expected 
to have reckoned with them, do not form part ofthe contract. 
(2) In case of doubt, standard terms are interpreted against the user. 
§ 306 Legal consequences of non-incorporation and invalidity 
(I) If all or some standard terms have not become part of the contract or are invalid, the remainder of the 
contract continues to be valid. 
(2) Where provisions have not become part of the contract or are invalid, the content of the contract is 
determined by the statutory rules. 
(3) The contract is invalid if one party would suffer unreasonable hardship if he were bound by the 
contract even after the amendment provided for in subsection (2) above. 
§ 306a No circumvention 
The rules in this section apply even if they are circumvented by other arrangements. 
398 § 307 Content Control 
(1) Provisions in standard terms are invalid if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, they place the 
contractual partner of the user at an unreasonable disadvantage. An unreasonable disadvantage may also 
result from the fact that the provision is not clear and comprehensible. 
(2) In case of doubt, an unreasonable disadvantage is assumed if a provision 
1. can not be reconciled with essential basic principles of the statutory rule from which it 
deviates, or 
2. restricts essential rights or duties resulting from the nature of the contract in such a manner 
that there is a risk that the purpose of the contract will not be achieved. 
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) above, and §§ 308 and 309 apply only to provisions in standard terms by 
means of which provisions derogating from legal rules or provisions supplementing those rules are 
agreed. Other provisions may be invalid under subsection (1), sentence 2, above, in conjunction with 
subsection (1), sentence 1, above. 
§ 308 Clauses whose validity depends on an evaluation 399 
In standard terms the following terms, in particular, are invalid: 
1. (period for acceptance or performance) 
a provision by which the user reserves the right to an unreasonably long or inadequately 
specified period for acceptance or rejection of an offer or for performance; this does not include 
398. The original of the translation translates Inhaltskontrolle as "Review of subject-matter." 
399. The original of the translation translates Wertung as "appraisal." 
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reservation of the right to perform only after expiry of the period for revocation or return under 
§§ 355(1) and (2) and 356; 
2. (additional period for performance) 
a provision by which the user, in derogation from legislative provisions, reserves the right to an 
unreasonably long or inadequately specified additional period within which to perform; 
3. (right oftermination) 
the stipulation of a right for the user to free himself, without an objectively justified reason 
specified in the contract, of his duty to perform; this does not apply to a contract for the 
performance of a recurring obligation; 
4. (right of amendment) 
the stipulation of the user's right to alter or depart from the promised performance, unless, taking 
into account the user's interests, the stipulation to alter or depart from performance is reasonable 
for the other party; 
5. (fictitious declarations) 
a provision whereby a declaration of the user's contractual partner is deemed or not deemed to 
have been made by him ifhe does or fails to do a particular act, unless 
a) he is allowed a reasonable period within which to make an express declaration and 
b) the user undertakes to draw to his attention at the beginning of the period the particular 
significance of his conduct; this does not apply to contracts in which the whole of Part B 
of the contracting rules for award of public works contracts is incorporated; 
6. (fictional receipt) 
a provision which provides that a declaration by the user of particular importance is deemed to 
have been received by the other party; 
7. (winding-up of contracts) 
a provision by which, in the event that one of the parties to the contract terminates the contract or 
gives notice to terminate it, the user can demand 
a) unreasonably high remuneration for the utilisation or use of a thing or a right or for 
performance made, or 
b) unreasonably high reimbursement of expenditure; 
8. (unavailability of the object of performance) 
a stipulation permitted under 3. above of the user's right to free himself of his obligation to 
perform the contract if the object of the performance is not available, unless the user agrees 
a) to inform the other party immediately of the unavailability, and 
b) immediately to refund counter-performance by that party. 
§ 309 Clauses whose invalidity is not subject to any evaluation 
Even where derogation from the statutory provisions is permissible, the following are invalid in standard 
terms: 
1. (price increases at short notice) 
a provision which provides for an increase in the remuneration for goods or services that are to 
be supplied within four months of the conclusion of the contract; this does not apply to goods or 
services supplied in the course of a recurring obligation; 
2. (right to refuse to perform) 
a provision by which 
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a) the right under § 320 of the contractual partner of the user to refuse to perfonn is 
excluded or restricted, or 
b) a right of retention of the contractual partner of the user, in so far as it arises from the 
same contractual relationship, is excluded or restricted, in particular by making it subject 
to recognition by the user of the existence of defects; 
3. (prohibition of set-off) 
a provision by which the contractual partner of the user is deprived of the right to set off a claim 
which is undisputed or has been declared final and absolute; 
4. (notice, period for perfonnance) 
a provision by which the user is relieved of the statutory requirement to give notice to the other 
party to perfonn or to fix a period for perfonnance or supplementary perfonnance by him; 
5. (lump-sum claims for damages) 
stipulation of a lump-sum claim by the user for damages or for compensation for reduction in 
value, if 
a) the lump sum in the cases in question exceeds the damage expected in the nonnal 
course of events or the reduction in value which nonnally occurs, or 
b) the other party is not given the express right to prove that damage or reduction in value 
has not occurred or is materially lower than the lump sum agreed; 
6. (penalty) 
a provision by which the user is entitled to receive payment of a penalty in the event of non-
acceptance or late acceptance of perfonnance, delay in payment or in the event that the other 
party withdraws from the contract; 
7. (exclusion of liability for death,400 injury to body and health and for gross fault) 
a) (death and injury to body and health) 
exclusion or limitation of liability for losses arising out of death, injury to body or health 
caused by negligent breach of duty by the user or a deliberate or negligent breach of duty 
by his statutory agent or a person employed by him to perfonn the contract; 
b) (gross fault) 
exclusion or limitation of liability for other losses caused by a grossly negligent breach of 
duty by the user or a deliberate or grossly negligent breach of duty by a statutory agent of 
the user or by a person employed by him to perfonn the contract; 
a) and b) above do not apply to restrictions of liability in the tenns of transport, 
authorised in accordance with the Passenger Transport Act, of trams, trolley buses and 
motor vehicles in scheduled services, in so far as they do not derogate, to the detriment of 
passengers, from the Regulation concerning the tenns of transport by tram and trolley bus 
and by motor vehicles in scheduled services of 27 February 1970; b) above does not 
apply to restrictions ofliability for State-approved lottery or raffle contracts. 
8. (other exclusions ofliability in the event of breach of duty) 
a) (exclusion of the right to withdraw from the contract) 
a provision which, upon a breach of duty for which the user is responsible and which 
does not consist in a defect of the thing sold or the work, excludes or restricts the other 
party's right to withdraw from the contract; this does not apply to the tenns of contract 
and tariff rules referred to in No.7 on the conditions set out therein; 
b) (defects) 
a provision by which, in contracts for the supply of new, manufactured things or of work, 
aa) (exclusion and reference of claims to third parties) 
400 Literally, "injury to life." 
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claims against the user on account of a defect as a whole or with regard to 
individual elements of it are excluded entirely, restricted to the assignment of 
claims against third parties, or which make the pursuit of legal proceedings 
against third parties a condition precedent; 
bb) (restriction to supplementary performance) 
claims against the user are restricted, entirely or with regard to individual 
elements, to a right to supplementary performance, unless the other party is given 
an express right to claim a price reduction if supplementary performance is 
unsuccessful or, except where the defects liability is in respect of building work, 
to choose to terminate the contract; 
cc) (expenditure incurred in the course of supplementary performance) 
the user's obligation to bear the expenditure necessary for supplementary 
performance, in particular the costs of carriage, transport, labour and materials, is 
excluded or restricted; 
dd) (withholding of supplementary performance) 
the user makes supplementary performance conditional on the prior payment of 
the entire price or, having regard to the defect, an unreasonably high proportion 
thereof; 
ee) (time-limit for notice of defects) 
the user fixes a period within which the other party must give notice of non-
obvious defects which is shorter than the period permitted under ff) below; 
ff) (facilitation oflimitation) 
facilitates the limitation of claims on account of defects in the cases set out in § 
438(1), No.2 and § 634a(1), No.2, or, in other cases, results in a limitation period 
of less than one year from the date on which the statutory period of limitation 
begins; this does not apply to contracts in which the whole of Part B of the 
contracting rules for award of public works contracts is incorporated; 
9. (period of recurring obligations) 
in a contractual relationship concerning the periodic delivery of goods or the periodic supply of 
services or work by the user, 
a) a contract duration which binds the other party for more than two years, 
b) a tacit extension of the contractual relationship which binds the other party for a period 
of more than one year in each particular case, or 
c) to the detriment of the other party, a period of notice to terminate the contract which is 
more than three months prior to the expiration of the initial or tacitly extended period of 
the contract; 
this does not apply to contracts for the supply of things sold as a unit, to insurance 
contracts or contracts between the owners of copyrights and of claims and copyright 
collecting societies within the meaning of the Protection of Copyrights and Related 
Rights Act; 
lO. (change of contract partner) 
a provision whereby in sales contracts, contracts for the supply of services or contracts for work 
a third party assumes or may assume the rights and obligations of the user under the contract, 
unless the provision 
a) specifies the third party by name, or 
b) gives the other party the right to withdraw from the contract; 
II. (liability of an agent on conclusion of the contract) 
a provision by which the user imposes on an agent who concludes the contract for the other 
party, 
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a) the agent's own liability or duty to perfonn the contractual obligation without having 
made an express and separate declaration in that regard, or 
b) where the agent lacks authority, liability which exceeds that under § 179; 
12. (burden of proof) 
a provision by which the user alters the burden of proof to the detriment of the other party in 
particular by 
a) imposing the burden in respect of circumstances which fall within the scope of the 
user's responsibility, or 
b) requiring the other party to acknowledge particular facts; 
Subsection b) above does not apply to acknowledgments of receipt which are separately 
signed or bear a separate, qualified electronic signature; 
13. (fonn of notices and declarations) 
a provision by which notices or declarations to be given to the user or third parties are subject to 
a stricter requirement than the need for writing or to special requirements with regard to receipt. 
§ 310 Scope of application 
(1) § 305(2) and (3) and §§ 308 and 309 do not apply to standard tenns which are proffered to a 
businessperson, a legal person governed by public law or a special fund governed by public law. In 
those cases § 307(1) and (2) nevertheless applies to the extent that this results in the invalidity of the 
contractual provisions referred to in §§ 308 and 309; due regard must be had to the customs and 
practices applying in business transactions. 
(2) §§ 308 and 309 do not apply to contracts of electricity, gas, district heating or water supply 
undertakings for the supply to special customers of electricity, gas, district heating or water from the 
supply grid unless the conditions of supply derogate, to the detriment of the customer, from Regulations 
on general conditions for the supply of tariff customers with electricity, gas, district heating or water. 
The first sentence applies mutatis mutandis to contracts for the disposal of sewage. 
(3) In the case of contracts between a businessperson and a consumer (consumer contracts) the rules in 
this section apply subject to the fol1owing provisions: 
1. Standard tenns are deemed to have been proffered by the businessperson, unless the consumer 
introduced them into the contract; 
2. §§ 305c(2) and §§ 306, 307 to 309 of the present Act and Article 29a of the Introductory Act 
to the Civil Code apply to pre-established conditions of contract even if they are intended for use 
only once and in so far as, because they are pre-established, the consumer could not influence 
their content. 
3. When deciding whether there has been unreasonable detriment under § 307(1) and (2) the 
circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract must also be taken into account. 
(4) This section does not apply to contracts in the field of the law of succession, family law and 
company law or to collective agreements and private- or public-sector works agreements. When it is 
applied to labour contracts, appropriate regard must be had to the special features of labour law; § 305 
(2) and (3) is not to be applied. Col1ective agreements and public and private sector works agreements 
are equivalent to legal rules within the meaning of § 307(3). 
